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ABSTRACT

TENSE IN CONDITIONALS: INS AND OUTS
SEPTEMBER 2022
ZAHRA MIRRAZI
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Ana Arregui

This dissertation is concerned with the role of tense in bringing about the semantic and pragmatic differences in conditionals. Investigating the contribution
of tense and aspect in Farsi conditionals, this dissertation expands the typology of
temporal morphology in antecedents of conditionals.
First, I make a novel observation that Farsi morphologically distinguishes between hypothetical and factual conditionals. Conditionals with zero tense in their
antecedent require the truth of their antecedent to be unsettled in the context, and
they yield hypothetical interpretation. Conditionals with present tense in their
antecedent require the truth of their antecedent to be settled in the projected context
set, and they yield factual interpretation.
Second, I explore the pattern of Farsi X-marked conditionals (a.k.a., subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals). Like English and many other languages, the
antecedent of X-marked conditionals in Farsi appears with past tense morphology.
v

There are, however, two properties in which X-marked conditionals in Farsi and
English differ: (i) the temporal orientation of antecedents, and (ii) the strength of
antecedent falsity.
After discussing the challenges such cross-linguistic variations raise for for mapping the form of X-marked conditionals to the meaning they contribute, I present a
uniform past approach that can derive the interpretation of X-marked conditionals
from the contribution of past tense to determining the domain of quantification
(following the Stalnakerian insight), while keeping a unified semantics for past
tense morphology. I propose that there are two tenses in conditional constructions
that contribute to semantics and pragmatics of conditionals: the tense of the modal
(the temporal specification of the situation variable which modals take as first argument), and the tense of the antecedent (the temporal specification of the situation
denoted by the antecedent). Although in many languages the information carried
by the two tenses are indistinguishably packed into the temporal morphology in
conditional antecedents, Farsi teaches us that they independently contribute to the
semantics and pragmatics of conditionals. The main contribution of this dissertation is to show how the cross-linguistic variations in X-marked conditionals can
be explained by different properties of tense associated with the temporal location
of antecedents, while positing that the semantic contribution of past tense in Xmarked conditionals is the same across languages.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction

This chapter has three sections. First, I will introduce the main questions this dissertation addresses. In the second section of this chapter, I give a preview of my main
proposal and the main findings of each chapter. Finally, before I end this chapter, I
lay out my theoretical assumptions about the semantics of tense and aspect within
situation semantics.

1.1

Setting the stage

Conditional constructions like (1) typically convey that their antecedents are false.
Following terminology of von Fintel & Iatridou (2020), I will refer to these conditionals as X-marked conditionals.
(1)

If kangaroos had no tail, they would topple over.

Lewis (1973)

Pinning down the meaning contribution of such conditional constructions has
proven to be a difficult task, as they do not always imply falsity of their antecedents.
A prominent proposal that captures intuitions about the meaning of X-marked
conditionals, originally put forward by Stalnaker (1975), is that they signal ‘that
there is a domain of quantification which contains at least some worlds outside the context
set’ (von Fintel 1998).
Mapping the form of X-marked conditionals to the meaning they contribute has
1

been an even harder task. Many unrelated languages use the same linguistic device
(i.e. past tense) for X-marking. This raises a question about the link between the
semantics of past tense and the interpretation of X-marked conditionals. Linguists
have taken this question seriously. Most linguistic work on X-marked conditionals
is focused on deriving the semantics and pragmatics of these conditionals from the
semantic contribution of past tense. There are broadly two kinds of approaches to
account for the semantic contribution of the past morpheme in X-marked conditionals: (i) the ambiguous past approach (Iatridou 2000; Schulz 2014; Karawani & Zeijlstra
2013, and Mackay 2019a) which takes past tense morphemes to contribute either
temporal reference to a time different from the present time or modal reference
to a set of worlds different from the worlds in the context set. (ii) the uniform
past approach (Ippolito 2013; Arregui 2005; Grønn & Von Stechow 2009; Romero
2014, Khoo 2015) which takes the past tense morpheme to always have a uniform
temporal meaning. Under the latter approach, the special interpretation of the past
in X-marked conditionals is compositionally derived from the interaction of the past
and the modal, as a result of the structural position of the past. But the issue is far
from settled. In a recent paper, von Fintel & Iatridou (2020) examine X-marking in
three different environments (conditionals, expressions of unattainable desire and
weak necessity modals) across a wide range of languages, and reiterate that the
Stalnakerian insight remains the best approximation to the meaning contribution
of X-marking in all of its occurrences. However, they voice their skepticism over
‘whether a formal implementation of this picture is in reasonable reach’ (von Fintel &
Iatridou 2020). They are especially skeptical about whether this can be without
assuming ambiguity in past morphemes.
In this dissertation, I provide data from Farsi that complicates the matter even
further. Like English and many other languages, antecedents of X-marked conditionals in Farsi appear with past tense morphology. The antecedent falsity inference
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associated with Farsi X-marked conditionals, however, is not as easily cancellable.
They are infelicitous in classic cases in which falsity of the antecedent is not implied (Future less vivid (Iatridou 2000; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020), Andersontype example (Anderson 1951), Stanley Peter’s case von Fintel (1998)). Antecedent
falsity, however, is not hardwired into the semantics of Farsi X-marked conditionals.
Farsi X-marked conditionals can be used to conduct a modus tollens argument.
Moreover, there are cases where they do not imply falsity of their antecedent, but
these are not the same cases that are familiar from the literature on English Xmarked conditionals. Current theories of X-marking, as they stand now, are not
equipped with tools to account for cross-linguistic variations in the strength of
antecedent falsity inference. Thus, the pattern of Farsi X-marked conditionals raises
new challenges for the already difficult task of formulating the semantic contribution of past tense in X-marking.
• Research questions: Is the semantic contribution of past tense to X-marking in
Farsi and English the same or different? If different, why are these different meanings expressed via the same morphology? If the same, what accounts for differences
between the two languages in cancellabilty of antecedent falsity inference associated
with their X-marked conditionals?
What makes Farsi an ideal testing ground to study these questions is that its
morphologically rich tam system lets the meaning contribution of temporal morphemes shine through despite the complexity of the structure they appear in. As
such, Farsi presents a unique opportunity to shape theoretical debates on the role
of tense and aspect in X-marking.

3

1.2

Preview of Proposal

In this dissertation, I provide novel arguments in favor of the view that both tense
and aspect in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals contribute their typical semantic contribution (reiterating the position of Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009)). I ground
my arguments on two main empirical observations from Farsi:
• X-marked conditionals with only one instance of past tense morphology can
simultaneously express counterfactuality and pastness of their antecedent.
• Aspectual restrictions that hold outside of conditional environments also hold
in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals.
This dissertation advances a uniform past approach that can derive the interpretation of X-marked conditionals from the contribution of past tense to determining
the domain of quantification (following the Stalnakerian insight), while keeping a
unified semantics for past tense morphology. I will argue for a version of Arregui’s
account of X-marked conditionals that is coupled with an accompanying account of
O-marked conditionals (a.k.a., indicative conditionals) in Anchor Semantics (Kratzer
2020). According to this proposal, the structure of modals and conditionals contains a situation variable from which possibilities project (anchor situation). The
role of this situation is to ‘anchor the interpretation of conditionals on particular actual
world facts’ (Arregui 2020). Past tense in the structure of X-marked modals and
conditionals specifies the temporal location of the anchor situation.
I posit that the semantic contribution of past tense in X-marked conditionals is
the same across-languages. However, properties of tense associated with the temporal location of antecedents can affect felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals
in a given language. I will provide evidence showing that the antecedent of Farsi
X-marked conditionals contains a deictic tense which I independently argue comes
with a settledness presupposition. Due to this settledness presupposition, Farsi
4

conditionals with deictice tenses in their antecedent are only felicitous in contexts
where the truth or falsity of their antecedent is settled in the projected context
set (in the sense of Farkas & Bruce (2010)). Antecedents of English X-marked
conditionals do not carry any presupposition, and thus are felicitous in agnostic
contexts.
In the following, I give a preview of the key observations and the issues they
raise as well as how the proposal in this dissertation enables us to address these issues. The following sections correspond to individual chapters in this dissertation.

1.2.1

Chapter 2: Tense, Aspect, and Mood in Farsi

In this chapter, I present an overview of tense, aspect and mood in Farsi that will
be relevant for the discussion of conditionals in the subsequent chapters. Here, I
briefly introduce the main facts about Farsi tam system that will be discussed in
this chapter.
Farsi has two deictic tenses (past and present). Only past tense has an overt
morphological realization, shown in (2a). I will use ∅ within Farsi sentences to
illustrate the morphologically null present tense (2b) In addition to the two deictic tenses, Farsi also has specialized forms for zero tense1 (represented with ∅
in glosses) whose occurrences in matrix clauses are restricted to the expression of
wishes, desire, and suggestions, as the translation of (2c) shows. The morphological difference between deictic and zero tense forms of verbs is identified via
aspectual markers. Imperfective, for instance, has two morphological realizations
depending on whether the tense it combines with is deictic (mi-) or zero tense
(be-). This morphological distinction will be important in the discussion of Xmarked conditionals as a tensed imperfective is used in the antecedent of X-marked
conditionals.
1 Zero

tense clauses in Farsi are finite but have a defective tense head (Darzi & Kwak 2015).
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(2)

a. mi-xor-d-im
impf-eat-pst-1pl
we ate.

b. mi-xor-∅-im
impf-eat-pres-1pl
we eat.

c. be-xor-im
impf-eat.∅-1pl
let’s eat.

In addition to the descriptive presentation of tam morphology in Farsi, Chapter
Two also provides a formal analysis of tense and aspect in Farsi. I argue that while
present tense is shiftable with a non-past semantics, past tense is non-shiftable.
Showing that past tense in embedded clauses can only yield de re interpretations, I
will also argue that there is no SOT rule in Farsi.

1.2.2

Chapter 3: Tense in Conditionals

Chapter Three has two main objectives. First, it presents novel data from Farsi
regarding semantics and pragmatics of conditionals. It will be shown that morphologically rich tam system of Farsi expands the typology of temporal morphology
in antecedents of conditionals and thus provides us with a unique opportunity
to further our understanding of the role of temporal elements in bringing about
semantic and pragmatic differences in conditionals. Secondly, this chapter also
engages with the literature on X-marked conditionals. I will discuss the strength
and shortcomings of each approach in light of Farsi data. The data and discussion in
this chapter points to an account of conditionals under which both tense and aspect
contribute their typical semantics in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals.
Here, I give a brief sketch of the key data introduced in this chapter. I make
a novel observation that Farsi morphologically distinguishes between hypothetical
and factual conditionals. Conditionals with zero tense in their antecedent require
the truth of their antecedent to be unsettled in the context, and they yield hypothetical interpretation. Conditionals with present tense in their antecedent require
the truth of their antecedent to be settled in the projected context, and they yield
factual interpretation. Aspect in the antecedent of these conditionals uniformly
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puts restriction on the temporal orientation of the antecedent. Antecedents of zero
tense and present tense conditionals that carry imperfective aspect cannot have a
past interpretation, and antecedents with perfect aspect lack a present oriented
interpretation.
This chapter also introduces new data about X-marked conditionals. Verbs in
the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals either carry past imperfective morphology or pluperfect. The consequent does not contain an overt modal. Following Kratzer (1979, 1981, 2012), I will assume that they are implicitly modalized.
The verb in the consequent is past imperfective. I discuss in detail differences
between Farsi and English X-marked conditionals. The key observations about
Farsi X-marked conditionals are summarized below. I showcase some of these
observations with data, but the reader can find more examples in Section 3.1.2 of
Chapter Three.
(i) The temporal orientation of the antecedent
(ia) Both imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals can refer to past
events.
(3)

Due to Covid-related travel restrictions, John couldn’t attend Sara’s
birthday in Italy yesterday.
a. agar John dirooz
mi-raf-t
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday impf-go-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.
b. agar John dirooz
rafte bud
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday go-pp aux-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.
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(ib) Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot refer to present states or
events.
(4)

a. *agar Ava alan javaab ro daneste bud,
barande-ye
if
Ava now answer ra know-pp aux-pst-3sg winner-ez
mosabeghe mi-šod.
competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava had known the answer now, she would have won the competition.’
b. #agar alaan dars xun-de budi,
man radio ro
if now lesson study-pp aux.pst-2sg I
radio ra
xamush mi-kard-am
off
impf-do.pst-1sg
‘If you had been studying now, I would turn off the radio.’

(ii) Aspectual restrictions in the antecedent
(iia) Aspectual restrictions that hold outside of conditional environments also
hold in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. One such restriction
which is illustrated below is the incompatibility of the stative verb know
with perfect aspect.
(5)

a. agar Ava javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
barande-ye
if
Ava answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg winner-ez
mosabeghe mi-šod.
competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer, she would win/have won the competition.’
b. *agar Ava javaab ro daneste bud,
barande-ye
if
Ava answer ra know-pp aux-pst-3sg winner-ez
mosabeghe mi-šod.
competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava had known the answer, she would have won the competition.’

(iib) The presence of imperfective aspect in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals is necessary to make counterfactual generic claims.
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(6)

a. Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt mi-xor-d-and,
if dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat impf-eat-pst-3pl,
dandun-ha-šun saf ne-mi-bud.
tooth-pl-their flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
b. #Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt xor-de bud-and,
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat eat-pp aux-pst-3pl,
dandun-ha-šun saf ne-mi-bud.
tooth-pl-their flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.

(iii) Strength of counterfactuality (defeasibility of antecedent falsity)
(iiia) Farsi X-marked conditionals lack Future Less Vivid interpretations.
(7)

The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
a. #agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card
mi-gereft-am
impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. agar latary ro be-bar-am,
green card mi-gir-∅-am
if
lottery ra impf-win-∅-1sg green card impf-get.pres-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’

(iiib) Farsi X-marked conditionals are infelicitous in agnostic contexts (Andersontype examples and Stanley Peter’s case).
(8)

agar bimar sorxak gerefte bud,
daghighan in
if
patient measles get-pp aux.pst.3sg exactly
this
alayem-i
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan
symptoms-indf that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show
mi-daad.
impf-give-pst-3.sg
‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he shows now.
7We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
3But we know that he doesn’t have the measles.
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(iiic) Past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi do not necessarily imply falsity of their antecedent.
(9)

Context: I ask Rodica why she went to the store yesterday and not any
other day.
(chon)
agar dirooz
mi-raf-t-am,
taxfif
(because) if
yesterday impf-go-pst-1sg, discount
mi-gereft-am.
impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I went yesterday, I would get a discount.’

The issue of the strength of counterfactuality is particularly important for characterizing the meaning of X-marked conditionals. I refer the reader to Section 3.3.2
for more examples and in-depth discussion.

1.2.3

Chapter 4: An Anchor semantics for conditionals

Building on the data introduced in the Chapter 3, this chapter present the main
proposal of this dissertation. I start this chapter by introducing Anchor Semantics
(Kratzer 2020) and presenting my analysis of conditionals in this framework. I
argue that there are two tenses in conditional constructions that contribute to the
semantics and pragmatics of conditionals: the tense of the modal (the temporal
specification of the situation variable which modals take as first argument), and the
tense of the antecedent (the temporal specification of the situation denoted by the
antecedent). I then demonstrate how this proposal accounts for the pattern of Farsi
and English conditionals. I motivate a view in which Farsi and English differ with
respect to properties of tense in the antecedents of conditionals associated with the
expression of counterfactuality. I then frame the typological picture arising from
the addition of Farsi data.
In sum, my proposal supports the hypothesis that X-marking has a uniform
contribution in both Farsi and English. Under this account, the role of X-marking
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past is to specify that the anchor situation of the modal is a past situation. The
two languages, however, differ in presuppositions carried by the tense specifying
the temporal location of the antecedent. While the antecedent of English X-marked
conditionals contains zero tense Arregui (2009) and does not carry any presupposition, tense in the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals is deictic and, hence,
comes with a settledness presupposition.
I demonstrate how a uniform semantics for X-marking together with the presuppositions carried by the tense in the antecedent could account for the observed
differences in the behavior of X-marked conditionals in Farsi and English. As for
the observation about the temporal orientation of the antecedent, I argue that past
tense in the structure of X-marked conditionals can shift the evaluation time of the
shiftable present tense in the antecedent. The perceived strength in antecedent
falsity inference associated with Farsi X-marked conditionals arises because the
settledness presupposition of deictic tense in the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals is not satisfied in agnostic contexts (Future Less Vivid, Anderson-type
examples, Stanley Peter’s case). Since settledness is the presupposition of deictic
tenses, when the present tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditional is shifted
to past and thus is not interpreted deictically, the conditional can be felicitously
used in contexts where settledness is not satisfied, (9) is an example of this phenomenon.

1.3

Theoretical Assumptions

In this section, I overview the framework of situation semantics (Kratzer 2021,
2012), which I adopt in this dissertation. Let us start with the ingredients of Kratzer’s
situation semantics:
S : The set of possible situations.
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A: The set of Individuals.

≤: A partial ordering on S ∪ A, representing the ‘part of ’ relation and satisfying the following condition:
– For all s ∈ S there is a unique s0 ∈ S such that s ≤ s0 and for all s00 ∈ S,
if s0 ≤ s00 , then s00 = s.
P(S): The power set of S; the set of propositions.
W: The set of maximal elements with respect to ≤; the set of possible worlds.
(Kratzer 2012: p.117)
Situations can be related to each other by the ‘part of’ (≤) relation: situations
can have other situations as parts, and be themselves part of other situations. Situations can differ in size. Some situations are maximally big and are not proper
parts of other situations (a possible world). The condition on the ‘part of’ relation
says that every situation s is related to a unique maximal element, i.e. the world of
s. Therefore, situations cannot be part of more than one possible world. Just like
Lewis-style individuals, they can be identified across possible world via counterpart relations.
Propositions in this framework can be defined as the characteristic function of
a set of situations, i.e. properties of situation. Some situations contain nothing
that does not contribute to the truth of a given proposition. These are exemplifying
situations of a proposition (Kratzer 2021). The notion of Exemplification is defined
below.
(10) Exemplification
A situation s exemplifies a proposition p if whenever there is a part of s in
which p is not true, then s is a minimal situation in which p is true.
(Kratzer 2021: p.23)
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There are two ways for a situation s to exemplify p: (i) Either p is true in all
subsituations of s, or (ii) s is a minimal situation in which p is true.
(11) Minimal situations
A situation s is a minimal situation in which a proposition p is true (p(s) =
1) iff it has no proper parts in which p is true. This is represented with the
notation ↓ p(s).
(Kratzer 2021: p.24)
To see the difference between these two different ways, Kratzer (2021) gives the
examples in (12).
(12)

a. There are three teapots.
b. There is mud.
(Kratzer 2021)

Situations exemplifying the proposition there are three teapots are situations containing three teapot and nothing else. These are minimal situations in the sense that
they do not have any proper part where this proposition is true. The situation
Teapots gives an illustration of a minimal exemplifying situation for the proposition
in (12a).
(13) ‘Teapots’ is a situation that has three teapots and nothing else in it.

(Kratzer 2021: p.25)
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In contrast, the situations exemplifying the proposition there is mud are situations that contain mud and nothing else, but they are not necessarily minimal
situations. The situation Mud gives an illustration of an exemplifying situation for
the proposition in (12b).
(14) ‘Mud’ is a situation that consists of mud and only mud.

(Kratzer 2021: p.24)
Kratzer (2021) mentions that there is an important caveat to keep in mind while
counting teapots. According to a fundamental principle of counting (Counting
Principle), a domain for counting cannot contain non-identical overlapping individuals (Casati & Varzi 1999). ‘With spatiotemporal objects like teapots, humans seem
to rely on counting criteria that privilege maximal self-connected entities (Spelke 1990;
Casati & Varzi 1999). A self-connected teapot is one that cannot be split into two parts
that are not connected. The maximality requirement prevents counting teapots that are
proper parts of other teapots, and the self-connectedness requirement disqualifies sums of
parts from different teapots’.
Situations are involved in the semantics of a wide variety of phenomena in natural languages, including tense, aspect and modals. Situation semantics provides
a machinery that can unify temporal categories (times and events), and modality
(worlds). ‘Situations are not to be reduced to spatio-temporal locations within a world
(indeed, there can be more than one situation in a single spatio-temporal region, and a
single situation can include disconnected spatio-temporal parts). However, as parts of what
is going on, they have both temporal and spatial coordinates within a world. This is what
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makes them particularly interesting to us: situations are at the same time temporal (i.e. they
are part of some temporal slice within a world), and modal (i.e. they are part of some world
and not others)’ (Arregui et al. 2014: p.311).
In the rest of this chapter, I will present a situation-based semantics of tense,
aspect and modals.

1.3.1

Aspect

While tense provides information about the temporal location of an situation, aspect is concerned with the structural properties of the situation under discussion.
One major account of aspectual categories that is easily translatable into a situations
framework is to define them in terms of mereological notions like whole and part
(e.g. Verkuyl 1972; Krifka 1992; Filip 1999).
According to Kratzer (2021), Davidsonian events and situations are the same
kinds of things. They are both built from relations and individuals involved those
relations. She argues that ‘we don’t seem to need both situation semantics and Davidsonian event semantics’. Within a situation semantics, Davidsonian events are defined
in terms of exemplifying situations. Given the definition of exemplification in (10),
the set of exemplifying situations of a proposition must be either homogeneous or
quantized (minimal).
(15) A set of situations is homogeneous iff it is closed under the parthood relation. That is, whenever it contains a situation s, it also contains all (relevant)
proper parts of s.
(16) A set of situations is quantized iff it doesn’t contain both a situation s and
a proper part of s.

(Kratzer 2021: p.29)

The algebraic notions of homogeneity and quantization have been argued to
capture grammatical and lexical aspectual distinctions (Krifka 1992). Kratzer (2021)
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illustrates this with the examples below.
(17)

a. Josephine built an airplane.
b. Josephine flew an airplane.

(Kratzer 2021: p.29)

Kratzer (2021) argues that the proposition expressed by (17a) is exemplified by
minimal past situations in which Josephine built an airplane. This set of situations is
quantized. The proposition expressed by (17b), on the other hand, is exemplified
by all past situations that contain airplane flying by Josephine and nothing else.
This set of situations is homogeneous (Kratzer 2021: p.29). It should be noted
that (17b) is true only of situations exemplifying the proposition expressed by
Josephine flew an airplane that do not lead to a violation of the Counting Principle.
That is, it is true of maximal self-connected situations exemplifying the proposition
expressed by Josephine flew an airplane.
In this dissertation, I will follow Cipria & Roberts (2000) in adopting a situation
semantic without explicit quantification over events in the object language. Taking
events to be exemplifying situations (Kratzer 2021), aspect will combine with a
property of situations expressed by VP and introduces structural constraints on
its exemplifying situations. Perfective aspect restricts the set of situations exemplifying the proposition expressed by its embedded VP to quantizated minimal
situations. Imperfective aspect, on the other hand, specifies that the set of situations exemplifying the proposition expressed by its embedded VP is a homogeneous set. A similar idea has been proposed by Deo (2020). She proposes that
sentences with imperfective aspect denote temporal predicates with the subinterval property. In contrast, perfective aspect is taken to mark the presence of antisubinterval property.
I propose (18) as the denotation of perfective aspect, according to which perfective aspect combines with a property of situations and results in a property of
situations. What perfective aspect adds is that situations exemplifying the proposi16

tion denoted by the embedded VP are quantized or minimal situations (illustrated
by ↓).
(18) JperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. & ↓ P(s) = 1
I follow Cipria & Roberts (2000); Arregui et al. (2014) in taking imperfective
aspect to introduce a universal quantifier over situations. Under this analysis, the
modal properties of imperfective aspect are organically derived. Arregui et al.
(2014) argue that a modal analysis of imperfective aspect can account for crosslinguistic variations in the interpretation of imperfective in terms of variation in
modal bases. In (19), I propose a modification to this modal analysis such that the
universal quantifier comes from the homogeneity of exemplifying situations. The
contextual relation R in (19) does the job of modal bases in the account proposed
by Arregui et al. (2014). The set of situations s0 that are proper part s, can further
be restricted by contextually supplied modal restrictions.
(19) JimperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∀s0 : s0 ≤s &

there exists a contextually salient relation R such that R(s)(s0 ). P(s0 ) = 1

According to (19), imperfective aspect combines with a property of situations
and returns a property of situations. It adds that the proposition denoted by VP
is exemplified by all the relevant sub-situations of the topic situation s specified
by the contextual parameter R. In this sense, imperfective aspect marks that the
set of exemplifying situations is homogeneous. The wide range of interpretations
cross-linguistically associated with imperfective aspect such as ongoing, generic,
and habitual readings can be captured via different values the contextual relation
variable R can take. In the case of habitual sentences, for instance, the contextual
relation R restricts the domain of quantification to characteristic sub-situations of
the topic situation (Cipria & Roberts 2000; Arregui et al. 2014).
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What about the perfect aspect? There is a huge body of literature on variation in
the interpretation of perfect across and within languages (McCoard 1978; Iatridou
et al. 2003; Pancheva & Von Stechow 2004; Portner 2003, among others). Addressing
the complexities of perfect is outside of the scope of this dissertation, although I will
say more about perfect aspect in Farsi in the next chapter. Here, inspired by AlonsoOvalle (2002) and Arregui (2007), I provide a denotation of perfect in a situations
framework.
(20) JperfectKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s) & P(s0 ) = 1
Perfect aspect combines with a property of situations and results in a property
of situations. It introduces a situation (result state) that holds after the proposition
denoted by the c-commanded VP is exemplified. Whether the exemplifying situations for the embedded VP property are quantized or homogeneous is determined
by the lower aspect head which can be either perfective or imperfective. This is
represented in the structures below.
(21)

a.

b.

AspP
λs.∃s0

:

τ (s0 )

≺ τ (s) & ↓

JpK(s0 )

AspP

perfect

1.3.2

:

τ (s0 )

≺ τ (s) & ∀s00 : s00 ≤ s0 & JpK(s00 )
AspP

perfect
λs.∀s00

λs. ↓ JpK(s)
Perfective

AspP
λs.∃s0

vP

:

s00

Imperfective

≤ s & JpK(s00 )
vP

p

p

λs.JpK(s)

λs.JpK(s)

Tense

I will adopt a presuppositional theory of tense (Heim 1994) which takes tenses to
introduce presuppositions about the value of a contextually specified parameter. In
this approach, tenses are treated as pronouns (Partee 1973). In situation semantics,
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we can treat tense as introducing a presupposition about the value of a variable that
ranges over situations. Thus, tense operates on an aspectual phrase in its scope
which contains some situation variable s, and introduces a presupposition about
the value of s.
Although I will not adopt a referential theory of tense (Partee 1973), I will
maintain its key insight: tenses carry presupposition about the value of a pronoun.
Following Kratzer (1998a) and Arregui (2009), I take the inventory of individual
pronouns to carry over to situation ones. Both individual and situation pronouns
can carry deictic features (presuppositions) that put constraints on their semantic
value. In the situation-based theory of tense I adopt, deictic tenses put temporal
constraints on the value of situation variables (e.g., Arregui 2009).
There is another kind of pronoun that Kratzer (1998a, 2009) dubbed as zero
pronouns (∅). Zero pronouns lack deictic features, and depend on an antecedent
in order to get their semantic value. Following Kratzer (1998b) and Arregui (2009),
I posit that zero tenses do not introduce any deictic constraint on the situation they
refer to. The denotation of deictic tenses (present and past) and the zero tense is
given bellow.
(22) Jpresenti Kg = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ◦ τ (si ). P(s) = 1, where si is the speech
situation by default.2

(23) Jpast j Kg = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). P(s) = 1, where s j and is the speech
situation by default.
(24) J∅Kg = λPhs,ti . P
According to the denotation of present tense in (22), present tense combines
with a property of situations hs, ti and introduces a presupposition on the domain
of the situation variable s such that the temporal slice of s (represented by τ (s)) is
2 An

alternative is to represent the index i as a variable in the syntax.
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presupposed to overlap with (represented by ◦) the temporal slice of a free variable
si and is the speech situation by default. The denotation of past tense in (23) does
a similar job, but the constraint it puts on the domain of the situation variable s is
that the the temporal slice of s has to precede (represented by ≺) the temporal slice
of si which is the speech situation by default. The denotation of zero tenses in (24)
is simply an identity function. They do not introduce any presupposition.

1.4

Summary

This chapter has introduced the main questions this dissertation addresses. It has
also provided a preview of my main proposal as well as an introduction to the
semantic framework I adopt for tense and aspect. In the next chapter, I present an
overview of tense, aspect and mood in Farsi.
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CHAPTER 2
Tense, Aspect, and Mood in Farsi

This dissertation is concerned with the role of tense, aspect and mood (TAM) in
the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals from the perspective of Farsi data. In
this chapter, I present an overview of Farsi TAM system. In Section 2.1, I introduce
the basics of the Farsi grammar with special focus on realization of tense, aspect
and mood. I will also lay out my assumptions about their denotations. Section
2.2 provides a theoretical discussion about properties of tenses in Farsi that will be
important in the subsequent chapters. In Section 2.3, I turn to the main topic of this
dissertation,i.e. conditionals, and provide an outline of the contribution of tense
and aspect in Farsi conditionals.

2.1

Basics of Farsi TAM system

Farsi is pro-drop, and predominantly head-initial. The following example shows a
sequence of nested phrases in which each head precedes its complement.
(25) man mi-dan-∅-am
ke Sara be yek doxtar-e ziba
ketab
I
impf-know-pres-1sg that Sara to a girl-ez beautiful book
dad.
give.perf.pst.3sg
I know Sara gave a book to a beautiful girl.
a. CP: [CP [C ke] [TP Sara be yek doxtar-e ziba ketab dad]]
b. PP: [PP [P be] [DP yek doxtar-e ziba] ]
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c. DP/NP: [DP [D yek] [NP [N doxtar]-e [AdjP ziba] ]]
However, Farsi has an SOV order (Taleghani 2008), as it is head-final in verbal
projections (Darzi & Anosheh 2010). Verbs are inflected for person, number, tense,
aspect, and mood. Like other Indo-Iranian languages, the verbal system of Farsi
revolves around two so-called verb stems: (i) Stem I traditionally called the present
stem and (ii) Stem II which is traditionally called the past stem and is regularly
derived by the addition of the suffix -id (and other allomorphs) to Stem I (Windfuhr
1979; Windfuhr & Perry 2013).
root
√
buy: √ xar
eat: √xor
kill: koš

Stem I
xar
xor
koš

Stem II
xar-id
xor-d
koš-t

Table 2.1: Verbal stems in Farsi

These stems combine with agreement morphology, presented below. Notice
that there is a difference in the third person singular morphology between these
two stems.
root
Stem I
Stem II

1sg
xar-am
xar-id-am

2sg
xar-i
xar-id-i

3sg
xar-ad
xar-id-∅

1pl
xar-im
xar-id-im

2pl
xar-id
xar-id-id

3pl
xar-and
xar-id-and

Table 2.2: Agreement morphology in Farsi
Following Kalin & Atlamaz (2015) and Anoushe (2018), I posit that Farsi verb
stems are decomposed into morphemes that encode semantic information about
temporal relations.
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2.1.1

Aspect and Present Tense

Farsi lacks an overt present tense marker. The traditionally called ‘present stem’
consists of the verb root and a null suffix, as shown in (71).
(26) T[pres] → −∅
In this section I explore the combination of present tense with imperfective,
progressive and perfect aspect. I postpone the discussion of present perfective to
Section 2.1.3.

2.1.1.1

Present imperfective and progressive

The morphological realization of imperfective aspect in Farsi is the prefix mi-.
(27) Asp[impf]→ mi-

to be revised

To refer to a present eventuality, the bare form of non-stative verbs is necessarily
marked with imperfective aspect prefix mi-, as shown in (28).
(28) dar xiaban, ye sag pars *(mi)-kon-∅-ad
in street, a dog bark impf-do-pres-3sg
A dog is barking in the street.1
The null copular verb be and the stative verb have are incompatible with the
imperfective marker mi-.
(29) Anha alan xune *mi-∅-and
they now home impf-be.pres-3pl
They are home now.
(30) Anha do-ta mašin *mi-dar-∅-and
Anha two-cl car
impf-have-pres-3pl
They have two cars.
1 It

is worth noting that the equivalent of the verb bark in Farsi is a complex predicate consisting
of a nominal element ‘pars: bark’ and a verbal element that carries inflectional morphemes. Folli
et al. (2005) analyze the verbal elements (light verb) as an overt v head.
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Instead, the null copular verb be and the bare form of stative verb have, as in (31)
and (32), inflected for agreement, refers to a state that is held in the utterance time.
(31) Anha alan
xune ∅-and
they tomorrow/now home be.pres-3pl.
they are home now.
(32) Anha do-ta mašin dar-∅-and
they two-cl car
have-pres-3spl
They have two cars.
In addition to describing ongoing events and states, the imperfective verb also
has the canonical generic and habitual interpretations, as shown in (33) and (34),
respectively. Note that the presence of imperfective aspect with the present form
of non-stative verbs is obligatory.
(33) sag-ha pars *(mi)-kon-∅-and
dog-pl bark impf-do-pres-3pl
Dogs bark.
(34) Ali footbal bazi *(mi)-kon-∅-ad.
Ali football play impf-do-pres-3sg
Ali plays football.
The present form of the copular verb in Farsi can also describe a future event,
as shown in (35).
(35) Anha farda
xune ∅-and
they tomorrow home be.pres-3pl
They will be home tomorrow.
The future-oriented interpretation of present tense verb in Farsi is different from
the futurate reading in English, as shown in (36). Copley (2009) defines a futurate
as a future-oriented reading of a sentence with no obvious means of future reference. The eventuality described in the sentence, however, must be plannable. An
unplannable future event cannot be described without an overt future marker, as
the infelicity of (37) and (38) shows.
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(36) The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.
(37) # The Red Sox defeat the Yankees tomorrow.
(38) Before tossing the coin: # The coin comes up heads.
In Farsi, however, present imperfective verbs not only can be used to describe
a plannable future event, as shown in (39), but also to make a prediction about an
unplannable future eventuality, as shown in (40) and (41).
(39) Farda
Esteqlal ba Perspolis bazi mi-kon-∅-ad.
tomorrow Esteqlal with Perspolis play impf-do-pres-3sg
Esteqlal plays Perspolis Tomorrow.
(40) Farda
Esteqlal Perspolis ro šekast mi-dah-∅-ad
tomorrow Esteqlal Perspolis ra defeat impf-give-pres-3sg
Esteqlal defeats Perspolis tomorrow.
(41) Sekke šir
mi-ay-∅-ad
coin heads impf-come-pres-3sg
The coin will come up heads.
I should also note that the future interpretation of present imperfective verbs in
Farsi is compatible with complete and incomplete telic eventualities.
(42)

a. Ta do mah-e
dige xune mi-saz-∅-ad
by two month-ez other house impf-build-pres-3sg
He will be build a house until the next two months.
3 and then the house will be ready.
3 Then he’ll take a break and will continue building the house later.2
b. Ta do mah-e
dige xune ro mi-saz-∅-ad
by two month-ez other house ra impf-build-pres-3sg
He will build the house by the next two months.3

Although progressive aspect will not play a role in my dissertation, it is worth
mentioning that imperfective form of the verb in Farsi can combine with an inflected
2 Thanks
3 The

to Sabine Iatridou for bringing this to my attention.
dom marker ra enforces a completed reading.
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progressive auxiliary (have) to describe an ongoing event, as shown in (43). The
presence of progressive aspect forces the ongoing reading of imperfective aspect,
which can otherwise get a wider range of interpretations.
(43) dar xiaban, ye sag dar-∅-ad
pars mi-kon-∅-ad
in street, a dog prog-pres-3sg bark impf-do-pres-3sg
A dog is barking in the street.
Progressive aspect is the preferred way of talking about an ongoing event, but
the ongoing reading of imperfective aspect is still available.
Present progressive verbs in Farsi, as in (44), are compatible with future-oriented
temporal adverbials. The presence of the progressive aspect here emphasizes the
existence of a firm plan for the eventuality to happen.
(44) Farda
sa’at-e 5, man dar-∅-am
tu cinema film
tomorrow clock-ez 5 I
prog-pres-1sg at cinema movie
mi-bin-∅-am.
impf-see-pres-1sg
Tomorrow at 5 o’clock, I will be watching a movie at the cinema.

2.1.1.2

Present Perfect

The present perfect form of a verb is constructed with the past participle and the
agreement inflected null auxiliary be.
(45) taze sandevich dorost karde ∅.am
fresh sandwich made do.ppl aux.pres.1sg
I’ve just made a sandwich.
As is the case with all Farsi verbs in present tense, present perfect verbs in Farsi
are compatible with a future reference time.
Context: It’s 5 PM right now. Sarah has just started making dinner and Mary has
just left her office to go home. It takes Sarah 30 minutes to make dinner, and Mary
an hour to get home.
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(46) ta vaghti Mary be-res-ad,
Sarah šam ra amade karde
by when Mary impf-arrive-∅-3sg, Sarah dinner ra ready do-ppl
ast.
aux.pres.3sg
‘By the time, Marry arrives, Sarah will have made dinner.’ 4
As I have have mentioned in the first chapter, perfect is a higher aspect head that
can combine with either imperfective or perfective aspect. Since Farsi has an overt
imperfective marker, the absence of this marker in present perfect forms indicates
that the lower aspect is perfective. An argument in favor of this view comes from
aspectual restrictions on some stative verbs like know. The verb know in Farsi always
carries imperfective aspect.
(47)

a. Ali javab-e
soal
ra mi-dan-∅-ad.
Ali answer-ez question ra impf-know-pres-3sg
Ali knows the answer to the question.
b. # Ali javab-e
soal
ra dan-est/
dan-este ast.
Ali answer-ez question ra know.pst.perf.3sg/ know-pp aux-pres.3sg
Ali knew/has known the answer to the question.

Perfective and perfect forms of this verb can only mean realize or consider.
(48)

a. man az ro-id-an-e
xar-e
sar-e
divar danest-am
I
from grow-pst-nom-ez thorn-ez head-ez wall know.perf.pst-1sg
ke nakas kas
ne-mi-gard-∅-ad
az in bala
that nobody somebody neg-impf-look-pres-3sg from this top
nešini-ha
sitting-pl
I realized from the thorn growing on the top of the wall that ‘nobody’ doesn’t
become ‘somebody” by sitting on the top.

Saeb Tabrizi ( Persian poet)

b. raees
jomhor ejabr-e
mask ra yek tasmim-e melli
prseident republic manadate-ez mask ra a decision-ez national
dan-este ast.
know-pp aux-pres.3sg
The president has considered the mask mandate a national decision.
4 The

third person form of the null copula be is morpholgically realized as ast.
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This aspectual restriction is removed when an imperfective marker is added to
the perfect form of the verb.
(49) hame-ye in moddat Ali javab-e
soal
ra mi-dan-este
all-ez
this duration Ali answer-ez question ra impf-know-pp
ast.
aux-pres.3sg
All this time, Ali has known the answer to the question.
In languages, like English, that do not morphologicallay distinguish between
perfective and imperfective aspect, these two perfect forms have the same morphological representation. Evidence for this comes from the contrast in the availability
of habitual and generic readings with present perfect in the two languages. While
English present perfect can have habitual and generic readings, the presence of an
imperfective marker is necessary to get these readings in Farsi.
(50)

a. Since the beginning of existence, the Earth has revolved around the sun.
b. Az aqaz-e
hayat,
zamin dor-e
xoršid
Since beginning-ez existence, Earth around-ez sun
#(mi)-čarxide
ast.
impf-revolve.pp aux.pres.3sg
Since the beginning of existence, the Earth has revolved around the sun.

Moreover, it has been cross-linguistically observed that universal readings of
perfect are only possible with perfects built out of statives (homogeneous predicates) (Dowty 1979; Mittwoch 1988; Vlach 1993; Portner 2003 and Iatridou et al.
2003). This can be seen in the contrast in (51). While the sentence with a stative
predicate in (51a) can have a universal (continuative) interpretation, (51b) with a
stage level eventive predicate can only have an existential interpretation.
(51)

a. John has been sick (for several days).
b. John has slept.

(Portner 2011)

In Farsi where perfect from embedding imperfective and perfective have distinct
morphological realizations, universal perfect readings are only possible when the
28

lower aspect is imperfective. The sentence in (52a) can only have an existential
perfect reading. When there is an imperfective aspect, as in (52c), the universal
perfect reading becomes available.
(52)

a. # Sara az sa’at-e 3 ketab xande ast.
Sara since clock-ez 3 book read.pp aux.pres.3sg
Sara has read a book since 3.
b. Sara az sa’at-e 3 ta 4 ketab xande ast.
Sara since clock-ez 3 to 4 book read.pp aux.pres.3sg
Sara has read a book from 3 to 4. (listing things Sara did today)
c. Sara az sa’at-e 3 ketab mi-xande ast.
Sara since clock-ez 3 book impf-read.pp aux.pres.3sg
Sara has been reading a book since 3.

It should, however, be noted that (52c) does not actually entail that the reading
event is still ongoing. (52c) is compatible with the continuation ”she got tired, and
is now resting”.
In languages like English, present perfect does not felicitously combine with
‘specific’ past time adverbials. This fact, which is known as the present perfect puzzle
(Klein 1992), is illustrated in (53). The incompatibility of present perfect and specific temporal adverbials is not found in all languages. Pancheva & Von Stechow
(2004) note that present perfect can felicitously combine with temporal adverbials
in German (as shown in (54)), Dutch, French, Icelandic, or Italian. As the grammaticality of (55) shows, Farsi also lacks a ban against such combinations.
(53)

* John has arrived yesterday.

(54) Hans ist gestern um zehn weggegangen.
Hans is yesterday at 10 left
Hans has left yesterday at 10.
(55) Ali dirooz
reside ast.
Ali yesterday arrive.pp aux.pres.3sg
Ali has arrived yesterday.
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(Musan 2001)

Another point of divergence among languages with respect to present perfect
are so-called life-time effects. As the example in (56) shows, the present perfect in
English cannot be felicitously used with dead persons or no longer existing objects
(Portner 2003).
(56) # Einstein has visited Princeton.
In languages like French (57a) or German (57b), on the other hand, such lifetime effects don’t arise (Schaden 2009).
(57)

a. Einstein a visité Princeton.
Einstein has visited Princeton
b. Einstein hat Princeton besucht.
Einstein has Princeton visited
(Schaden 2009)

The felicity of the example (58) shows that life-time effects do not obtain for the
present perfect in Farsi.
(58) Ebn-e-sina be Ray safar karde ast.
Avicenna to Ray travel do.pp aux.pres.3sg
Avicenna has travelled to Ray.

2.1.1.3

Denotations and LFs

We have seen that present tense in Farsi, unlike English, can freely refer to future
events. Klein (1992); Giorgi et al. (1997); Pancheva & Von Stechow (2004) argue
that there is cross-linguistic variation in the semantics of present tense. Pancheva
& Von Stechow (2004) provide examples in (59) and (60) to illustrate this meaning
difference. The ungrammaticality of sentences in (59) shows that English present
is not compatible with future temporal adverbs. German present, like Farsi, is
perfectly felicitous with future adverbials, as shown in (60).
(59)

a. # Fred is sick in 10 days.
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b. # It {rains/is raining} next week.
(60)

(Pancheva & Von Stechow 2004)

a. Fritz ist in 10 Tagen krank.
Fritz is in 10 days sick
‘Fritz will be sick in 10 days.’
b. Nächste Woche ist das Wetter schlecht.
next
week is the weather bad
‘Next week the weather will be bad.’
(Pancheva & Von Stechow 2004)

Therefore, I take Farsi present tense to have the semantics given in (61), which
is the denotation of the German present proposed by Pancheva & Von Stechow
(2004), translated into situation semantics (Arregui 2009). Note that the denotation
of the Farsi present tense is different from the English present, given in (22), in
having a non-past meaning. Farsi present tense introduces the presupposition that
the minimal temporal slice s belongs to (represented by τ (s)) overlaps with/follows
the minimal temporal slice that ( g(i ) = si ) belongs to (represented by τ (si )).
(61) Jpresenti Kc,g = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (si )  τ (s). P(s) = 1.
As I discussed in Chapter One, aspect in a situations framework where events
are also defined in terms of exemplifying situations, can be thought of as providing
structural specifications of exemplifying situations. I take imperfective aspect to
denote a homogeneous set of situations, as shown in (19) repeated here in (62).
(62) JimperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∀s0 : s0 ≤s & there exists a contextually salient
relation R such that R(s)(s0 ). P(s0 ) = 15

As I mentioned, the semantics of progressive aspect does not concern us in
this dissertation, but I want to sketch how its denotation is treated in a situations
framework with no events. I take progressive aspect, which embeds an imperfective
aspect in Farsi as shown in (43), to add a linguistically encoded modal restriction
5 To

account for compatibility of imperfective aspect and completed telic eventualities as in (42),
I follow Arregui et al. (2014) in taking R to be a Result relation: s results from s0 iff s includes the
consequences/results of the events in s0 .
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to the semantics of imperfective. The modal restriction encoded in the denotation
of progressive is taken from the definition of Event-inertia modal base by Arregui
et al. (2014).
(63) JprogressiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∀s0 : s0 ≤ s. &

∃s00 : s0 ≤ s00 . s’ continue in s” as they would if there were no interruptions.

& P(s00 ) = 1
The denotation given in (63) asserts that for every relevant sub-situation s0 of
the topic situation s there is a situation s00 in which s0 continues as if there were
no interruption, and the proposition P is exemplified by s00 . The Event-inertia (or
inertia-situations in terminology of Cipria & Roberts (2000)) serves to account for
the imperfective paradox, illustrated by the example (64) in which an event of a dog
crossing the street was in progress at a past topic situation but remains incomplete.
The intuition is that there was something happening that, in normal circumstances,
would lead to a situation that exemplifies the proposition a dog crossed the street.
(64) An sag dašt
az khiaban rad mi-shod
ke ba
that dog aux.pst.3sg from street pass impf-become.pst.3sg that with
otobus tasadof kard.
bus
accident do.perf.pst-3sg
As the dog was crossing the street, it was run over by a bus.
The denotation in (63) is similar to the semantics that Hallman (2009) has proposed for progressive. Like Hallman’s proposal, the denotation proposed here is a
version of Portner (2011) calls the event structure theory of the progressive ( Hinrichs
1983, Ter Meulen 1985, 1987, Bach 1986, Link et al. (1987), Parsons 1990, and Krifka
1992), which also maintains aspects of the modal theory of progressive (Dowty 1977,
1979; Asher 1992; Landman 1992; Bonomi 1997, and Portner 1998).
The denotation of perfect aspect in Farsi is given in (65), repeated from (20).
(65) JperfectKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s) & P(s0 ) = 1
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Putting the semantics of tense and aspect together, we will have (66b) and
(67) as the LF and truth conditions for the present imperfective sentence in (33),
repeated here in (66a), are given below.
(66)

a. sag-ha pars mi-kon-∅-and
dog-pl bark impf-do-pres-3pl
Dogs bark.
b. LF for (66a)
TP

hs,ti
λs : τ (s0 ) 

λs.∀s0

:

s0

≤

τ ( s ).∀ s 0

:

s0

≤ s.&R(s)(s0 ).bark(s0 )&( Ag(e,s0 )=dogs)

AspP

T

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

s.&R(s)(s0 ).bark(s0 )&( Ag(e,s0 )=dogs)
-∅

vP

Asp

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

λs.bark (s)&Ag(e,s)=dogs
miDP

v’

e

he,hs,tii
λe.λs.bark (s)&Ag(e,s)

sag-ha
VP

v

hs,ti

hhs,ti,he,hs,tii

pars

kon

λs.bark (s)

(67) [tP Presenti [aspP Imperfective [vP

p] ] ]

a. Jdogs impf-bark-presKc,g = λs : τ (s0 )  τ (s).∀s0 : s0 ≤ s.

& s0 is a characteristic part of s. bark (s0 )&( Ag(e,s0 )=dogs)

To achieve the order of morphemes, I follow Darzi & Anosheh (2010) to take
Farsi to be head-final in verbal projections, and to posit that the verb undergoes
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total head-movement, that is V moves through each functional head until it reaches
the highest functional projection6 .
(68)
TP

DP

T’

sag-ha
AspP

vP

<sag-ha>

Asp

v’

DP

T

-∅

mi-

VP

v

pars

kon

The LF and truth conditions of the present perfect sentence (69a) are given
below. As I mentioned in Chapter One, perfect aspect is a higher aspectual head,
and the whether the embedded proposition is exemplified by quantized or homogeneous situations is determined by the lower aspectual head. Since imperfective
aspect has an overt morphological realization, its absence in (69a) implies the presence of perfective aspect.
(69)

a. Ali reside ast.
Ali arrive.pp aux.pres.3sg
Ali has arrived.
b. LF for (69a)

6 Farsi

has both overt and null v. V-to-v movement only occurs when v is null (Darzi & Anosheh

2010)

34

TP

hs,ti
λs : τ (s0 )  τ (s).∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s)& ↓ arrive( Ali )(s0 )

AspP

T

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

λs.∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s)& ↓ arrive( Ali )(s0 )
pres
AspP

Asp

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

∅

λs. ↓ arrive( Ali )(s)
perfect
vP

Asp

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

aux:∅

λs.arrive( Ali )(s)
perfective
v’

VP

v

hs,ti

hhs,ti,hs,tii

λs.arrive( Ali )(s)
∅
V

DP

he,hs,tii

e

res

Ali

λe.λs.arrive(e)(s)

(70) J(69a)Kc,g = λs : τ (s0 )  τ (s).∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s)& ↓ arrive( Ali )(s0 )

2.1.2

Aspect and Past Tense

The traditionally called ‘past stem’ consists of the verb root and an allomoprh of the
suffix -id which is ambiguous between past and perfective, as shown in (71). We
will see examples where this morpheme appears in past imperfective (e.g., (75))
as well as in present perfective (e.g., (89)) and subjunctive perfective (e.g., (106)
and (109)).
(71) T[pst] → −id
Asp[perfective] → −id
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2.1.2.1

Past perfective

To express a culminated past event, the verb must be marked with one of the allomporhs of the suffix -id, as shown in (72) and (73).
(72) Zahra raf-t.
Zahra leave-perf.pst.3sg
Zahra left.
(73) vaghti tu otaq bud-am, Jyoti avaz xan-d
when in room be.pst-1sg, Jyoti song sing-perf.pst.3sg
When I was in the room, Jyoti sang.
Although both past tense and perfective aspect have a morphological realization
as the suffix -id, there is only one occurrence of suffix -id to mark a past perfective
verb. The reason is that there is a restriction on the number of tam affixes a verb
can bear in some Indo-Iranian languages like Farsi and Adiyaman Kurmanji (Kalin
& Atlamaz 2015). Verbs in these languages cannot bear more than one tam suffix
or more than one tam prefix. The co-occurrence of a tam prefix and a tam suffix,
however, is allowed. Therefore, I propose that -id can be morphological realization of the past perfective in Farsi (see also Windfuhr & Perry (2013) for a similar
proposal), as shown in (74).
(74) T[pst] [Asp[perfective]] → −id
In 2.2.2 where I discuss the contrast between past perfective and present perfect, I show that past perfective in Farsi comes with an evidential inference. The
evidentiality of perfective aspect in Farsi will not play a role in this dissertation.

2.1.2.2

Past imperfective and progressive

The past imperfective form of the verb, which contains the past morpheme and the
imperfective prefix mi-, can describe an event that was ongoing in a past time, as
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shown in (75a) and (75b). It can also describe a generic statement that held true in
the past (75c), as well a past habit (75d).
(75)

a. dar xiaban, ye sag pars mi-kard.
in street, a dog bark impf-do.pst.3sg
A dog was barking in the street.
b. vaghti madar-am vared-e otaq-am shod,
ba
when mother-my enter-ez room-my become.perf.pst-3sg, to
doost-am harf mi-zad-am.
friend-my talk impf-hit.pst-1sg
When my mother came into my room, I was talking with my friend.
c. dainasur-ha-ye Tirex gušt mi-xor-d-and.
dinosaur-pl-ez T-Rex meat impf-eat-pst-3pl
T-Rex dinosaurs ate meat.
d. man qablan sigar
mi-keš-id-am.
I
before cigarette impf-smoke-pst-3sg
I used to smoke before.

The past imperfective form of the verb can also combine with the past form of
the progressive auxiliary to describe an ongoing event in the past. This is shown
(76) and (77).
(76) dar xiaban, ye sag dašt
pars mi-kard.
in street, a dog prog.3sg bark impf-do.pst.3sg
A dog was barking in the street.
(77) vaghti madar-am vared-e otaq-am shod,
dašt-am
ba
when mother-my enter-ez room-my become.perf.pst-3sg, have.pst-1sg to
doost-am harf mi-zad-am.
friend-my talk impf-hit.pst-1sg
When my mother came into my room, I was talking with my friend.
As stative verbs are incompatible with the imperfective prefix, as was shown in
(29) and (29), the past form of stative verbs be and have in (78a) and (78b), refers
to a state that was held in the past.
(78)

a. Sa’at-e 3 Ali xune bud.
clock-ez 3 Ali home be.pst.3sg.
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Ali was home at 3 o’clock.
b. Ali do-ta mašin dašt.
Ali two-cl car
have.pst.3sg
Ali had two cars.

2.1.2.3

Past perfect

The past perfect form of a verb is constructed with the past participle and the past
form of auxiliary be which is inflected for agreement.
(79) vaqti Bill vared-e otaq shod,
John taze yek sandewich
when Bill enter-ez room become-perf.pst.3sg, John fresh a sandwich
dorost karde bud
made do.pp aux.pst.3sg
When Bill walked into the room, John had just made a sandwich.

2.1.2.4

Taking stock

Having discussed the properties of past tense in Farsi, I can now provide truth
conditions of past sentences in Farsi. (80) illustrates the denotation of past tense.
(80) Jpast j Kc,g = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). P(s) = 1, where s j and is the speech
situation by default.
As I discussed in the first chapter, I take perfective aspect to specify that situations exemplifying the embedded proposition are minimal situations (represented
by ↓). The denotation of perfective aspect is given in (81).
(81) JperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ↓ P(s) = 1
Putting the semantics of past tense and perfective aspect together, we will have
(82) as the semantics of past peferctive in Farsi.
(82) [tP Past j [aspP Perfective [vP

p] ] ]

J(82)Kc,g = λs.τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). ↓ JpK(s)
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(83) illustrates the semantics of past imperfective in Farsi.
(83) [tP Past j [aspP Imperfective [vP

p] ] ]

J(83)Kc,g = λs.τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). ∀s0 : s0 ≤ s.

& there exists a contextually salient relation R such that R(s)(s0 ). JpK(s0 )
Finally, the semantics of past perfect (pluperfect) in Farsi is given in (84). I
assume a case where the embedded aspect is perfective.
(84) [tP Past j [aspP Perfect [aspP Perfective [vP

p] ] ] ]

J(84)Kc,g = λs.τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). ∃s0 : τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s) & ↓ JpK(s0 ) = 1

2.1.3

Future

There are four strategies in Farsi to describe a future event. The most common way
of describing a future eventuality in colloquial Farsi is to use present imperfective7 ,
as in (85). As we saw in the section 2.1.1, present tense in Farsi has a non-past
semantics and thus it can freely take a future time reference.
(85) Farda
be bimarestan mi-rav-∅-am.
tomorrow to hospital
impf-go-pres-1sg
I will go to the hospital tomorrow.
The second strategy is to use the agreement inflected future auxiliary want followed by the perfective form of the verb with default third person agreement, as in
(86). This form is mainly used in formal contexts.
(86) Farda
be bimarestan xah-∅-am raft.
tomorrow to hospital
aux-pres-1sg go.perf.∅.3sg
I am going to the hospital tomorrow.8
7 As

I mentioned earlier, the present perfect in Farsi is compatible with a future reference time,
as in (46)
8 ∅ in glosses represents zero tense.
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An interesting property of this construction is the use of what seems to be the
past form of the verb (Bjorkman & Halpert 2017). In descriptive grammars of
Farsi, however, this form has been analyzed as a short infinitival form (Khanlari
(1988); Anvari & Ahmadi Givi (1995)).9 It is important to note that this future
form is only compatible with perfective interpretations, and is incompatible with
an imperfective reading. The infelicity of (87b) in the following context illustrates
this fact. Therefor, I take the verb in the future construction (86) to bear perfective
morphology (with zero tense).
(87) Context: Sarah has terminal cancer. She has just started writing a long novel.
Doctors think she will only live few more days and will die prior to the completion
of her book.
a. moghe-ye marg, Sarah (dar-∅-ad) ketab mi-nevis-∅-ad.
time-ez death, sarah aux-pres-3sg book impf-write-pres-3sg
Sarah will be writing a book at the time of her death.
b. #moghe-ye marg, Sarah ketab xah-∅-ad
nevešt.
time-ez
death, sarah ketab aux-pres-3sg write-perf.∅.3sg
Sarah will be writing a book at the time of her death.
The third strategy is to to use the present imperfective form of want and the socalled ‘subjunctive’ form of the verb, as in (88). This form has a volitional future
reading.
(88) Farda
Sarah mi-xah-∅-ad
be bimarestan be-rav-ad.
tomorrow Sarah impf-want-pres-3sg to hospital
impf-go.∅-3sg
Sarah will go to the hospital tomorrow.
Lastly, the perfective form of eventive verbs inflected with agreement morphology can be used to refer a future event. The future use of this form is limited to
event that are going to be completed in the imminent future, and is not felicitous
with a future adverbials.
9 Farsi

does not have infinitive clauses.
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(89) Ali’s mom talking to him on the phone: ”Everyone is waiting for you to come home.”
Ali:
a. umad.∅-am
come.perf-pres-1sg
I’m coming (right away).
b. # farda
umad.∅-am
tomorrow come.perf-pres-1sg
I’m coming tomorrow.
The perfective form of stative verbs doesn’t lend itself to a future interpretation.
(90) Ali’s friend is waiting outside Ali’s house. They are going to a concert. Ali:
a. # amade bud.∅-am
ready be.perf-pres-1sg
intensed meaning: I’ll be ready (right away).
b. amade shod.∅-am
ready get.perf-pres-1sg
I’ll get ready (right away).
Unlike the general trend in descriptive grammars of Iranian languages that takes
verbs bearing -id morpheme to encode pastness (hence the term past stem), Windfuhr & Perry (2013) take them to be an unmarked form which only encode a perfective meaning. However, the fact that verbs bearing -id morpheme can combine
with imperfective prefix mi- to describe a past imperfective event suggests that -id
is ambiguous between past and perfective readings. Given that imperfective aspect
has an overt morphological realization, we can deduce the existence of perfective
aspect in (89a) and (90b) from the absence of an imperfective marker. What is
tense in these sentences? There are three logical possibilities: past, present and
zero tense. As there is no past meaning involved, we can put aside this option.
Zero tense is also ruled out because its occurrence in matrix clauses is limited
to expression of wishes and desires (I will discuss this in the next section). The
sentences under consideration are clearly not about wishes and desire. The only
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option left is present tense. We have independently seen that present tense in Farsi
has a non-past semantics, and compatible with future reference. Therefore, I will
take the verbs in (89a) and (90b) to be the morphological realization of present
perfective in Farsi, as shown below.
(91) T[pres] [Asp [perfective]] → ∅-id
It has been cross-linguistically observed that perfective aspect appears to be
incompatible with present tense. De Wit (2016) refers to this observation as the
‘present perfective paradox’. The structure I have proposed in (91) raises the question as to whether Farsi lacks the “present perfective paradox”. There seems to be
variations among languages with respect to the acceptability of the combination
of present tense and perfective aspect, as well as the interpretations such a combination can get. The present perfective paradox is reported to be absent in French,
Dutch and German. De Wit (2016) shows that the sentence (92) can be felicitously
used by French speakers to convey that they are going home.
(92) Ne t’ inquiète
pas, j’ arrive
à toute suite
refl 2sg worry.pres.2sg neg 1sg arrive.pres.1sg at right away
‘Don’t worry, I’m arriving–see you right away!’
De Wit (2016), however, argues that the incompatibility between present tense
and perfective aspect is rooted in cognition, and thus it is universal. The present
form of verbs in languages that appear to lack such an incompatibility has properties that make it difficult to draw a conclusion about the status of the present perfective paradox. Following Smith (1997), she argues that imperfective and perfective
aspects don’t have a morphological realization in French, Dutch and German. Thus,
the present form of the verb is ambiguous between perfective and imperfective
readings. This has been illustrated with the example (93) by Smith (1997). As the
translation shows, (93) allows for two interpretations. The events of Mary smiling
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and Paul arriving can either be overlapping (i.e., imperfective) or sequential (i.e.,
perfective).

10

(93) Marie sourit
toujours quand Paul arrive
à la
Mary smile.pres.3sg always when Paul arrive.pres.3sg loc def.sg.f
maison.
house
Mary always smiles / is always smiling, when Paul gets home.
Based on this, she concludes that aspect in the sentence (92) is in fact imperfective. Given that imperfective aspect in Farsi has a distinct morphological realization, the same analysis cannot be entertained. As it was discussed in the section
2.1.1, present tense in Farsi patterns with present tense in German and Dutch in
having a non-past semantics, and can freely refer to a future time (Pancheva &
Von Stechow 2004). Unlike the case with present imperfective and present perfect
aspect, however, the future reading of present perfective is limited to imminent
events. The example (90b) also shows that present perfective is not compatible
with future-oriented adverbs. Therefore, I take the restriction on the future interpretation of present perfective in Farsi to be the footprint of the present perfective
paradox in Farsi.

2.1.4

Subjunctive

Farsi lacks infinitive clauses, and the subjunctive is used in environments where
an infinitive form is expected. In this section, I show that the so-called subjunctive
in Farsi lack deictic temporal features. That is, the distinction between indicative
and subjunctive mood in Farsi is in the presence or the absence of deictic tense.
There are three subjunctive forms in Farsi that vary in their aspectual properties:
imperfective, perfect, and perfective.
10 The

issue is more complex. De Wit (2016) notes that northern Slavic languages that lack other
dedicated future construction use present perfective to refer to future situations.
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The embedded clause of certain predicates and modals as well as the antecedent
of conditionals appear in the subjunctive form. The occurrence of subjunctive forms
in matrix clauses is restricted to the expression of wishes (as in (94a)), and suggestions (as in (94b)) (Windfuhr & Perry 2013; Darzi & Kwak 2015). I show the
subjunctive forms with ∅ in glosses, indicating that subjunctive forms lack deictic
tense.
(94)

a. xoda beh-et sabr
be-dah-ad.
god to-you patience impf-give.∅-3.sg
May god give you the patience.
b. be-rim
impf-go.∅-1pl
let’s go.

2.1.4.1

Subjunctive imperfective

Let us start with imperfective subjunctive, which is traditionally called simple subjunctive, which is made with adding the prefix be- to the verbal root.
(95) be-rav-ad
impf-go-∅-3sg
Darzi & Kwak (2015) observe that subjunctive imperfective (present subjunctive
in their terminology) locates the event of the embedded clause at a time interval
simultaneous or after the reference time which is the matrix event time, as in (96a)
and (96b).
(96)

a. Reza fekr
mi-kard
ke Ali diruz/emruz/farda
Rez thought impf-do.pst.3sg that Ali yesterday/today/tomorrow
be-rav-ad
unja.
impf-go-∅-3sg there
‘Reza thought that Ali would go there yesterday/today/tomorrow.’
b. Reza fekr
mi-kon-∅-ad
ke Ali *diruz/emruz/farda
Rez thought impf-do-pres-3sg that Ali yesterday/today/tomorrow
be-rav-ad
unja.
impf-go-∅-3sg there
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‘Reza thinks that Ali is going there *yesterday/today/tomorrow.’
adapted from (Darzi & Kwak 2015)
Counterparts of these sentences with matrix verb ‘know’, which only takes indicative complements, have an imperfective in their embedded clauses.
(97)

a. Reza mi-dan-est
ke Ali diruz/emruz/farda
Rez impf-know-pst.3sg that Ali yesterday/today/tomorrow
mi-rav-∅-ad
unja.
impf-go-pres-3sg there
‘Reza knew that Ali would go there yesterday/today/tomorrow.’
b. Reza mi-dan-∅-ad
ke Ali diruz/emruz/farda
Rez impf-know-pres-3sg that Ali yesterday/today/tomorrow
mi-rav-∅-ad
unja.
impf-go-pres-3sg there
‘Reza knows that Ali is going there *yesterday/today/tomorrow.’

Another argument in favor of imperfectivity of subjunctive verb forms with beis that they can express generic meaning, like its indicative counterpart mi-.
(98)

a. man fekr
mi-kon-∅-am
ke zamin dor-e
xoršid
I
thought impf-do-pres-1sg that earth around-ez sun
be-čarx-ad
impf-revolve.∅-3sg
I think that earth revolves around the sun.
b. man mi-dan-∅-am
ke zamin dor-e
xoršid
I
impf-know-pres-1sg that earth around-ez sun
mi-čarx-∅-ad
impf-revolve-pres-3sg
I know that earth revolves around the sun.

2.1.4.2

Subjunctive perfect

The second subjunctive form is subjunctive perfect, traditionally called past subjunctive. It is made with the past participle and the subjunctive form of the auxiliary
be.
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(99) rafte baš-ad
go-pp aux.∅-3sg
Darzi & Kwak (2015) also observe that subjunctive perfect locates the event of
the embedded clause at a time interval preceding the reference time which can be the
matrix event time (101a), a time denoted by a temporal adverbial in the embedded
clause (101b).
(100)

a. Reza fekr
mi-kon-∅-ad
ke Ali diruz
unja rafte
Reza thought impf-do.pres.3sg that Ali yesterday there go-pp
baš-ad
aux.∅-3sg
‘Reza thinks that Ali has gone there yesterday.’
adapted from (Darzi & Kwak 2015)
b. Reza diruz
fekr
mi-kard
ke Ali ta farda
unja
Rez yesterday thought impf-do.pst.3sg that Ali by tomorrow there
rafte baš-ad
go-pp aux.∅-3sg
‘Yesterday, Reza thought that Ali would have gone there by tomorrow.’

Counterparts of these sentences with matrix verb ‘know’, which only takes indicative complements, have perfect aspect in their embedded clauses.
(101)

a. Reza mi-dan-∅-ad
ke Ali diruz
unja rafte ast
Reza impf-know-pres-3sg that Ali yesterday there go-pp aux.pres.3sg
‘Reza knows that Ali has gone there yesterday.’
adapted from (Darzi & Kwak 2015)
b. Reza diruz
mi-dan-est
ke Ali ta farda
unja rafte
Rez yesterday impf-know-pst.3sg that Ali by tomorrow there go-pp
ast
aux.pres.3sg
‘Yesterday, Reza knew that Ali would have gone there by tomorrow.’

Neither perfect subjunctive nor perfect indicative can express generic meaning.
(102)

a. # man fekr
mi-kon-∅-am
ke zamin dor-e
xoršid
I
thought impf-do-pres-1sg that earth around-ez sun
čarxide baš-ad.
revolve.pp aux.∅.3sg
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I think that earth has revolved around the sun.
b. # man mi-dan-∅-am
ke zamin dor-e
xoršid čarxide
I
impf-know-pres-1sg that earth around-ez sun revolve.pp
ast.
aux.pres.3sg
I know that earth has revolved around the sun.
Given the data presented above, and following Windfuhr & Perry (2013) and
Darzi & Kwak (2015), I take subjunctive in Farsi to lack an autonomous time reference. More specifically, I follow the proposal by Ferreira (2017), and posit that
subjunctive forms in Farsi are the morphological realizations of zero tense (See
also Pica (1984); Picallo (1984); Johnson (1985); Landau (2004) for accounts of the
subjunctive in terms of anaphoric tense). It is the higher tense that is responsible for manipulating the temporal location of the event. I propose that be- is the
morphological realization of zero tense imperfective, as shown in (103a). I also
take the prefix mi- to not only encode information about the aspectual property
of the verb but also about the existence of a value for tense, as shown in (103b).
In fact, some traditional grammarians have analyzed mi- to be the marker of the
indicative mood (Anvari & Ahmadi Givi 1995; Khanlari 1988). The consensus in
the literature, however, is that the marker always denotes imperfectivity (Windfuhr
1979; Taleghani 2008; Windfuhr & Perry 2013; Darzi & Kwak 2015). The entry in
(103b) captures both of these intuitions.
(103)

a. T[∅][Asp[impf]] → be(“imperfective subjunctive”)
b. T[pres/pst][Asp[impf]] → mi(“imperfective indicative”)

Similarly, I take subjunctive perfect form to encode zero tense perfect, as shown
in (104a).
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(104)

a. T[∅][Asp[perfect]] → verb.pp aux.∅: baš
(“perfect subjunctive”)
b. T[pres][Asp[perfect]] →verb.pp aux.pres: ∅
(“perfect indicative”: present perfect)
c. T[pst][Asp[perfect]] →verb.pp aux.pst: bud
(“perfect indicative”: past perfect)

2.1.4.3

Subjunctive perfective

As Windfuhr & Perry (2013) note, the perfective form of verbs in Farsi can also have
a subjunctive function, by which I mean it can lack a deictic temporal specification.
That is, it neither patterns with present perfective nor with past perfective. Rather, it
only contributes a perfective interpretation. Moreover, like other subjunctive forms
in Farsi, it is used when the truth of the sentence bearing a perfective marker is an
open issue.
In certain embedded contexts such as under certain modals, the antecedent of
conditionals and adverbial clauses, perfective is used to refer to a future event or
state that will necessarily have been completed by the time of the matrix event.
As we saw in (86), repeated here as (105), the perfective form of the verb appears under the future modal, in which case the modal bears the agreement morphology and the verb appears with perfective morphology and default third person
agreement, which is morphologically null.
(105) Farda
be bimarestan xah-∅-am
raft.
tomorrow to hospital
want-pres-1sg go.perf.∅.3sg
I am going to the hospital tomorrow.
It can also appear under impersonal modals, bearing a default third person
agreement. These modals can only have a deontic reading.
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(106)

a. bayad haqiqat ra goft.
should truth ra say.perf.∅.3sg
It is necessary to tell the truth.
b. mi-tavan haqiqat ra goft.
impf-can truth ra say.perf.∅.3sg
It is possible to tell the truth.
c. mi-šav-∅-ad
haqiqat ra goft.
impf-become-pres-3sg truth ra say.perf.∅.3sg
It is possible to tell the truth.
d. mi-šod
haqiqat ra goft.
impf-become-pst truth ra say.perf.∅.3sg
It was possible to tell the truth.

It is important to note that these modals only take subjunctive complements and
are incompatible with indicative complements.
(107)

a. bayad haqiqat ra be-gu-yi/
*mi-gu-∅-yi.
should truth ra impf-say.∅.2sg/ impf-say-pres-2sg
You should tell the truth.
b. mi-tavan-i haqiqat ra be-gu-yi/
mi-gu-∅-yi.
impf-can truth ra impf-say.∅.2sg/ impf-say-pres-2sg
You can tell the truth.
c. mi-šav-∅-ad
haqiqat ra be-gu-yi/
*mi-gu-∅-yi.
impf-become-pres-3sg truth ra impf-say.∅.2sg/ impf-say-pres-2sg
It is possible to tell the truth.
d. mi-šod
haqiqat ra be-gu-yi/
*mi-gu-∅-yi.
impf-become-pst truth ra impf-say.∅.2sg/ impf-say-pres-2sg
it was possible to tell the truth.

Another environment perfective subjunctive appears is under the modal adverbial maybe, in which case the perfective form of verbs bear agreement morphology.
In the same environment, an imperfective subjunctive can also be used, but an
imperfective indicative is not felicitous11 .
11 That

is not to say that indicative forms are ungrammatical with maybe, but they are infelicitous
in scenarios when the truth of the modal claim is an open issue.
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(108) The result of lottery will be announced tomorrow:
a. šayad barande šod-i
maybe winner become.perf.∅.2sg
maybe, you’ll win.
b. šayad barande be-š-i
maybe winner impf-become-.∅.2sg
maybe, you’ll win.
c. #šayad barande mi-š-∅-i
maybe winner impf-become-pres.2sg
maybe, you’ll win.
Subjunctive perfective can appear in the antecedent of conditionals, in which
case it refers to a future event whose realization or completion is a precondition
for the consequent. The aspectual contrast between subjunctive perfective and imperfective manifests itself when the antecedent contains a stative predicate. Stative
predicates are known to be incompatible with perfective aspect, which requires
bounded predicates. When perfective aspect combines with unbounded predicates
like statives, an eventive interpretation is coerced (De Swart 1998; Bary 2009; Homer
2011). Stage-level stative predicates, like being tired in (109a), are coerced in perfective.
(109) Stage-level statives:
a. agar Ali xaste bud,
mozahem-sš ne-mi-š-∅-am
if
Ali tired be.perf.∅.3sg, bother-him neg-impf-become-pres-1sg
If Ali is (found out to be) tired, I will not bother him.
b. agar Ali xaste baš-ad, mozahem-sš ne-mi-š-∅-am
if
Ali tired be.∅-3sg, bother-him neg-impf-become-pres-1sg
If Ali is tired, I will not bother him.
Individual-level statives need some contextual support for coercion. The presence of temporal adverbial then in (110a) facilitates an eventive interpretation.
(110) Individual-level statives:
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a. agar Ali #(un moghe) mehrabun bud,
komak-et
if
Ali (that moment) kind
be.perf.∅.3sg, help-you
mi-kon-∅-ad
impf-do-pres-3sg
If Ali is being kind then (is in a good mood), he will help you. This cannot
mean If Ali is kind, he will help you.
b. agar Ali mehrabun baš-ad, komak-et mi-kon-∅-ad
if
Ali (that
moment) kind
be.∅-3sg,
help-you
impf-do-pres-3sg
If Ali is being kind then (is in a good mood), he will help you. and If Ali is
kind, he will help you.
Certain individual-level predicates like intelligent cannot be coerced, and thus
are incompatible with perfective. The infelicity of (111a) illustrates this fact.
(111) Individual-level statives:
a. #agar Ali bahuš
bud,
javab-e
in soal
ra
if
Ali intelligent be.perf.∅.3sg, answer-ez this question ra
mi-dan-∅-ad
impf-know-pres-3sg
If Ali is intelligent, he knows the answer to this question.
b. agar Ali bahuš
baš-ad, javab-e
in soal
ra
if
Ali intelligent be.∅.3sg, answer-ez this question ra
mi-dan-∅-ad
impf-know-pres-3sg
If Ali is intelligent, he knows the answer to this question.
when clauses and after clauses are other contexts where subjunctive perfective
can appear, and refer to a future event that is required to be completed before the
matrix event.
(112)

a. vaghti res-id,
beh-et zang mi-zan-∅-am
when arrive-perf.∅.3sg to-you call impf-hit-pres-1sg
When she arrives, I will call you.
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b. bad-e inke kelas-eš tamum shod,
beh-et zang
after-ez that class-her end
become-perf.∅.3sg to-you call
mi-zan-∅-am
impf-hit-pres-1sg
After her class ends, I will call you.
In the same environments, imperfective indicative is infelicitous to refer to future events.
(113)

a. vaghti be-res-ad/
#mi-res-∅-ad,
beh-et zang
when impf-arrive.∅.3sg/ impf-become-pres-3sg to-you call
mi-zan-∅-am
impf-hit-pres-1sg
When she arrives, I will call you.
b. bad-e inke kelas-eš tamum be-šav-ad/
after-ez that class-her end
impf-become.∅.3sg/
#mi-šav-∅-ad,
beh-et zang mi-zan-∅-am
impf-become-pres-3sg to-you call impf-hit-pres-1sg
After her class ends, I will call you.

The time of the event in the matrix clause of a when clause that contains subjunctive perfective is understood to strictly follow the antecedent event. A progressive
verb in the matrix clause is incompatible with subjunctive perfective matrix clauses,
as shown in (114a). Only subjunctive imperfective can be used in such case, as in
(114b).
(114)

a. # vaqti Ali res-id,
dar-∅-im
šam mi-xor-∅-im
when Ali arrive.perf.∅.3sg, prog-pres-1pl dinner impf-eat-pres-1pl
When Ali arrives, we will be eating dinner.
b. vaqti Ali be-res-ad,
dar-im
šam mi-xor-∅-im
when Ali impf-arrive.∅.3sg, prog-pres-1pl dinner impf-eat-pres-1pl
When Ali arrives, we will be eating dinner.

The table below summarizes morphological representations of past and present
temporal relations in Farsi.
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Perfective
Imperfective
Perfect

“Indicative”
Present
Past
raghs-id-∅-am
raghs-id-am
verb-perf-pres-1sg
verb-perf-pst-1sg
mi-raghs-∅-am
mi-raghs-id-am
impf-verb-pres-1sg
impf-verb-pst-1sg
raghs-ide ∅-am
raghs-ide bud-am
verb-pp aux.pres.1sg verb-pp aux.pst.1sg

“Subjunctive”
∅-tense
raghs-id-am
verb-perf-∅-1sg
be-raghs-am
impf-verb-∅-1sg
raghs-ide baš-am
verb-pp aux.∅.1sg

Table 2.3: Morphological representations of tense and aspect in Farsi

2.2

Inventory of Tenses in Farsi

I adopt a presuppositional theory of tense (Heim 1994) within the situation-based
framework. Following Kratzer (1998a), I argue for the existence of two different
kinds of tenses in Farsi: (i) deictic tenses (past and present) which add a temporal
constraint on the value of situation variable in their embedded aspectual phrase,
and (ii) zero tense which is just an identity function and does not carry any temporal presupposition.
In this section, I will discuss the inventory of Farsi tenses. In the first part of this
section, I argue that present tense in Farsi is shiftable (a.k.a. ‘relative tense’). That
is, the time reference is construed as present relative to a time in its local or global
context. I then argue that past tense in Farsi is unshiftable (a.k.a. ‘absolute tense’)
and is always interpreted as past relative to the speech time. Lastly, I argue that
so-called subjunctive forms in Farsi are morphological realization of zero tense.
(115)

The inventory of Farsi tenses:
a. Unshiftable (absolute) tense: past
b. Shiftable (relative) tense: present
c. Zero tense: ‘subjunctive’
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2.2.1

Shiftable Present

Like Russian and Hebrew, Farsi has a shiftable present tense. That is, present tense
in Farsi under the complement clause of a past attitude predicate, can be interpreted
de se. That is, it can be evaluated with respect to the time in which the attitude
holder self-locates themselves. For instance, the sentence in (116) conveys that the
time of John’s living in Amherst overlaps with the time at which Ana self-located
herself when uttering ”John lives in Amherst now” in 2004.
(116) Ana in 2004: ”John lives in Amherst now.”
dar 2004, Ana gof-t
ke John dar Amherst zendegi
In 2004, Ana say-perf.pst.3sg that John in Amherst live
mi-kon-∅-ad.
impf-do-pres-3sg
’In 2004, Ana said that John lived in Amherst (then).’
Languages with a shiftable present differ in whether or not present tense can
shift outside of attitudinal environments, such as relative clauses. While present
tense in Hebrew and Russian does not shift in such environments, present tense in
Japanese does. Farsi behaves like Hebrew and Russian in this respect. The sentence
in (117a) is infelicitous in the given context where an absolute reading is ruled out.
This shows that Farsi present tense does not shift in relative clauses.
(117) John is dead. Lyn met John in 1985. He was living in Amherst then.
a. # dar 1985, Lyn mardi
ra molaqat kard
ke hamun
In 1985, Lyn man-indf ra meet
do.perf.pst.3sg that same
moghe dar Amherst zendegi mi-kon-∅-ad.
time in Amherst live
impf-do-pres-3sg
’In 1985, Lyn met a man who lives in Amherst.’
b. dar 1985, Lyn mardi
ra molaqat kard
ke hamun
In 1985, Lyn man-indf ra meet
do.perf.pst.3sg that same
moghe dar Amherst zendegi mi-kard.
time in Amherst live
impf-do-pst-3sg
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’In 1985, Lyn met a man who lives in Amherst.’
In Section 2.1, I showed that present tense in Farsi, like German, has a non-past
semantics. I take the pattern of data presented above as evidence for the shiftability
of present tense in languages like Farsi and Russian. Shiftable (relative) tenses can
be interpreted relative to a point in time, which can be provided either the global
context of utterance or the local context introduced by an attitude predicate.
I propose (118a) as the denotation of present tense in Farsi. According to (118a),
present tense (presenti ) receives an interpretation that depends on a variable assignment ( g), and there is a deictic constraint that the denotation should be nonpast relative to i, which is just a variable ranging over situations without any deictic constraint. This situation variable takes its value from the global or the local
context. Note that the denotation of Farsi present tense (118a) differ from the
denotation of English present tense (118b) in two respects: (i) Unlike Farsi present
tense that has a non-past semantics, and can freely refer to future, English present
tense presupposes that the temporal slice of s overlaps with the temporal slice of a
free variable si (ii) While si in the denotation of English present tense is set to the
speech situation, in Farsi this free variable can get its value from its local context.12
(118)

a. Farsi
Jpresenti Kc,g =λPhs,ti . λs : τ (si )  τ (s). P(s) = 1.
b. English
Jpresenti Kg = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ◦ τ (si ). P(s) = 1, where si is the speech
situation by default.

12 Alternatively,

we can represent si as variable in syntax and let it be bound by the closest ccommanding binder.
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2.2.2

Unshiftable Past

This section has two main objectives. In the first of this section, I argue that Farsi
past tense is an absolute tense. That, is it is always construed as past relative to
the speech situations. I also present data showing that Farsi lacks a SOT rule. In
the second part of this section, I bring up a data point about Farsi past that will be
that will be important in the subsequent chapters. Farsi past tense cannot occur in
the antecedent of conditionals to describe a past situation. Instead, perfect aspect
is used. I then show that this property seems to be shared among languages that
pattern with Farsi in the competition between past tense and present perfect.

2.2.2.1

No SOT Rule

In some languages, known as SOT languages, there is a mechanism by which temporal features of an embedded past tense remains uninterpreted. The details of this
mechanism does not concern us here (tense deletion under c-command (Sharvit
2003, 2018) or feature transmission (Abusch 1997; Kratzer 1998a; Grønn & Von Stechow 2010)). I will refer to this mechanism as ‘tense deletion rule’ because of the
transparency of this term, but this does not come with a theoretical commitment.
The existence of the tense deletion rule accounts for the availability of a simultaneous reading for (119), which is ambiguous between a ‘simultaneous’ and a ‘backshifted’ reading.
(119) On January 20th, 2021, Mary said that Donald was the president.
Simultaneous reading: Mary said:‘Donald is the president.’
Mary is a devoted Trump supporter who thinks the election was rigged. She still
considers Trump to be the legitimate president of the US.
Back-shifted reading: Mary said:‘Donald was the president.’
Mary is a democrat and is happy that Trump lost the election.
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Now let us look at data showing that Farsi lacks a tense deletion rule. The same
sentence in Farsi only has a back-shifted reading.
(120) Dar Janvie-ye 2021, Mary goft ke Donald raees-jomhoor bud.
In Jauary-ez 2021, Mary say.perf.pst.3sg that Donal president be.pst.3sg
Only back-shifted reading: Mary said:‘Donald was the president.’
In languages that lack a tense deletion rule, like Hebrew and Russian, the tense
feature of an embedded past is always interpreted. This, however, does not mean
that a past-under-past construction cannot have a simultaneous reading in non-SOT
languages. An embedded past event which is interpreted as past with respect to the
utterance time can happen to have the same running time as the matrix past event.
In (121), for instance, both loving and saying are evaluated as past with respect to
the utterance time.
(121) Sara broke up with Sina last week. Two years ago, Sara told Sina that she loved
him. But she doesn’t love him anymore.
do sal piš Sara be Sina gof-t
ke dust-aš dašt.
two year ago Sara to Sina say-perf.pst.3sg that love-her have.pst.3sg
‘Two years ago, Sara told Sina that she loved him.’1314
This strategy gives rise to a de re interpretation of past tense (Ogihara 1989;
Abusch 1997), and the temporal features of the embedded tense are interpreted.
13 I should note that for many of my consultants, including myself, the embedded past is in general

marked, and is only acceptable with certain intonation (putting focus on the matrix verb say).
14 This is similar to double access reading of present tense in English, exemplified in (i).
(i)

John thought that Mary is pregnant.

The key intuition is that such sentences make reference to two times: Mary’s pregnancy overlaps
with both (i) the attitude holder’s now (de se component) and (ii) the utterance time (de re
component) (Enç 1987; Abusch 1997; Heim 1994, among others).
Similarly, simultaneous readings of the embedded past tense is only allowed when the event
described by the complement is past with respect to both the attitude holder’s now, and the actual
utterance time. This seems to me to be the difference between (121) and (120). I leave this as a topic
for future research.

57

Therefore, simultaneous readings are in principle available in both SOT and nonSOT languages (Sharvit 2014; Bar-Lev 2015). Only simultaneous readings that are
the result of a tense deletion rule are expected to be absent in non-SOT languages.
How can we show that the simultaneous reading of past-under-past constructions
in Farsi is only achieved via a de re strategy? Consider the context given in (122) in
which Sara still loves Sina. Since the use of past tense in Farsi triggers a cessation
implicature, the past form of the verb love is infelicitous when the loving state still
holds and is not entirely in the past of the utterance time.
(122) Sara and Sina are a happy couple and love each other. Two years ago, Sara told Sina
for the first time that she loved him.
# do sal piš Sara be Sina gof-t
ke dust-aš dašt.
two year ago Sara to Sina say-perf.pst.3sg that love-her have.pst.3sg
‘Two years ago, Sara told Sina that she loved him.’
Another way to distinguish between the two strategies to obtain simultaneous
readings is to block the de re interpretation of the embedded past and check whether
the sentence can still have a simultaneous reading (Ogihara & Sharvit 2012). Tsilia
(2021) argues that Farsi lacks a tense deletion rule by showing that the example
(123), where the de re interpretation of the embedded past is blocked, only has a
back-shifted reading.
(123) hafteie pish,
Abtin goft ke dah ruz dige be dustdoxtar-esh
week previous, Abtin tell-pst that ten day other to girlfriend-his
xaahad goft ke daf’eie axari-bud ke hamdigaro didand
will
tell-pst that time last-was that eachother see-pst
‘A week ago, Abtin said that in ten days he would say to his girlfriend that they had
met for the last time’

(Tsilia 2021)

The simultaneous reading is only available when shiftable present is used.
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(124) hafteie pish,
Abtin goft ke dah ruz dige be dustdoxtar-esh
week previous, Abtin tell-pst that ten day other to girlfriend-his
xaahad goft ke daf’eie axari-e ke hamdigaro mibinand
will
tell-pst that time last-is that eachother see-pres
‘A week ago, Abtin said that in ten days he would say to his girlfriend that they met
for the last time.’

(Tsilia 2021)

In the context (125) where the intended reading of ”two hours ago, Zahra thought
it was 2.” is only true with a de se interpretation of the embedded tense, a pastunder-past construction a 125a is infelicitous. Farsi behaves exactly like other nonSOT languages that have a shiftable present. Such languages usually achieve the
simultaneous reading via a shiftable present instead. As shown in (125b), the
embedded verb should bear a present tense in order to convey a simultaneous de se
reading.
(125) It’s now 1pm. Two hours ago when it was 11am, Zahra thought it was 2pm.
a. # Do sa’at-e piš Zahra fekr
mi-kard
ke Sa’at 2 bud.
two hour-ez ago Zahra though impf-do.pst.3sg that hour 2 be.pst.3sg
‘Two hours ago, Zahra thought it was 2.’
b. Do sa’at-e piš Zahra fekr
mi-kard
ke Sa’at 2 ast
two hour-ez ago Zahra though impf-do.pst.3sg that hour 2 be.pres.3sg
‘Two hours ago, Zahra thought it was 2.’
The inability of past-under-past constructions in Farsi to obtain a simultaneous
reading in de re blocking scenarios, shows that Farsi lacks the tense deletion rule.
Past-under-future constructions in Farsi cannot have a Later-than-Matrix readings in which the embedded event is interpreted as past relative to the matrix event.
(126) # do mah-e
digar Zahra be Carl mi-guy-ad
ke mah-e
two month-ez other Zahra to Carl impf-say.pres-3sg that month-ez
qabl defa
kard.
before defense do.past.perf-3sg
‘Two months from now, Zahra will tell Carl that she defended (her thesis) a month
before.’
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Given the data discussed above, I take past tense in Farsi to be an unshiftable
(absolute) tense, which can only be interpreted relative to the speech situation.

2.2.2.2

Competition between past and present perfect

It is infelicitous to use simple past in the antecedent of Farsi conditionals to refer to
a past event.
(127) *Agar John dirooz
raghs-id/
mi-raghs-id,
Mary ham
if
John yesterday dance-perf.pst.3sg/ impf-dance-pst.3sg, Mary too
raghs-id/raghs-ide
ast.
dance-perf.pst.3sg/dance-pp axu.pres.3sg
‘If John danced yesterday, Mary danced too.’
To refer to a past event in the antecedent of a conditional, Farsi uses either
present perfect (128a) or subjunctive perfect (128b).
(128)

a. Agar John dirooz
(mi)-raghs-ide ast,
Mary ham
if
John yesterday (impf)-dance-pp axu.pres.3sg, Mary too
raghs-ide ast.
dance-pp axu.pres.3sg
‘If John danced yesterday, Mary danced too.’
b. Agar John dirooz
raghs-ide bash-ad, Mary ham raghs-ide
if
John yesterday dance-pp axu.∅.3sg, Mary too dance-pp
ast.
axu.pres.3sg
‘If John danced yesterday, Mary danced too.’

I do not attempt to account for why this happens, but this descriptive fact will
be important in the discussion of Farsi conditionals in Chapter Three. Here, I want
to demonstrate that infelicity of simple past in the antecedent of conditionals is not
limited to Farsi. It seems to exist in languages that pattern together when it comes
to the competition between past tense and present perfect.
It is infelicitous to use the simple past in the antecedent of conditionals to refer
to a past event in languages like German (129a) and Dutch (130a). Instead, present
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perfect has to be used in such contexts.
(129)

a. # Wenn Hans auf der Party war, war die Party lustig / ist die Party
If
John at the party was, was the party fun / is the party
lustig gewesen
fun been
If john was at the party, the party was/has been fun.
b. Wenn Hans auf der Party gewesen ist, war die Party lustig / ist die
If
John at the party been
is, was the party fun / is the
Party lustig gewesen
party fun been
If john has been at the party, the party was/has been fun.
German

(130)

a. ?? Als Jan op het feest was, is het feest leuk geweest / was het
If John at the party was, is the party fun been
/ was the
feest leuk
party fun
If john was at the party, the party was/has been fun.
b. Als Jan op het feest is geweest, is het feest leuk geweest / was het
If John at the party is been,
is the party fun been
/ was the
feest leuk
party fun
If john has been at the party, the party was/has been fun.
Dutch

We have seen in (131a) and (55), repeated below in as (131), that present perfect
in German and Farsi can felicitously combine with ‘specific’ past time adverbials.
(131)

a. Hans ist gestern um zehn weggegangen.
Hans is yesterday at 10 left
Hans has left yesterday at 10.

(Musan 2001)

b. Ali dirooz
reside ast.
Ali yesterday arrive.pp aux.3sg
Ali has arrived yesterday.
Schaden (2009) argues that the differences observed among languages with
respect to the present perfect puzzle, is part of a bigger pattern of cross-linguistic
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variation in the outcome of the competition between simple past and present perfect. He argues that simple past in German and French cannot be used in contexts
where some current relevance of the event under consideration is required.
A context where the current relevance can be tracked is where an object resulting from a past event is under discussion at the moment of utterance. Schaden
(2009) shows that while the English simple past can be felicitously used to describe
an event that outputs the object while pointing at it, simple past in German cannot.
Instead, present perfect has to be used in such contexts. This has been illustrated
in (132).
(132) The speaker is pointing to the picture painted by their daughter:
a. My daughter painted this.
b. # Meine Tochter malte das.
My
daughter painted this
Schaden (2009) comments that (132b) can only be interpreted as the thing represented in this picture has been painted at some time in the past by my daughter, but not
as this is a picture that my daughter painted. To convey the latter meaning in German,
present perfect has to be used.
Farsi patterns with German. In the context described above, the simple past in
Farsi is infelicitous, as shown in (133a), and present perfect should be used instead,
as in (133b).
(133)

a. # doxtar-am in naghaši ro kešid.
daughter-my this painting ra draw-perf.pst.3sg
My daughter painted this painting.
b. doxtar-am in naghaši ro kešide ast
daughter-my this painting ra draw.pp aux.pres.3sg
My daughter has painted this painting.

Kratzer (1998a) makes a similar observation. She notes that simple past tense
in English and German behave differently. The use of simple past in the question
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in (134a) is acceptable out of the blue. The example in (134b) shows that simple
past in German is infelicitous out of the blue. In such contexts, present perfect is
used in German, as shown in (134c).
(134)

a. Who built this Church? Borromini built this church.
b. *Wer baute diese Kirche? Borromini baute diese Kirche.
Who built this church? Borromini built this church.
c. Wer hat diese Kirche gebaut? Borromini hat diese Kirche gebaut.
Who has this church built? Borromini has this church built.
(Kratzer 1998a)

In Farsi, like German, sentences containing a past tense need a contextually
salient past time to be felicitous. If a salient past time is not available, present perfect
is used instead. This is shown in examples (135) and (136).
(135) You are looking at mosques in Isfahan. Out of the blue, the following question
comes up:
a. # ki in majesd ra saxt?
who this mosque ra build.perf.pst.3sg
‘Who built this mosque?’
b. ki in majesd ra saxte
ast?
who this mosque ra build.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘Who has built this mosque?’
(136)

a. be hameye šekayat-i
ke #(dirooz) daryaft
to every complaints-indef that yesterday received
šo-d
residegi mi-šav-∅-ad
becom-perf.pst.3sg reviewed impf-become-pres-3sg
‘Every complain that was received yesterday will be reviewed. ’
b. be hameye šekayat-i
ke daryaft šode
ast
to every complaints-indef that received become.pp aux.pres.3sg
residegi mi-šav-∅-ad
reviewed impf-become-pres-3sg
‘Every complain that was received will be reviewed. ’
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Schaden (2009) describes the difference between languages that pattern with
English (like Spanish) and languages that pattern with German (like French, Dutch
and Farsi) as follows: In English-like languages, present perfect is not the only way
to express current relevance. In German-like languages, however, present perfect
is necessarily used to express current relevance.

In sum, it seems that the infelicity of past tense in the antecedent of conditionals in certain languages is part of the cross-linguistic pattern of the competition
between present perfect and past tense. I leave the question of why such infelicity
arises to future study.

2.2.3

Zero tense

Following Kratzer (1998a); Arregui (2005), I propose that in addition to two deictic
tenses (past and present), the inventory of tenses in Farsi has a zero tense, which is
traditionally referred to as ‘subjunctive’. Unlike deictic tenses, zero tenses does not
add any temporal constraint on the value of the situation variable in the embedded
aspectual phrase. Zero tenses are simply identity functions.
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(137) J∅Kg =λPhs,ti . P
Given that the shiftability of present tense in Farsi, there are embedded contexts where both zero tense and present tenses can describe the temporal relation
between matrix and embedded events.
(138)

a. dirooz
Ana fekr
mi-kard
ke Sara be mehmani
yesterday Ana thought impf-do.pst that Sara to party
be-ay-ad.
impf-come.∅-3sg
Yesterday, Ana thought that Sara would come to the party.
b. dirooz
Ana fekr
mi-kard
ke Sara be mehmani
yesterday Ana thought impf-do.pst that Sara to party
mi-ay-∅-ad.
impf-come-pres-3sg
Yesterday, Ana thought that Sara would come to the party.

In the next section, I will show that these two tenses differ in presuppositions
they trigger. Following (Mari & Portner 2018), I take the zero tense in Farsi to
presuppose that the truth of the proposition is not settled in the context. Present
tense, on the other hand, trigger the presupposition that the context either entails
the truth of the proposition or it entails that it is asserted in the context, which is
similar to the presupposition (Farkas 2003; Schlenker 2005) assign to the indicative
mood. In the next chapter, however, I show that this is in fact the presupposition
of deictic tenses in Farsi, and not the mood.

2.3

Tense and aspect in Farsi conditionals

It has been observed that languages use their inventories of temporal morphology to mark semantics and pragmatic differences in conditionals. What makes
Farsi interesting is that it uses seven out of nine logically possible combinations
of tense (present, past, zero tense) and aspect (imperfectice, perfective, perfect)
morphemes to distinguish between different kinds of conditionals.
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These three types of conditionals have imperfective and perfect versions. Temporal specifications of the antecedent is determined in part by aspect in the antecedent. Imperfective antecedents are compatible with past (only in past marked
conditionals), present and future situations. Perfect antecedents are compatible
with past and future situations, but not with present situations. Perfective aspect
only shows up in the antecedent of zero tense conditionals, and can only refer to
future situations.
In the rest of this chapter, I give a brief description of Farsi conditionals. Properties of Farsi conditionals will be discussed in more details in the next two chapters.

2.3.1

Tense

The antecedents of the conditionals in (139) have perfect aspect, and they all describe a past situation. These conditionals, however, differ in the tense morphology
of their antecedents, which determines their interpretation. Consequents of Farsi
conditionals do not usually have an overt modal in them.15
(139)

a. Zero tense conditional
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
(hypothetical)

15 It

(i)

is of course possible to have an overt modal in the consequent but it is not necessary.
a. agar Ali mariz baš-ad/ ast,
mi-tavan-∅-ad moraxxasi be-gir-ad
if
Ali sick be.∅-3sg/ be.pres-3sg impf-can-pres-3sg leave
impf-take.∅-3sg
Roughly means: If Ali is sick, he can take a day off.
b. agar Ali mariz baš-ad/ ast,
bayad moraxxasi be-gir-ad
if
Ali sick be.∅-3sg/ be.pres-3sg should leave
impf-take.∅-3sg
Roughly means: If Ali is sick, he should take a day off.
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b. Present tense conditional
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
(factual)
c. Past tense conditional
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro mi-košt.
another-indf him ra ind.impf-kill.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
(counterfactual)
(139a) contains a zero tense (subjunctive), and has a hypothetical interpretation. That is, it can be used to talk about the consequence of a hypothetical situation
in which Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy (the antecedent might or might not be true in
reality). The only difference between (139b) and (139a) is that the antecedent of
(139b) is marked with present tense. Note that the consequent of both (139b) and
(139a) is in present tense. The English translations for both of these conditionals are
the same, but as the labels show, they have different interpretations in Farsi. (139b)
can only have a factual interpretation. That is, it can only be used in contexts where
in the antecedent proposition has been proposed to be true (usually by someone
other than the speaker (Bhatt & Pancheva 2017; Iatridou 1991)). The dialogue in
(140) provides a stereotypical example of factual conditionals.
(140)

a. My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
b. Oh yeah? If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
(Bhatt & Pancheva 2017)
67

In Farsi, such conditionals can only be made with present tense in the antecedent.
(141) My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
Oh yeah?
a. Present tense conditional
agar enqadr bahuš ast,
čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.pres.3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
b. Zero tense conditional
#agar enqadr bahuš baš-ad, čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.∅-3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
Going back to our Oswald examples, the truth of the antecedent proposition is
unsettled in the context below. It might or might not be the case that Oswald killed
Kennedy. Here, only a zero tense conditional is felicitous.
(142) Context: The police holds a press conference, and announces that they are investigating the speculation that Oswald might not be the murderer, but nothing is
certain. John and his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte #ast/
baš-ad,
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg/ aux.∅.3sg
kas-e
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
person-ez another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
When is a present tense conditional used? To see this, consider the following
context.
(143) Context: Investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and announces that they can confirm that Oswald wasn’t the murderer. John and his
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friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast/
baš-ad,
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg/ aux.∅.3sg
kas-e
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
person-ez another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
In the context given in (143), the antecedent proposition has been already asserted by the police. Here, both zero tense and present conditionals are felicitous.
Why is that? Isn’t the context settled with respect to the truth of the antecedent?
Shouldn’t we expect the zero tense conditional to be infelicitous?
Notice that the context doesn’t specify whether the proposition has been accepted or rejected by the participants in discourse. The mere act of asserting a
proposition doesn’t settle the question about the truth of that proposition in the
context. We disagree with each other, and reject many claims our interlocutors
make. Context doesn’t automatically change to entail a proposition that is asserted.
It only entails propositions that are accepted by all participants in discourse. While
context doesn’t necessarily presuppose a proposition (p) after its being asserted, it
does presupposes that ‘p is asserted’(Stalnaker 2014). All it takes for present tense
conditionals to be felicitous is that context entails that the antecedent proposition
is asserted. Zero tense conditionals are felicitous as long as the context doesn’t presuppose the truth or falsity of the antecedent proposition, irrespective of whether
it is asserted or not.
The example shows that in a context where the truth of the antecedent proposition is presupposed, the zero tense conditional is infelicitous. In such a context,
only a present tense conditional can be used.
(144) Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh oftaade ast/
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence fall.pp aux.pres.3sg/
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#baš-ad, jang-e jahani-e
sevvom ham mi-tavan-∅-ad
aux.∅-3sg war-ez worldwide-ez third also impf-can-pres-3sg
ettefagh be-oft-ad
occurrence impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars have happened, a third world war can also happen.
Past antecedent conditionals, like (139c), have a counterfactual reading. They
can only be used in contexts where the falsity of the antecedent proposition is
either presupposed or asserted. The consequent of these conditionals is always
in past tense. Like other conditionals in Farsi, there is usually no overt modal in the
consequent.16
Past conditionals show a similar pattern of competition with zero tense conditionals as present (factual) conditionals. Consider again the context given in (142),
repeated here in (145).
(145) Context: The police holds a press conference, and announces that they are investigating the speculation that Oswald might not be the murderer, but nothing is
certain. John and his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Past tense conditional
# Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
16 It is possible to have an overt modal in the consequent.

Note, however, that the presence of past
tense is still necessary. If the modal itself has a past form, like tavan, it appears in past. If the modal
lacks a past form, like bayad, it is the embedded verb that carries the past tense morphology.
(i)

a. Past tense conditional
agar Ali mariz (mi)-bud,
mi-tavan-est
moraxxasi be-gir-ad
if
Ali sick impf-be.pst.3sg impf-can-pst.3sg leave
impf-take.∅-3sg
Roughly means: If Ali was sick, he could have taken a day off.
b. Zero tense conditional
agar Ali mariz (mi)-bud,
bayad moraxxasi mi-gereft
if
Ali sick impf-be.pst.3sg should leave
impf-take.pst-3sg
Roughly means: If Ali was sick, he should have taken a day off.
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digar-i
ou ro košte bud
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
b. Zero tense conditional
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
Since the truth of the antecedent proposition is unsettled in the context, and its
falsity has not been asserted either, only a zero tense antecedent is accepted. Now,
let us consider the context in (146) where the falsity of the antecedent proposition
is asserted, but it is not specified whether the claim has been accepted. As was
the case with the competition between present tense and zero tense conditionals in
(143), both past tense and zero tense conditionals are felicitous in such a context.
The only difference is that here the disagreement with what has been asserted needs
to be marked, hence the use of ‘but’.
(146) Context: Investigation is complete. The police announces that they can confirm
that Oswald was in fact the murderer.
a. Past tense conditional
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte bud
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
b. Zero tense conditional
Amma agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
but
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
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‘But if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
Finally, in contexts where it is settled that the antecedent is false, the zero tense
conditional is infelicitous.
a. Past tense conditional
Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh na-oftaade bud,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence neg-fall.pp aux.pst.3sg
emkan
na-dašt
ke jang-e jahani-e
sevvom
possiblity neg-have.pst.3sg that war-ez worldwide-ez third
ettefagh be-oft-ad
occurrence impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars hadn’t happened, there wouldn’t have been the possibility of
a third world war.
b. Zero tense conditional
# Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh na-oftaade baš-ad,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence neg-fall.pp aux.∅-3sg
emkan
na-dar-∅-ad
ke jang-e jahani-e
sevvom
possiblity neg-have-pres-3sg that war-ez worldwide-ez third
ettefagh be-oft-ad
occurrence impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars haven’t happened, there won’t be a possibility of a third world
war.
To sum up, I have shown that conditionals whose antecedents lack deictic tense
(i.e. subjunctive) are used when the context doesn’t presuppose truth or falsity of
the antecedent. In contrast, conditionals whose antecedents carry a deictic tense
(present, past) are used when the context presupposes either the truth/ falsity of
the antecedent or the assertion of its truth/ falsity.
One might argue that it is the mood choice in the antecedent that distinguishes
subjunctive conditionals from past and present conditionals which have an indicative mood. Given that the mood distinction in Farsi is really about the presence or
72

absence of deictic tense, at this point this is just a choice of terminology. In the next
chapter, however, I’ll argue that the cross-linguistic variations are better explained
in terms of properties of tense in the antecedent.
The role of tense in Farsi conditionals will be explored in details in Chapter
Three and Four.

2.3.2

Aspect

Aspect has a uniform meaning contribution in the antecedent of the tree conditional types in Farsi. In this section, I will discuss one such contribution that is
easily detectable across conditional constructions in Farsi. That is, aspect restricts
the temporal orientation of the antecedent. In what follows, I will provide data
showing that antecedents that contain perfective aspect (both perfective and perfect
that embeds perfective) cannot describe situations that are ongoing at the utterance
time. Moreover, it will be shown that only perfect aspect can describe past situations in the antecedent of all conditional types. Imperfective aspect can only do so
when the antecedent carries past tense.
There are seven conditional constructions in Farsi that differ in tense and aspect
morphology in their antecedent. Perfect and imperfective aspects can combine with
the three available tenses in Farsi. Perfective aspect only appears in the antecedent
of zero tense conditionals. The temporal orientations of antecedents of these conditionals are represented in the table below.
Tense
Present

Past

∅

Imperfective

Temporal orientation

present/future

present/past/future

present/future

Perfect

Temporal orientation

past/future

past/future

past/future

Perfective

Temporal orientation

future

Table 2.4: Temporal orientation of antecedents
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As the table shows, there is only one type of conditionals whose antecedent carries perfective aspect. This conditional patterns with other zero tense conditionals
in the presuppositions of the contexts in which they are felicitous. As mentioned
earlier, zero tense conditionals are felicitous in contexts where the truth of the
antecedent proposition is an open issue. This is illustrated with a fair coin flipping
scenario given below, in which zero tense conditionals (both imperfective and perfective) are felicitous, but conditionals with present and past in their antecedents
are infelicitous.
(147)

a. Zero tense (im)perfective conditional
agar sekke šir
umad/
be-ay-ad,
tim-e abi
if
coin heads come.∅.perf.3sg/ impf-come.∅.3sg team-ez blue
bazi ra šoru mi-kon-∅-ad
game ra begin impf-do-pres-3sg
If the coin comes up heads, the blue team will start the game.
b. Present tense imperfective conditional
#agar sekke šir
mi-ay-∅-ad,
tim-e abi bazi ra šoru
if
coin heads impf-come-pres-3sg team-ez blue game ra begin
mi-kon-∅-ad
impf-do-pres-3sg
If the coin is coming up heads, the blue team will start the game.
c. Past tense imperfective conditional
#agar sekke šir
mi-amad,
tim-e abi bazi ra šoru
if
coin heads impf-come-pst.3sg team-ez blue game ra begin
mi-kard
impf-do-pst.3sg
If the coin was coming up heads, the blue team would start the game.

The antecedent of a perfective conditional can only describe a future situation,
even when the antecedent contains a stative predicate. The example in (109a),
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repeated here as (148), illustrates this fact. Perfective conditionals describe a hypothetical future situation where Ali is tired. The conditional is infelicitous with the
temporal adverb ‘now’.
(148) Zero tense perfective conditionals
agar Ali (#alan) xaste bud,
mozahem-sš
if
Ali now
tired be.perf.∅.3sg, bother-him
ne-mi-š-∅-am
neg-impf-become-pres-1sg
If (it turns out that) Ali is tired, I will not bother him.
The choice of aspect in the antecedent results in semantic and pragmatic differences between imperfective and perfective zero tense conditionals. Conditional
imperatives provide a clear case of contrast between these conditionals. As shown
in (149), conditional imperatives in Farsi are ungrammatical with imperfective zero
tense antecedents. Deriving the differences between perfective and imperfective
zero tense conditionals in Farsi is outside the scope of this dissertation, and I will
not discuss perfective zero tense conditionals further in this dissertation.
(149)

a. *Agar farda
be-bin-i-sh,
in-o
beh-esh be-gu
If
tomorrow impf-see.∅-2sg-him this-ra to-him imper-say
If you see him tomorrow, tell this to him.
b. Agar farda
did-i-sh,
in-o
beh-esh be-gu
If
tomorrow see.perf.∅-2sg-him this-ra to-him imper-say
If you see him tomorrow, tell this to him.

All three perfect conditionals in Farsi (present, past, zero tense) are incompatible with present oriented interpretations. That is, they cannot describe situations
that are ongoing at the time of utterance.
(150) Zero tense conditionals (hypothetical)
a. *agar Ava alan javaab ro daneste baš-ad,
barande-ye mosabeghe
if
Ava now answer ra know-pp aux.∅-3sg winner-ez competition
mi-šav-∅-ad.
impf-become-pres-3sg
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‘If Ava knows the answer now, she will win the competition.’
Present oriented stative
b. #agar alaan dars xun-de baši,
man radio ro xamush
if now lesson study-pp aux-pres-2sg I
radio ra off
mi-kon-∅-am
impf-do.pst-1sg
‘If you have studied now, I will turn off the radio.’
Present oriented eventive
(151) Present tense conditionals (factual)
a. *agar Ava alan javaab ro daneste ast,
barande-ye
if
Ava now answer ra know-pp aux.present-3sg winner-ez
mosabeghe mi-šav-∅-ad.
competition impf-become-pres-3sg
‘If Ava knows the answer now, she will win the competition.’
Present oriented stative
b. #agar alaan dars xun-de ∅-i,
man radio ro xamush
if now lesson study-pp aux-pres-2sg I
radio ra off
mi-kon-∅-am
impf-do.pst-1sg
‘If you have studied now, I will turn off the radio.’
Present oriented eventive
(152) Past tense conditionals (counterfactual)
a. *agar Ava alan javaab ro daneste bud,
barande-ye
if
Ava now answer ra know-pp aux-pst-3sg winner-ez
mosabeghe mi-šod.
competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer now, she would win the competition.’
Present oriented stative
b. #agar alaan dars xun-de budi,
man radio ro xamush
if now lesson study-pp aux.pst-2sg I
radio ra off
mi-kard-am
impf-do.pst-1sg
‘If you had been studying now, I would turn off the radio.’
Present oriented eventive
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Conditionals with a perfect antecedent describe past and future situations (although they need a future temporal adverb (by ...) to be able to do so). Aspect in
the antecedent of the zero tense conditional in (153a) is perfect, and the conditional
hypothesizes about a past situation where Ali went to the party. Perfect aspect in the
antecedent of zero tense conditionals can also describe a future situation provided
that there is future temporal adverb in the antecedent, as in (153b).
(153) Perfect zero tense conditionals (hypothetical)
a. Agar Ali dirooz
be mehmooni rafte baš-ad, xoš gozašte
If
Ali yesterday to party
go-pp aux.∅-3sg fun pass-pp
ast
aux.pres.3sg
If Ali has gone to the party yesterday, it was fun.
Past oriented
b. Agar Ali ta farda
reside baš-ad, be mehmooni
If
Ali by tomorrow arrive-pp aux.∅-3sg to party
mi-rav-∅-ad
imp-go-pres.3sg
If Ali has arrived by tomorrow, he’ll go to the party
Future oriented
Similarly, the antecedent of the present tense conditional in (154a) has perfect
aspect, and the conditional describes a past situation where Ali went to the party.
Again, factual conditionals are only felicitous in contexts where the proposition
in the antecedent has already been asserted. This is why it is hard to construct a
natural context where the a future oriented present perfect conditional is felicitous,
although it is in principle possible for perfect factual conditionals to describe a
future situation, as in (154b).
(154) Perfect present tense conditionals (factual)
a. Agar Ali be mehmooni rafte ast,
xoš gozašte ast
If
Ali to party
go-pp aux.pres-3sg fun pass-pp aux.pres.3sg
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If Ali has gone to the part, it was fun.
Past oriented
b. Sara: I’ve read that experts believe Covid will be over by summer.
John: good to know, ...
Agar Covid ta tabestun tamum šode
ast
bilit-ha-ye
If
Covid by summer finish bcome.pp aux.pres-3sg ticket-pl-ez
parvaz gerun
mi-šav-∅-ad
flight expensive impf-become-pres.3sg
If Covid has been over by summer, flight tickets will get expensive.
Future oriented
Past tense conditionals whose antecedent carry perfect aspect can also refer to
past and future situations. For instance, (155) can describe a contrary-to-fact past
or (unrealizable) future situation.
(155) Perfect Past tense conditionals (counterfactual)
agar John dirooz/farda
rafte bud
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday/tomorrow go-pp aux-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday/tomorrow, Sara would have been happy.
Past/future oriented
All three imperfective conditionals (present, past, zero tense) can refer to present
(stative predicates) or future (stative and eventive predicates) situations. The eventive predicate in the antecedent of the imperfective zero tense conditional in (156a)
refers to a hypothetical future situation where Ali goes to the party. When there is
a stative verb in the antecedent, it can refer to both present and future situations,
as in (156b).
(156)

Imperfective zero tense conditionals (hypothetical)
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a. Agar Ali farda
be mehmooni be-rav-ad,
xoš
If
Ali tomorrow to party
impf-go.∅-3sg, fun
mi-gozar-∅-ad
impf-pass-pres-3sg
If Ali goes to the party tomorrow it will be fun.
Future oriented eventive
b. Agar Ali alan/farda
xune bašad,
cheraq rošan ast.
If
Ali now/tomorrow home be.∅-3sg, lamp on
be.pres-3sg
If Ali is home now/tomorrow the light is/will be on.
Present/future oriented stative
Present tense conditionals show the same pattern as zero tense conditionals.
The antecedent of the imperfective zero tense conditional on (157a) refers to a
future situation where Ali goes to the party. Being a factual conditional, (157a)
is only felicitous when Ali’s plan to go to the party has been already uttered in the
context. The stative verb in the antecedent can refer to both present and future
situations, as shown in (158b).
(157) Imperfective present tense conditionals (factual)
a. Agar Ali be mehmooni mi-rav-∅-ad,
xoš mi-gozar-∅-ad
If
Ali to party
impf-go.pres-3sg fun impf-pass-pres-3sg
If Ali goes to the part, it will be fun.
Future oriented eventive
b. Agar Ali alan/farda
xune ast,
cheraq rošan ast.
If
Ali now/tomorrow home be.pres-3sg lamp on
be.pres-3sg
If Ali is home now/tomorrow, the light is/will be on.
Present/future oriented stative
Like imperfective present and zero tense conditionals, the antecedent of an imperfective past conditional can refer to present or future situations depending on
lexical aspect of the predicate. In addition to present and future orientated interpretations, imperfective past conditionals can also describe a past situation (irrespective of predicate type), as shown in (158).
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(158)

Imperfective past conditionals (counterfactual)
a. Agar Ali dirooz/farda
be mehmooni mi-raft,
xoš
If
Ali yesterday/tomorrow to party
impf-go.pst-3sg fun
mi-gozašt
impf-pass-pst-3sg
If Ali had gone to the party yesterday/tomorrow, it would have been fun.
Past/future oriented eventive
b. Agar Ali dirooz/alan/farda
xune bud,
cheraq rošan
If
Ali yesterday/now/tomorrow home be.pst-3sg lamp on
bud.
be.pst-3sg
If Ali had been home yesterday/now/tomorrow, the light would have been on.
Past/present/future oriented stative

The temporal orientation of antecedents in past conditionals is more complicated, and I will discuss the full pattern of past conditionals in the next chapters.
Note, however, that present and zero tense imperfective conditionals (irrespective
of the type of the predicate in their antecedent) cannot describe past situations.
This is shown in (159) and (160).
(159) Imperfective zero tense conditionals (hypothetical)
a. *Agar Ali dirooz
be mehmooni be-rav-ad,
xoš gozašte
If
Ali yesterday to party
impf-go.∅-3sg, fun pass-pp
ast
aux.pres.3sg
Intended: If Ali went to the party yesterday, it was fun.
*Past oriented eventive
b. *Agar Ali dirooz
xune bašad,
cheraq rošan bud.
If
Ali yesterday home be.∅-3sg, lamp on
be.pres-3sg
Intended If Ali was home yesterday, the light was on.
*Past oriented stative
(160) Imperfective present tense condtionals (factual)
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a. *Agar Ali dirooz
be mehmooni mi-rav-∅-ad,
xoš gozašte
If
Ali yesterday to party
impf-go.pres-3sg, fun pass-pp
ast
aux.pres.3sg
Intended: If Ali went to the party yesterday, it was fun.
*Past oriented eventive
b. *Agar Ali dirooz
xune ast,
cheraq rošan bud.
If
Ali yesterday home be.pres-3sg, lamp on
be.pres-3sg
Intended: If Ali is home yesterday, the light was on.
*Past oriented stative

2.4

Summary

In this chapter, we reviewed essential background on properties of tense, aspect
and mood in Farsi. In the next chapter I provide more detailed description of Farsi
conditionals, focusing on the distribution of tense and aspect in the antecedent of
different types of conditionals. I also discuss the problems the pattern of Farsi
conditionals pose for existing theories of X-marking.
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CHAPTER 3
Tense in Conditionals

In the last chapter we have seen that there are seven types of conditionals in Farsi
differing in specifications of tense and aspect in their antecedent. This chapter
focuses on the role of tense in determining semantic and pragmatic properties of
conditionals.
I begin this chapter with an investigation of semantics and pragmatics of conditional constructions in Farsi. Focusing on properties of conditional constructions
associated with the expression of counterfactuality, I present the main empirical
facts this dissertation aims to explain. In addition to a descriptive presentation,
this chapter provides the theoretical background for the study of conditionals that
express counterfactuality. As I will show, the pattern of Farsi conditionals poses
new challenges for existing theories.

3.1

Types of conditionals

I start this section with giving an overview of various types of conditionals in Farsi
and English. I then turn to a detailed discussion about properties of conditional
constructions associated with the expression of counterfactuality in the two languages.
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3.1.1

O-marked vs. X-marked conditionals

The linguistic and philosophical research distinguishes between two main types of
conditionals: (i) indicative conditionals convey that the truth of the antecedent is an
open issue; (ii) counterfactual or subjunctive conditional convey that the antecedent is
false. These two types of conditionals are exemplified by a modified version of the
famous counterfactual sentence from Lewis (1973) and its indicative counterpart
in (161b) and (161a), respectively.
(161)

a. If the (newborn) kangaroo has no tail, it will topple over.
(indicative/O-marked)
b. If the newborn kangaroo had no tail, it would topple over.
(subjunctive/counterfactual/X-marked )

The labels indicative, subjunctive and counterfactual are misleading. von Fintel &
Iatridou (2020) suggest a different terminology. They refer to the second group,
which cross-linguistically carry some extra morphology, as X-marked conditionals.
They call the first group, in which the extra morphology is absent, O-marked conditionals.
(162) “Since neither the term ‘counterfactual conditional’ nor ‘subjunctive conditional’ will do, we propose that we need new terminology, which will have
the advantage of not suggesting (right or wrong) associations. We propose to use the term ‘O-marked conditional’ (where ‘O’ can stand for open,
ordinary, or whatever other mnemonic the reader prefers) for (1a) (exemplified here in (161a) and (163a)). We propose to use the term ‘X-marked
conditional’ (where ‘X’ can stand for eXtra, or whatever other mnemonic
the reader prefers) for (1b)... (exemplified here in (161b) and (163b))”
(von Fintel & Iatridou 2020)
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In addition to the present/future oriented forms, given in (161), the two kinds
of conditionals also have a past oriented form. The distinction between past oriented O-marked and X-marked conditionals is illustrated in the famous example
by Adams (1970), given in (163).
(163)

a. If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.
(O-marked)
b. If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
(X-marked )

I refer to the X-marked conditionals in (161b) and (163b) as the simple past and
the pluperfect X-marked conditionals, respectively. Simple past X-marked conditionals refer to present or future situations, and pluperfect X-marked conditionals refer
to past and future situations.
Across many languages, the grammatical difference between the O-marked and
X-marked conditionals is reflected in the temporal morphology of their antecedent.
Many unrelated languages use past tense morphology in the antecedent of X-marked
conditionals (Iatridou 2000), as in (161). The meaning contribution of past tense
morphology in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals is not to specify the temporal orientation of the antecedent. The temporal orientation of antecedents of Xmarked conditionals is the same as the temporal orientation of the corresponding
O-marked antecedent (without the X-marker past). The corresponding O-marked
antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals would be a sentence with a bare
form of the verb, which can have either present or future orientation. The corresponding O-marked antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals still carries
past tense morphology, and thus it is evaluated in the past. O-marking is characterized by the absence of X-marking. On grammatical grounds, antecedents of
O-marked conditionals look exactly like those of X-marked conditionals, except for
lacking the additional X-marking morphology.
84

Let us now look at the morphological make-up of conditionals in Farsi. Like
English and many other languages, the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in
Farsi appears with past tense morphology. In addition to a past morpheme, the
verb in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in Farsi carries the tensed (a.k.a.,
indicative) form of the imperfective prefix mi-, as shown in (164). I will call this
structure imperfective X-marked. Although it’s been argued that the antecedent of
English X-marked conditionals is also imperfective (Iatridou 2000), I will only use
the term ‘imperfective X-marked’ for Farsi in which an overt imperfective morpheme
appears together with the past morpheme.
(164) Present/future oriented imperfective X-marked
Context: The rule of the game is that whoever gather 10 points faster wins. Ava
only needs one more point to win. A new question is asked, which is about geography. Zahra knows that Ava cannot possibly know the answer as she’s very bad at
geography.
Zahra: It’s a shame that Ava doesn’t know anything about geography.
agar Ava javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
barande-ye mosabeghe
if
Ava answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg winner-ez competition
mi-šod.
impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer, she would win the competition.’
We have said that O-marked conditionals are characterized by not being Xmarked. As discussed with examples (139) in Section 2.3.1 of Chapter Two, there
are two conditionals in Farsi that are not X-marked, and thus we can refer to both as
O-marked. These two conditionals differ in properties of tense in their antecedents:
zero tense vs. present tense. Present/future oriented zero tense O-marked conditionals carry the tenseless (a.k.a., subjunctive) variant of imperfective aspect (be-)
in their antecedent, as shown in (165). I will refer to zero tense O-marked conditionals as hypothetical conditionals, since the truth of their antecedents is an open
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issue ( these are conditionals that are traditionally called indicative conditionals).
(165) Present/future oriented imperfective zero tense O-marked
Context: The rule of the game is that whoever gather 10 points faster wins. Ava
only needs one more point to win.
agar Ava javaab ro be-dan-ad,
barande-ye mosabeghe
if
Ava answer ra impf-know-∅-3sg winner-ez competition
mi-šav-∅-ad.
impf-become.pres-3sg
‘If Ava knows the answer, she will win the competition.’
The present/future oriented present tense O-marked conditionals carry the present
imperfective form of the verb (tensed variant of the imperfective marker (mi-) and
a null present morpheme) in their antecedent, as shown in (166).
(166) Present/future oriented imperfective present tense O-marked
Context: The rule of the game is that whoever gather 10 points faster wins. Ava only
needs one more point to win. A new question is asked, which is about literature.
Zahra knows that Ava knows the answer to this question as they talked about the
same topic the day before.
Zahra : Ava knows the answer to this question. We were talking about the same
thing yesterday.
Kosar: Oh, that’s perfect then...
agar Ava javaab ro mi-dan-∅-ad,
barande-ye mosabeghe
if
Ava answer ra impf-know-pres-3sg winner-ez competition
mi-šav-∅-ad.
impf-become.pres-3sg
‘If Ava knows the answer, she will win the competition.’
Present tense O-marked conditionals are interpreted as factual, as the truth of
their antecedents is either settled or already asserted in the context. We have seen
a stereotypical example of factual conditionals in in (140), repeated here as (167).
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(167)

a. My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
b. Oh yeah? If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
(Bhatt & Pancheva 2017)

As I have shown in the previous chapter, such conditionals in Farsi can only be
made with present tense in the antecedent. This was illustrated with the contrast
in (141), repeated here as (168).
(168) My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
Oh yeah?
a. Present tense O-marked
agar enqadr bahuš ast,
čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.pres.3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
b. Zero tense O-marked
#agar enqadr bahuš baš-ad, čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.∅-3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
Factual O-marked conditionals and X-marked conditionals pattern together in
requiring the truth or falsity of their antecedent to be somehow settled. The infelicity of both factual O-marked conditional (169a) and X-marked conditional (169b)
in a fair coin-tossing scenario illustrates this. Since the future event that the antecedent refers to is not plannable, only a zero tense hypothetical conditional (169c)
can be used in such a context.
(169)

a. Future oriented imperfective present tense O-marked
# agar sekke šir mi-y-∅-ad,
team-e abi bazi ra šoru
if
coin head impf-come-pres-3sg, team-ez blue game ra begin
mi-kon-∅-ad
impf-do-pres-3sg
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#If the coin will come up head, the blue will start the game.
b. Future oriented imperfective X-marked
# agar sekke šir mi-am-ad,
team-e abi bazi ra šoru
if
coin head impf-come-pst-3sg, team-ez blue game ra begin
mi-kard
impf-do.pst.3sg
If the coin had come up head, the blue would have started the game.
c. Future oriented imperfective zero tense O-marked
agar sekke šir be-y-ad,
team-e abi bazi ra šoru
if
coin head impf-come-∅-3sg, team-ez blue game ra begin
mi-kon-∅-ad
impf-do-pres-3sg
If the coin comes up head, the blue will start the game.
As the English translations for (165) and (166) show, O-marked conditionals in
English are ambiguous between hypothetical and factual interpretations. However,
their factual interpretation is usually ignored in the discussion of the dichotomy between O-marked and X-marked conditionals. Take this quote from Bennett (2003),
for instance.
(170)

‘Counterfactual’ is not matched by a corresponding label for the other type of
conditional, which nobody has called ‘factual’ or ‘profactual’ or the like (Bennett
2003)1

As we have seen in the last chapter with examples (139), repeated here in (171),
past oriented forms of X-marked and O-marked conditionals (hypothetical and
factual) are made via perfect aspect. It is tense that distinguishes the three types
1 It

should be, however, noted that Goodman (1947) alludes to the relation between counterfactuals and factual conditionals, but it is ignored in the rest of the literature on X-marked conditionals.
“In one sense the name ‘problem of counterfactuals’ is misleading, because the problem is independent of the
form in which a given statement happens to be expressed. The problem of counterfactuals is equally a problem
of factual conditionals, for any counterfactual can be transposed into a conditional with a true antecedent and
consequent”.(Goodman 1947)
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of conditionals. Past oriented X-marked conditionals are made via pluperfect as
shown in (171a). The antecedent of past oriented hypothetical conditionals appears
in zero tense perfect, as shown in (171b). Lastly, the antecedent of past oriented
factual conditionals appears in the present perfect, as shown in (171c).
(171)

a. past oriented pluperfect X-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro mi-košt.
another-indf him ra impf-kill.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
b. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
c. Past oriented perfect present tense O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’

I have discussed felicity conditions for each of these conditionals in length in
Chapter Two. The upshot of the discussion was that zero tense O-marked conditionals stand apart from X-marked and factual O-marked conditionals in requiring
their antecedent proposition to be an open issue. That is, the truth of their antecedent is not settled in the context. Factual O-marked conditionals and X-marked
conditionals require the truth or falsity of their antecedents to be (or proposed to
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be) settled in the context. To refresh our memory, let us look at the contexts provided in the last chapter, which illustrate the contrast between these conditionals
are illustrated. In the context given in (172), repeated from (142) and (145), in
which the truth of the antecedent proposition is unsettled and there is no pending
proposal about it either, only a zero tense conditional is felicitous.
(172) Context: The police holds a press conference, and announces that they are investigating the speculation that Oswald might not be the murderer, but nothing is
certain. John and his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
b. Past oriented pluperfect X-marked
#Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro mi-košt.
another-indf him ra impf-kill.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
c. Past oriented perfect present tense O-marked
#Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
In contexts where the truth of antecedent propositions are proposed to be settled (that is the proposition has been asserted in the context but it still needs to be
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accepted by other participants in discourse), both zero tense and factual O-marked
conditionals are felicitous and true. The zero tense conditional implies that despite
police’s statement the truth of the antecedent is still an open issue. This was shown
in the last chapter with the example (143), repeated here as (173).
(173) Context: The investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and
announces that they can confirm that Oswald wasn’t the murderer. John and his
friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Past oriented perfect present tense O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
b. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
Similarly, in contexts where the falsity of antecedent propositions are proposed
to be settled, both zero tense O-marked and X-marked conditionals are felicitous,
but only O-marked conditional is true. This was shown in the last chapter with the
example (146), repeated here as (174).
(174) Context: The investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and
announces that they can confirm that Oswald was in fact the murderer. John and
his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
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a. Past oriented pluperfect X-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte bud
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
b. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
Amma agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
but
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘But if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
In contexts where the antecedent propositions is settled (that is, its truth or
falsity is among the shared presuppositions of discourse participants ), factual Omarked conditionals have to be used. Similarly, only X-marked conditionals can be
used in contexts where the falsity of the antecedent is settled. Zero tense O-marked
conditionals are infelicitous in both of these contexts. This was illustrated in the last
chapter with example (144) and (146a), repeated here as (175) and (176).
(175)

a. Past oriented perfect present tense O-marked
Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh oftaade ast,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence fall.pp aux.pres.3sg
jang-e jahani-e
sevvom ham mi-tavan-∅-ad ettefagh
war-ez worldwide-ez third also impf-can-pres-3sg occurrence
be-oft-ad
impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars have happened, a third world war can also happen.
b. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
#Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh oftaade baš-ad,
jang-e
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence fall.pp aux.∅-3sg war-ez
jahani-e
sevvom ham mi-tavan-∅-ad ettefagh
worldwide-ez third also impf-can-pres-3sg occurrence
be-oft-ad
impf-fall-∅-3sg
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If two world wars have happened, a third world war can also happen.
(176)

a. Past oriented pluperfect X-marked
Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh na-oftaade bud,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence neg-fall.pp aux.pst.3sg,
emkan
na-dašt
ke jang-e jahani-e
sevvom
possiblity neg-have.pst.3sg that war-ez worldwide-ez third
ettefagh be-oft-ad
occurrence impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars hadn’t happened, there wouldn’t have been the possibility of
a third world war.
b. Past oriented perfect zero tense O-marked
# Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh na-oftaade baš-ad,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence neg-fall.pp aux.∅-3sg
emkan
na-dar-∅-ad
ke jang-e jahani-e
sevvom
possiblity neg-have-pres-3sg that war-ez worldwide-ez third
ettefagh be-oft-ad
occurrence impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars haven’t happened, there won’t be a possibility of a third world
war.

The table below summarizes facts about the antecedents of Farsi conditionals. As we have seen, tense in the antecedent of Farsi conditionals determines
the interpretation of the whole conditional by marking the relationship between
the antecedent proposition and presuppositions held in the context. Conditionals
whose antecedents are marked with deictic tense (indicative mood) have to be used
in contexts in which their truth (present tense) or falsity (past tense) is settled
or will be settled after an already uttered proposition is accepted by participants
in discourse. Present and past tense conditionals are interpreted as factual and
counterfactual conditionals, respectively. Zero tense (subjunctive mood) conditionals whose antecedent lacks semantic specification for tense, are used when the
proposition is not settled in the context. The felicity of zero tense conditionals
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crucially is not sensitive to unnegotiated proposals in the common ground. Zero
tense conditionals are interpreted as hypothetical conditionals. This is shown in
the first and second rows of the table below, where Cs represents the Stalnakarian
context set ( the set of possible worlds in the intersection of commonly accepted
propositions in Common Ground). The symbol CF represents the context set adjusted to entail a given pending proposal (referred to as the projected context set
(Farkas & Bruce 2010; Biezma & Goebel to appear)). p represents the antecedent
proposition, and “CF |= p” is to be read as “the projected context set entails p”,
and “Cs 6|= p∧ Cs 6|= ¬p” as “the context set does not entail p and does not entail ¬
p”.
We have also seen that aspect in the antecedent restricts the temporal orientation
of the antecedent situation. The third row of the table shows that imperfective
aspect is only compatible with past situation when the antecedent carries past tense
morphology. Perfect aspect is always incompatible with present situations. Finally,
the last row of the table represents the morphological make-up of the antecedents
of Farsi conditionals.
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Indicative

Subjunctive
Tense

Imperfective

Perfect

Present

Past

∅

Cs

CF |= p

CF |= ¬p

Cs 6|= p∧ Cs 6|= ¬p

label

‘factual’

‘counterfactual’

‘hypothetical’

time

present/future

present/past/future

present/future

morphology

impf-verb.pres

impf-verb-pst

impf-verb.∅

example

(166)

(164)

(165)

Cs

CF |= p

CF |= ¬p

Cs 6|= p∧ Cs 6|= ¬p

label

‘factual’

‘counterfactual’

‘hypothetical’

time

past/future

past/future

past/future

morphology

verb.pp aux.pres

verb.pp aux.pst

verb.pp aux.∅

example

(171c)

(171a)

(171b)

Table 3.1: Antecedent morphology of Farsi conditionals
What Farsi data shows us is that the complement of the set of X-marked conditionals (i.e. O-marked conditionals) is not a homogeneous group. Rather, O-marked
conditionals are further subdivided into two groups: hypothetical and factual conditionals. We saw that X-marked conditionals in Farsi pattern with factual conditionals in requiring their antecedents to be settled. What does this tell us about Xmarked conditionals in English? Does this mean X-marked conditionals in English
are also matched by factual conditionals, but we cannot see it due to impoverished
morphology? Or can it be that X-marked conditionals in English and Farsi are
different? If so, what is the source of this difference?
The rest of this chapter aims to answer these questions. I will first compare
Farsi and English X-marked conditionals. After showing the shared and distinct
properties of X-marked conditionals in the two languages, I will give an account of
the observed variation.
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3.1.2

Properties of X-marked conditionals: Farsi vs English

As it was discussed in the previous section, the salient overt morphological difference between the antecedents of X-marked conditionals in English and Farsi is that
Farsi marks the antecedent of present/future oriented X-marked conditionals with
past imperfective, as shown in (177a).2
(177)

a. Present/future oriented past imperfective X-marked
agar Ava javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
barande-ye mosabeghe
if
Ava answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg winner-ez competition
mi-šod.
impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer, she would win the competition.’
b. Past oriented pluperfect X-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte bud
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’

In this section, I will discuss three areas in which Farsi and English X-marked
conditionals differ: (1) temporal orientation of antecedents, (2) aspectual restrictions in antecedents, and (3) strength of counterfactuality.

3.1.2.1

Temporal orientation of antecedents

Simple past X-marked conditionals in English can either describe a contrary-to-fact
present situation (presX), as in (178), or refer to unlikely but still realizable future
possibilities (“Future Less Vivid” (FLV) (Iatridou 2000)), as in (179).
(178) If I were rich, I would buy a house.
2 They

also differ in whether the modal in the consequent is null (Farsi) or overt (English).
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(179) If I won a lottery, I would buy a house.
Iatridou (2000) argues that it is the lexical aspect of predicates in the antecedent
that determines whether the conditionals is interpreted as a presX or a FLV conditional. She shows that the interaction of the predicate type and the time of evaluation in the antecedent of the simple past X-marked conditional is similar to how
different predicate types are interpreted when combined with present tense morphology. Simple past X-marked conditionals containing eventive predicates (e.g.
180) talk about a situation in the future that is unlikely to be realized. In contrast,
a simple past X-marked conditional containing an (individual-level) stative (e.g.
181a) describes a counterfactual situation in the present (although it is possible
to get a future interpretation with individual-level stative predicates, as shown in
(181b)). Finally, simple past X-marked conditionals containing stage-level stative
predicates can describe either a situation in the future that is unlikely to be realized(e.g. 182a) or a counterfactual situation in the present (e.g. 182b).
(180) Eventive predicates
If he took the syrup, he would get better.

Future

(181) Individual-level statives
a. If I were tall, I would be able to reach the ceiling.

Present

b. Context: Mahdieh and Majid both have black hair. They are expecting a baby.
If the baby was blond, they would be surprised.

Future

(182) Stage-level statives
a. If he were drunk at next weeks meeting, the boss would be really angry.
Future
b. If he were drunk, he would be louder.

Present

The same interaction holds in conditionals containing present tense morphology. When the antecedent contains an eventive predicate, the situation described
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can only be interpreted to be about the future. When the antecedent contains a
stative predicate (stage-level or individual-level), it can either describe a situation
in the future or a situation at the utterance time.
(183) Eventive predicates
If he takes the syrup, . . .

Future

(184) Individual-level statives
a. If he is tall, . . .

Present

b. If the baby is blond, . . .

Future

(185) Stage-level statives
a. If he is drunk next week, . . .

Future

b. If he is drunk, we should not let him drive.

Present

The tables below summarize the time orientation of the predicate types when
combined with the simple past and the present tense in the antecedent in English.
In sum, all antecedents can get future interpretations, but only antecedents containing a stative predicate can get present interpretations.

English

Past

Present

Future

Individual-level Stative

7

3

3

Stage-level Stative

7

3

3

Eventive

7

7

3

Table 3.2: Temporal orientation of antecedents of English X-marked
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English

Past

Present

Future

Individual-level Stative

7

3

3

Stage-level Stative

7

3

3

Eventive

7

7

3

Table 3.3: Temporal orientation of antecedents of English O-marked
Similarly, the lexical aspect of predicates in past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi determines whether the antecedent has a present or future oriented
interpretation. A past imperfective X-marked conditional whose antecedent contains an eventive predicate (e.g. 186a) can talk about a future situation that is no
longer possible to be realized.
(186) Eventive predicates
a. There’s Covid-related travel restrictions in place. Only EU residents can visit
Europe. John is American. He cannot visit Sara, who lives in Italy.
agar John farda
mi-raf-t
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John tomorrow impf-go-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod.
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John went to Italy tomorrow, Sara would be happy.

Future

As we have stated earlier, Farsi X-marked conditionals can only be used when
their antecedent is settled in the projected common ground. That means they cannot describe a future situation that may or may not be realized. In other words,
Farsi X-marked conditionals lack Future Less Vivid interpretations. In a scenario
where the result of a lottery has not yet been announced, an X-marked conditionals
is infelicitous, and only a zero tense O-marked conditional can be used.
(187) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
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a. #agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. agar latary ro be-bar-am,
green card mi-gir-∅-am
if
lottery ra impf-win-∅-1sg green card impf-get.pres-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
Future
A past imperfective X-marked conditional that contains an individual-level stative predicate (e.g. 188), like in English, describes a contrary-to-fact situation in
the present. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the copular verb be and the stative
verb have are incompatible with the imperfective marker mi-. In the antecedents
of X-marked conditionals, there is variation among speakers as to whether the
imperfective marker is used with the stative verbs, hence the use of parenthesis.
(188) Individual-level statives
agar ghad boland (mi)-bud-am, dast-am be saghf mi-res-id
if
height tall
impf-be.pst-1sg hand-my to ceiling impf-reach-pst.3sg
‘ If I were tall, I would be able to reach the ceiling.’

Present

Unlike English, however, individual-level stative predicates in antecedents of
X-marked conditionals that have future orientations are rare. The reason is that
the falsity of the antecedent proposition of Farsi X-marked conditionals has to be
settled in the projected context set. The unlikelihood of a future state is not enough
for the felicity of Farsi X-marked conditionals.
(189) Individual-level statives
Context: Mahdieh and Majid both have black hair. They are expecting a baby.
#agar bačče blond (mi)-bud,
taajob
mi-kard-and
if
baby blond impf-be.pst-3sg surprised impf-becomepst.3sg
‘ If the baby was blond, they would be surprised.’
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future

The example below illustrates a scenario in which a future individual-level state
is not realizable, and thus the X-marked conditional is felicitous.
(190) Individual-level statives
Context: Swati is planting some sunflower seeds.
agar gol-ha-š
qermez (mi)-bud,
Sakshi xošhal
if
flower-pl-its red
impf-be.pst.3sg Sakshi happy
mi-šod
impf-become.pst.3sg
If its flowers were red, Sakshi would be happy.

Future

Finally, past imperfective X-marked conditionals containing stage-level stative
predicates or atelic eventive predicates can describe either a future situation that
is no longer realizable (e.g. 191a and 192a) or a contrary-to-fact present situation
(e.g. 191b and 192b).
(191) Stage-level statives
a. John used to have an alcohol problem but he does not drink anymore.
agar tu jalase-ye hafte-ye ba’d mast (mi)-bud,
ra’ees vaghean
if
at meeting-ez week-ez next drunk impf-be.pst-3sg boss really
asabani mi-sho-d.
angry impf-become-pst.3sg
‘If he were drunk at next week’s meeting, the boss would be really angry.’
Future
b. agar mast (mi)-bud,
sholoogh-tar (mi)-bu-d.
if
drunk impf-be.pst-3sg louder
impf-be-pst.3sg
‘If he were drunk, he would be louder.’

Present

(192) Atelic eventives
a. agar farda
dars mi-xun-d-i,
emtehan ro pass
if
tomorrow lesson impf-study-pst-2sg exam
ra pass
mi-sho-d-i
impf-become-pst-2sg
‘If you studied tomorrow, you would pass the exam.’
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Future

b. agar alaan dars mi-xun-d-i,
man radio ro xamush
if
now lesson impf-study-pst-2sg I
radio ra off
mi-kard-am
impf-do.pst-1sg
‘If you were studying now, I would turn off the radio.’3

Present

As Iatridou (2000) showed for English, the same interaction holds in O-marked
conditionals containing present tense morphology. When the antecedent contains
a telic predicate, the situation described can only be in the future (e.g. 193a). When
it contains an individual-level stative predicate (e.g. 194a), it describes a situation
at the utterance time. Again, since present O-marked conditionals require the truth
of their antecedent to be settled in the projected common ground, individual-level
stative predicates in antecedents of factual O-marked conditionals cannot be about
future.
(193) Telic predicates
a. agar john
farda
mi-rav-∅-ad italia, . . .
if
tomorrow impf-go.pres-3sg Italy
If John goes to Italy tomorrow, . . .

Future

(194) Individual-level statives
a. agar ghad boland ast,
...
if
height tall
be.pres.3sg
If he is tall, . . .

Present

(193) Context: Swati is planting some sunflower seeds.
agar gol-ha-š
zard ast,
Sakshi xošhal
if
flower-pl-its red be.pres.3sg Sakshi happy
mi-šav-∅-ad
impf-become-pres-3sg
If its flowers are red, Sakshi will be happy.
3 Note

Future

that imperfective verbs in Farsi can get ongoing interpretation (as shown in (28) and
(75a)), but in English ongoing readings are only possible with progressive aspect ( ‘dogs bark’ vs.
‘dogs are barking’).
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When the antecedent contains a stage-level stative or an atelic eventive predicate, it can either be about a situation in the future (e.g. 194a and 195a) or a situation
at the utterance time(e.g. 194b and 195b).
(194) Stage-level statives
a. Agar farda
xaste ast,
...
if
tomorrow tired be.pres.3sg
‘If he is tired tomorrow, . . .’
b. agar xaste ast,
na-bayad be-gzar-im
ranandegi
if
tired be.pres.3sg, neg-should impf-let-∅-1pl drive
bo-kon-ad
impf-do-∅-3sg
‘If he is tired, we should not let him drive. ’

Future

Present

(195) Atelic eventives
a. agar farda
dars mi-xun-∅-i,
...
if
tomorrow lesson impf-study.pres-2sg
‘If you study tomorrow, . . .’
b. agar alaan dars mi-xun-∅-i,
man radio ro xamush
if
now lesson impf-study.pres-2sg I
radio ra off
bo-kon-am
impf-do-∅-1sg
‘If you are studying now, I’ll turn off the radio.’

future

Present

There is an important difference in the temporal orientation of Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals and English simple past X-marked conditionals. In
Farsi, both past imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals can be used to
describe a contrary-to-fact situation in the past, as shown in (196b).
(196) Due to Covid-related travel restrictions, John couldn’t attend Sara’s birthday in
Italy yesterday.
a. agar John dirooz
mi-raf-t
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday impf-go-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.
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b. agar John dirooz
rafte bud
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday go-pp aux-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.
Past
The contrast in (197) shows that English can only use pluperfect (e.g. (197b))
to express counterfactuality in the past. A simple past X-marked conditional, given
in (197a), cannot refer to counterfactual past events.
(197)

a. *If John went to Italy yesterday, Sarah would be happy.
b. If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.

The tables below summarize the temporal orientation of the predicate types
when combined with past imperfective and present imperfective in the antecedent
in Farsi.
Farsi

Past

Present

Future

Individual-level Stative

7

3

3

Stage-level Stative

3

3

3

Telic Eventives

3

7

3

Atelic Eventives

3

3

3

Table 3.4: Temporal orientation of antecedents of Farsi imperfective X-marked

Farsi

Past

Present

Future

Individual-level Stative/pres impf

7

3

3

Stage-level Stative/pres impf

7

3

3

Telic Eventives/pres impf

7

7

3

Atelic Eventives/pres impf

7

3

3

Table 3.5: Temporal orientation of antecedents of Farsi imperfective O-marked
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As seen in the contrast given in (197), to express counterfactuality in the past in
English a pluperfect has to used. Pluperfect X-marked conditionals can also refer
to a contrary-to-fact situation in the present and in the future.
(198)

a. If Her Majesty had been here now, she would have been revolted.
b. If Grannie had missed the last bus on Friday (next Friday), she would
have walked home (she is actually dead).

(Dudman 1984)

Like English, Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals can describe both past
(199a) and future situations(199b).
(199)

a. agar John dirooz
rafte bud
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John yesterday go-pp aux-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy yesterday, Sara would have been happy.

Past

b. agar John farda
rafte bud
italia, Sara xošhal
if
John tomorrow go-pp aux-pst.3sg Italy Sara happy
mi-šod
impf-become-pst.3sg
If John had gone to Italy tomorrow, Sara would have been happy.

Future

Unlike English pluperfect X-marked conditional which can describe present situations as in (198a), Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot be about present.
This is shown in (??) and (??).
This brings me to an important observation: the “realness” of aspect in the
antecedent of X-marked conditionals.

3.1.2.2

Aspectual restrictions in antecedents

As I have discussed in Chapter Two, Section 2.2.2, the lack of aspectual morphology
in English obscures the distinction between imperfective and perfective. There
is a controversy in the literature about the semantic contribution of aspect in the
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antecedent of X-marked conditionals. Under some accounts, the aspect in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals is considered to be ’fake’ (Iatridou 2000, 2009) or
rendered vacuous (Anand & Hacquard 2010; Ferreira 2011, 2016). Arregui (2005,
2007), however, argues that aspect in these conditional is real and contributes its
typical meaning. Since Farsi overtly marks imperfective aspect, the absence of imperfective marker indicates the presence of perfective in the structure. Here, I want
to illustrate that this feature of Farsi grammar provides an opportunity to further
our understanding of the semantic contribution of aspect in the antecedent of Xmarked conditionals.
While eventive verbs can appear with either the past imperfective or the pluperfect form in antecedents of X-marked conditionals to express counterfactuality
in past and future, stative verbs like “know”, which are generally incompatible with
perfect aspect in Farsi, can only appear in past imperfective to describe past, present
or future counterfactuals.
(200)

a. agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’
b. *agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro daneste
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra know-pp
bud,
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
aux-pst-3sg winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’

A similar aspectual restriction with stative verbs can be seen in the pluperfect.
Farsi stative verbs be and have cannot take the pluperfect outside of X-marking
contexts, as shown in (201).4
4 It should be noted that the restriction, at least in the case of “have”, is not morphological.
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“have”

(201)

a. *qablan xune dašte bud-am
before house have.pp aux.pst-1sg
‘I had had a house before.’
b. *qablan puldar bude budam.
before rich
be.pp aux.pst-1sg
‘I had been rich before.’
c. qablan italia rafte budam.
before Italy go.pp aux.pst-1sg
‘I had gone to Italy before.’5

The ungrammaticality of (202) shows that this restriction also holds in the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals.
(202)

a. *agar xune dašte bud-am,
ejare ne-mi-dad-am.
if
house have.pp aux.pst-1sg rent neg-impf-give.pst-1sg
‘I had had a house, I wouldn’t have to pay rent.’
b. *agar puldar bude budam,
xune mi-khar-id-am
if
rich
be.pp aux.pst-1sg house impf-buy-pst-1sg
‘If I had been rich, I would have bought a house.’

Farsi X-marked conditionals whose antecedent contains a stative predicate can
only carry past imperfective morphology, as shown in (203).6
(203)

a. agar xune (mi)-dašt-am,
ejare ne-mi-dad-am.
if
house impf-have.pst-1sg rent neg-impf-give.pst-1sg
‘I had had a house, I wouldn’t have to pay rent.’
b. agar puldar (mi)-bud-am, xune mi-khar-id-am
if
rich
impf-be.pst-1sg house impf-buy-pst-1sg
‘If I had been rich, I would have bought a house.’

As I discussed in Section 2.2.2.2 of the last chapter, such differences arise because
Farsi perfect forms that lack imperfective marker always embed perfective aspect,
is a common light verb in Farsi and can take the pluperfect (e.g. negah dašte bud-am = had kept)
5 Unlike English, Farsi pluperfect doesn’t need a subordinate clause to act as a reference time.
6 Most stative predicates in Farsi are complex predicates whose verbal elements are either be or
have.
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which is known to be incompatible with stative verbs as well as with present interpretations (present perfective paradox).
Counterfactual generic conditionals provide further evidence in support of the
realness of aspect in X-marked conditionals. In Chapter Two, I discussed that the
presence of an imperfective aspect marker is necessary to get generic readings in
Farsi. Perfect forms of the verb that do not carry an additional imperfective marker,
cannot have generic interpretation. This was shown in (50b), repeated here as
(204).
(204) Az aqaz-e
hayat,
zamin dor-e
xoršid (*mi)-čarxide
Since beginning-ez existence, Earth around-ez sun impf-revolve.pp
ast.
aux.pres.3sg
Since the beginning of existence, the Earth has revolved around the sun.
As the contrast in (205) shows, counterfactual generic statements can only be
expressed with imperfective aspect in the antecedent. Pluperfect X-marked conditionals, which do not carry an imperfective marker and thus contain perfective
aspect, cannot yield generic interpretations.
(205)

a. Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt mi-xor-d-and, dandun-ha-šun
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat impf-eat-pst-3pl, tooth-pl-their
saf ne-mi-bud.
flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
b. #Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt xor-de bud-and,
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat eat-pp aux-pst-3pl,
dandun-ha-šun saf ne-mi-bud.
tooth-pl-their flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.

I conclude therefore, that aspects maintain their semantics in antecedents of Xmarked conditionals.
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3.1.2.3

Strength of counterfactuality

X-marked conditionals in Farsi and English show a contrast in contexts where they
can be felicitously used without implying the falsity of their antecedents. As shown
in (179), repeated here as (206), future oriented simple past X-marked conditionals
in English yield Future Less Vivid interpretations.
(206) If I won a lottery, I would buy a house.
Farsi, in contrast, lacks Future Less Vivid conditionals. A conditional claim
about the future whose antecedent is still an open question, no matter how unlikely
it is, can only be expressed via a hypothetical O-marked conditional. Future oriented X-marked conditionals in Farsi can only be used when the situation described
by the antecedent is believed to be unrealizeable in the future. This was illustrated
by the lottery example (187), which is repeated here as (207).
(207) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
a. #agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. agar latary ro be-bar-am,
green card mi-gir-∅-am
if
lottery ra impf-win-∅-1sg green card impf-get.pres-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
Future
It is worth mentioning that future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals
cannot have Future Less Vivid interpretations in either English (Ippolito 2013) or
Farsi.
(208) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
a. #If I had won the lottery, I would have gotten a green card.
b. #agar latary ro borde bud-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra win-pp aux-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
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‘If I had won the lottery, I would have gotten a green card.’
Farsi and English X-marked conditionals differ as to whether they can be used
in Anderson-type examples. (Anderson 1951) made a seminal observation that
English X-marked conditionals can be used as part of reasoning for the truth of the
antecedent. Consider examples below which are variants of the Anderson-type
example provided by Iatridou (2000).
(209)

a. If the patient had had the measles, he would have shown exactly the
symptoms he shows now.
3We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
3But we know that he doesn’t have the measles. (Ippolito & Su 2014)
b. If the patient had the measles, he would have exactly the symptoms he
has now.
3We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
3But we know that he doesn’t have the measles.

(Ogihara 2014)

Anderson examples point to the cancelability of antecedent falsity inference associated with X-marked conditionals. This important observation which has attracted significant attention in the philosophical and linguistic literature (Stalnaker
1975; von Fintel 1998; Ippolito 2006, 2013; Mackay 2015 and Leahy 2018, among
others) has led many scholars to conclude that the antecedent falsity is a pragmatic property of X-marked conditionals (But see Zakkou (2020) for a presuppositional account of antecedent falsity). In Section 3.3.2, I will discuss more cases
that demonstrate that the antecedent falsity is not hardwired into semantics of Xmarked conditionals.
Past imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals in Farsi cannot be used
to reason for the truth of the antecedent. The infelicity of (210a) and (210b) shows
that the antecedent falsity of counterfactual conditionals in Farsi cannot be can110

celled. Only a perfect zero tense conditional (210c) is compatible with the continuation ”We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles”.
(210)

a. Pluperfect X-marked
agar bimar sorxak gerefte bud,
daghighan in
if
patient measles get-pp aux.pst.3sg exactly
this
alayem-i
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan
symptoms-indf that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show
mi-daad.
impf-give-pst-3.sg
‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he
shows now.
7We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
3But we know that he doesn’t have the measles.
b. Imperfective X-marked
agar bimar sorxak mi-gereft,
daghighan in alayem-i
if patient measles imp-get.pst.3sg exactly
this symptoms-indf
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan mi-daad.
that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show impf-give-pst-3.sg
‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he
shows now.
7We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
3But we know that he doesn’t have the measles.
c. Zero tense (hypothetical) O-marked
agar bimar sorxak gerefte bash-ad, daghighan in alayem-i
if
patient measles get-pp aux.∅-3sg exactly
this symptoms-indf
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show impf-give-pres-3.sg
‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he
shows now.
3We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
7But we know that he doesn’t have the measles.
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Interim Summary
Let us take stock here. We started with the well-established categorization of conditionals into two groups of O-marked (indicative conditionals) and X-marked
conditionals. On grammatical grounds, O-marked conditionals are conditionals
that lack the morphology for X-marked conditionals. In the most part of the literature, O-marked conditionals have been assumed to form a unified class. The
morphological distinction between present and zero tense conditionals in Farsi
shows that O-marked conditionals are further subdivided into hypothetical and
factual conditionals. Farsi X-marked conditionals pattern with factual conditionals
in both morphology (carrying the tensed form of the imperfective marker (mi-))
and felicity conditions (requiring their antecedent to be settled in the projected
common ground). I have discussed two areas where Farsi and English X-marked
conditionals differ:
(i) The temporal orientation of the antecedent
(ia) Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals can refer to past events,
but English simple past X-marked conditionals cannot ((196b) vs. (197)).
(ib) English pluperfect X-marked conditionals can refer to present states, but
Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot ((198a) vs. (??)).
(ii) Strength of counterfactuality (defeasibility of antecedent falsity)
(iia) English simple past X-marked conditionals have a Future Less Vivid interpretation, Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals do not ((206)
vs. (208b)).
(iib) English pluperfect X-marked conditionals can be used in Andersontype examples, but Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot ((209)
vs. (210)).
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I have also shown that the overt morphological realization of aspectual markers
in Farsi lets their semantic contribution in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals
shine through. I have made two observations that lead me to conclude that aspect
maintains its typical semantics in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals.
(a) Aspectual restrictions that hold outside of conditional environments also hold
in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals (illustrated with examples (200)
and (202)).
(b) The presence of imperfective aspect in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals is necessary to make counterfactual generic claims (illustrated with
example 205).
The table below provides a summary of contrasts between English and Farsi
X-marked conditionals.
Counteractual

English

Farsi

non-counteractual

PastX

PresX

FutX

FLV

Anderson

Simple past

7

3

7

3

3

Pluperfect

3

3

3

7

3

Past imperfective

3

3

3

7

7

Pluperfect

3

7

3

7

7

Table 3.6: Contrasts between English and Farsi X-marked conditionals
Given the wide cross-linguistic distribution of past tense in the morphological
make-up of X-marked conditionals, most linguistic work on the topic is focused on
deriving the semantic and pragmatic differences between X-marked and O-marked
conditionals from the semantic contribution of the past tense (Dudman 1984; Iatridou 2000, 2009; Arregui 2005, 2009; Ippolito 2006, 2013; Khoo 2015; Schulz 2014;
Karawani 2014; Karawani & Zeijlstra 2013; Romero 2014). There are two main
113

accounts of what the past tense means in X-marked conditionals. According to
one approach, the past tense morpheme always has a temporal meaning (Dudman
1984; Arregui 2005; Ippolito 2006; Khoo 2015). The other approach takes the past
tense morpheme to be underspecified, which can have temporal or modal interpretations depending on the environment it occurs in (Iatridou 2000; Schulz 2014;
Mackay 2019a). These approaches can also differ as to whether the relevant pairs
of O-marked and X-marked conditionals have a substantive semantic difference
(Edgington 1995; Bennett 2003) or they just merely differ in the temporal reference
(Dudman 1984; Khoo 2015).
What is the source of these variations in properties of X-marked conditionals
in Farsi and English? What does the typological picture of X-marked conditional
emerging from the data look like? To answer these questions, I will first review
existing theories on the semantic contribution of the linguistic ingredients of Xmarking. To understand how these theories handle the Farsi data, I will then discuss how the temporal orientation of antecedent and the defeasibility of antecedent
falsity are accounted for under these two types of approaches.

3.2

The role of tense in X-marked conditionals

A series of papers by Dudman draw attention to grammatical differences between
English O-marked and X-marked conditionals (Dudman 1983, 1984). Linguists
explored this matter further to understand the contribution of morphological elements found in X-marked conditionals, especially the role of the past morphology
that is used in a large number of unrelated languages to distinguish O-marked and
X-marked conditionals. There are two main approaches to account for the semantic
contribution of the past morpheme in X-marked conditionals: (i) the ambiguous7
7 I’m

using the term ambiguous atheoretically. Iatridou (2000) and Mackay (2019a) take the past
morpheme to be underspecified.
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past approach (Iatridou 2000; Schulz 2014; Karawani & Zeijlstra 2013, and Mackay
2019a) which takes past tense morphemes to contribute either temporal reference
to a time different from the present time or modal reference to a set of worlds
different from the worlds in the context set. (ii) the uniform past approach (Ippolito
2013; Arregui 2005; Grønn & Von Stechow 2009; Romero 2014, Khoo 2015) which
takes the past tense morpheme to always have a uniform temporal meaning. Under
this approach, the special interpretation of the past in X-marked conditionals is
compositionally derived from the interaction of the past and the modal, as a result
of the structural position of the past.
Following the suggestion of Schulz (2014), the ambiguous past approach and
the uniform past approach have been referred to as past as modal as past as past,
respectively. I believe these terms are misleading, as they obscure the modal aspect
of the past meaning within the uniform past approach.
Here, I will present a general overview of these two approaches, and how they
account for variations in the temporal orientation of antecedents, as well as the
strength of counterfactuality. A full comparison between the two approaches will
be postponed until the next section.

3.2.1

Ambiguous Past

An early highly influential theory for the semantic contribution of past tense in Xmarking was proposed by Iatridou (2000). Exploring the morphological make up
of X-marking in conditionals as well as wish-constructions across several languages,
Iatridou (2000) argues that the past tense in these constructions does not contribute
its usual temporal interpretation, and thus is fake. To explain the role of past tense in
X-marking, she proposes that the morpheme associated with the past tense always
has a skeletal meaning of the form (211).
(211) Topic(x) excludes the x of the deictic center.
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The variable x can range over times or worlds. When x ranges over times, the
topic time excludes the utterance time and we get ‘past tense.’ We don’t get the
future because unlike the past and the present, it is not a tense but a modal.
When the variable x ranges over worlds, the topic worlds exclude the actual
world. The past in X-marked conditionals conveys that the set of worlds selected
by the antecedent excludes the world of utterance, and thus gives rise to modal
remoteness inference.
Schulz (2014) aims to formulate Iatridou’s proposal more explicitly. Instead
of the exclusion schema proposed by Iatridou (2000), Schulz’s approach takes the
morphological realization of past morpheme to encode an anteriority function x <
x*. This function operates either on temporal domain or epistemic domain. The
variable x* is the deictic center. When the function operates on the temporal domain, the order is interpreted as temporal precedence.
In the modal interpretation, x* is the epistemic deictic center, which is the set of
worlds that the speaker expects the actual world to be among. Worlds are ordered
on the basis of what the speaker considers to be epistemically optimal. The anteriority function localises the worlds selected by the antecedent outside the epistemic
deictic center. X-marked conditionals, therefor, convey that the conditional is about
unexpected worlds.
Similarly, Mackay (2019a) takes past tense to have a skeletal denotation x < x*,
where x can get either temporal or modal value. In the modal case, the past operates
on modal bases. He proposes that the variable x is sets of propositions in the modal
base, and x* is the factive common ground, defined in (212), which determines the
set of of worlds epistemically possible in a context.
(212) The factive common ground: The set of proposition that are presupposed
and true in a context of utterance.
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The relation < in the modal context is a proper subset relation ⊆.8 Therefore,
what past in X-marked conditional contributes is the presupposition that the modal
base is a proper subset of the factive common ground. The modal base of O-marked
conditionals, in contrast, is the factive common ground.
Under Mackay’s approach, the modal remoteness inference is derived as a presuppositional implicature. When the modal base is a proper subset of the factive
common ground, Maximize presupposition Heim (1991) makes the assertion of an
X-marked conditional obligatory. When the modal base is the factive common
ground, only an O-marked conditional can be asserted as the presupposition of
the X-marked conditional is not met in such contexts.

3.2.2

Uniform Past

The second kind of approach to the role of the past in X-marked conditional takes it
to always contribute a temporal precedence. The perceived deviance from the usual
interpretation arises because the structural position of the past tense in X-marked
conditionals enables it to manipulate a parameter of the conditional, instead of
shifting the temporal reference of the antecedent or consequent. Accounts in this
group differ in which parameter of the conditional they take the past tense to shift.
An obvious candidate is the time in which the conditional statement is evaluated.
This approach, which is taken by Dudman (1984) and Romero (2014), takes Xmarked conditionals and future-oriented O-marked conditionals to differ merely in
temporal reference. The idea basically is that an X-marked conditional like (213a)
expresses at a later time what is expressed by its corresponding future-oriented
O-marked conditional (213b).
8 Note,

however, that unlike Iatridou’s and Schulz’s analysis in which the function < in both
temporal and modal meaning of the past is the same, under Mackay’s analysis we are really dealing
with a purely ambiguous past morpheme with no overlap between the modal and temporal meaning
of past.
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(213)

a. If Oswald had not killed Kennedy, someone else would have.
b. If Oswald does not kill Kennedy, someone else will.

Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013) provides a compositional account of the meaning
contribution of the past tense. A conditional is evaluated with respect to two times:
the accessibility time and the reference (a.k.a., evaluation) time. These times can be
shifted by temporal operators, independently of each other. Instead of evaluation
time, however, she takes the past tense in X-marked conditionals to manipulate the
time of the accessibility relation of the modal. She argues that X-marked conditionals may have more than one past operator, in which case the additional past can
shift the reference time to a past time.
According to Ippolito’s account, X-marked conditionals are bare conditionals
embedded under a past operator. The modal operator of the conditional “woll”
takes the past tense as its time argument that manipulates the time of the accessibility relation. Following Thomason & Gupta (1980) and Condoravdi (2001), she
argues that the accessibility relation is historical. Therefore, the modal with the past
as its argument picks out worlds that are historically accessible from the evaluation
world at some past time.
(214) J woll Kc,g,t,w = λt’ ∈ Di .λp<s,t> . λq<s,t> .∀w’ [ w’ ∈ SIMw (HIST w,t0 (p)) →
w’ ∈ q]
As the defintion of the modal operator in (214) shows, the first argument of the
modal has to be of type i. However, the past tense, as defined in 215 by Ippolito
(2013), is of type hhi,ti, t i.
(215) JpastKc,g,t,w = λ P<i,t> . ∃ t’ < t : P(t’) =1

(Ippolito 2013)

To resolve this type mismatch, tense raises and adjoins to the bare conditional.
It leaves a trace of type i behind and creates a λ-abstractor which is co-indexed with
the trace. (216) shows the structure of X-marked conditionals.
118

(216) The structure of simple past X-marked conditionals
S”

S’

Past

S

1

α

Antecedent-clause

β

woll

Consequent-clause

t1

(Ippolito 2013)
The presence of the past operator which shifts the time of the accessibility relation to the past allows these conditionals to be felicitous when there is no world
historically accessible at the utterance time in which the antecedent proposition is
true. By shifting the accessibility time to the past, we make sure that the antecedent
worlds can be incompatible with the actual world at the utterance time. This gives
rise to the antecedent falsity inference. In the case of an O-marked conditional
whose time of the accessibility relation is the utterance time, quantification cannot
be over antecedent-worlds that are not compatible with the actual world at the
utterance time. Therefore, when the antecedent is false, an O-marked conditional
is infelicitous.
Adapting a situations framework (Kratzer 2021), Arregui (2005, 2009) proposes
a uniform past account that takes the role of the past to be to anchor the interpretation of the X-marked conditional on particular past facts. That is, the past
tense determines the temporal specification of the anchor situation from which the
modal domain in conditionals projects. She adopts a Lewis-Stalnakerian semantics,
according to which an X-marked conditional of the form if A, would B is true iff
the most similar A-worlds are also B-worlds. By identifying features of the actual
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world that are shared in A-worlds, the pastness of the anchor situation affects the
resolution of similarity invoked by X-marked conditionals. According to Arregui’s
proposal, X-marked conditionals of the form if A, would B are true iff A-worlds that
also contain a counterpart of the past facts the anchor situation refers to, are worlds
in which B is true9 .

3.3

Approaches to X-marking in light of Farsi data

We have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals differ in two aspects from their
English counterparts:
(i) The temporal orientation of the antecedent
(ii) Strength of counterfactuality (defeasibility of antecedent falsity)

3.3.1

Temporal orientation of the antecedent

Earlier in this chapter we have seen that the antecedents of X-marked conditionals in
Farsi can get a range of temporal interpretations, which their corresponding English
X-marked conditionals lack.
(ia) Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals can refer to past events, but
English simple past X-marked conditionals cannot ((196b) vs. (197)).
(ib) English pluperfect X-marked conditionals can refer to present states, but Farsi
pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot ((198a) vs. (??)).
In this section, I will review how these important properties of X-marked conditionals are accounted for in existing proposals. I will also discuss where these
9 Unlike the standard Lewis-Stalnakerian approach where the kind of similarity is global similar-

ity, Arregui argues for a local notion of similarity.
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proposals stand with respect to the observed variation in temporal orientation of
antecedents between Farsi and English.
I will discuss two classes of proposals. The first group take the temporal orientation of the antecedent to follow from the evaluation time of the antecedent
represented by tense in the antecedent (Iatridou 2000, 2009; Ippolito 2006, 2013).
The second group take the interaction of the modal and aspect in the antecedent
to determine the temporal orientation of the antecedent (Arregui 2005, 2007, 2009;
Khoo et al. 2022).

3.3.1.1

Tense and lexical aspect

The first linguistic analysis of the temporal orientation of antecedents in X-marked
conditionals was presented by Iatridou (2000). As mentioned earlier, she argues
that tense and the lexical aspect of the predicate in the antecedent determines its
temporal interpretation. She has convincingly shown that the temporal orientation
of the antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals mirrors the temporal interpretation of the predicate involved in the antecedent of O-marked conditionals
whose antecedent is marked with the present tense. Stative predicates can refer to
the present or the future. Eventive predicates can only describe a future event. She
argues that the antecedent of past oriented X-marked conditionals contain a real
past tense.
Ippolito (2006) provides a compositional implementation of this idea in a uniform past approach. She takes the temporal interpretation of the antecedent to be
independent of the past tense c-commanding the bare conditional. Ippolito (2006)
takes the antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals to contain a present
tense. She argues that the present in English has a non-past semantics, and thus
can be used to refer to the present and the future. It is only when the predicate is
eventive that the present tense obligatorily receives a future interpretation, as the
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behavior of temporal adverbs in (217a) shows. (217b) reveals that these temporal
adverbs behave exactly the same in the antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals. Ippolito (2006) takes this as evidence for the presence of the present tense
in the antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals.
(217)

a. I hope John cooks fish tomorrow/every day/*right now.
b. If John cooked fish tomorrow/every day/*right now, I wouldn’t have to.

Ippolito (2006) argues that the ungrammaticality of simple past X-marked conditionals with past oriented temporal adverbs, as in (218), provides a compelling
evidence that the antecedent contains a present tense.
(218) *If John cooked fish yesterday, I wouldn’t have to.
The structure that Ippolito (2006) proposes for simple past X-marked conditionals is given in (219).
(219) past [modal [if pres-φ]tc [...]]
Like Iatridou (2000), Ippolito (2006) takes the presence of a real past tense in
the antecedent of X-marked conditionals to be necessary to describe a past event.
Therefore, she proposes (220) as the structure of pluperfect X-marked conditionals
that receive a past oriented temporal interpretation. The pluperfect is the morphological realization of two layers of past morphology in English.
(220) past [modal [if past-φ]tc [...]]
As we have seen earlier, the pluperfect X-marked conditional can also receive
present and future interpretations. There are in fact cases like (221) where a pluperfect X-marked conditional is needed to refer to a counterfactual situation in the
future. In the scenario given in (221), the simple past X-marked conditional is
infelicitous.
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(221) John had chicken pox last year during the summer exam period. It was a disaster.
a. Bad timing. #If he were sick with chicken pox next summer instead, it
would be much better.
b. Bad timing. If he had been sick with chicken pox next summer instead,
it would have been much better.
Ippolito (2013) argues that Iatridou’s approach in which a second layer of past
always locates the eventuality in the antecedent in the past fails to account for the
future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals. To account for future interpretation of pluperfect X-marked conditionals, (Ippolito 2013) posits that the antecedent
of these conditionals contains a present tense, and that the whole conditional is
embedded under two layers of past morphology, as shown in (222).
(222) past [ past [modal [ if pres-φ]tc [...]]]
Now let us consider Farsi facts again. As was shown in (196b), repeated here
as (223), past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi, which contain only one
past marker, can be used to describe a counterfactual past event.
(223) agar dirooz
rah mi-oft-aad hafte-ye ba’d mi-res-id
if
yesterday way impf-fall-pst week-EZ next impf-arrive-pst.3sg
‘If he had left yesterday, he would have arrived next week.’
The Farsi data is a problem for accounts that rely on an additional layer of past
to account for past orientation of the antecedent. It is especially problematic for an
ambiguous past version of such accounts (Iatridou 1991), as it is not clear how a
fake past that doesn’t contribute a temporal meaning can locate the time of the event
described in the antecedent in the past.
A uniform past version of this kind of accounts Ippolito (2013) has a way out of
this problem, by attributing Farsi facts to special properties of the present tense in
Farsi. As we saw in the last chapter, the present tense in Farsi is shiftable. That is,
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a present tense verb embedded under a matrix past tense can get a past interpretation. This fact about Farsi is illustrated in (224), which conveys that the time of
John’s living in Amherst overlaps with the time at which Ana self-located herself
when uttering ”John lives in Amherst now” in 1985.
(224) Ana in 2004: ”John lives in Amherst now.”
dar 2004, Ana gof-t
ke John dar Amherst zendegi mi-kon-∅-ad.
In 2004, Ana say-pst.3sg that John in Amherst live
impf-do-pres-3sg
’In 2004, Ana said that John lives in Amherst (then).’
According to Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013), in an X-marked conditional a past tense
scopes over the whole conditional. Assuming the antecedent of a past imperfective
X-marked conditional in Farsi contains a shiftable present tense, we can argue that
the past orientation of these conditionals arises because the present tense is interpreted relative to the c-commanding past tense. I will come back to this idea in
Chapter Four.

3.3.1.2

Modal and Aspect

Arregui (2005, 2009) takes a different approach. She proposes that the antecedent
of X-marked conditionals lacks a deictic tense. Tense in the antecedent is a zero
tense pronoun (∅). Following Kratzer (1998a), she takes English zero pronoun
to inherit the morphological features of the closest c-commanding deictic tense.
According to her analysis, (225) is the structure of X-marked conditionals.
(225) The structure of X-marked conditionals (Arregui 2009)
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Pasti
consequent
would
j

if [......∅ j ......]

Semantically, the antecedent of X-marked conditional is interpreted as a property
of situations. There is no temporal constraints on the situation a zero tense can refer
to. Arregui (2005, 2009) proposes that the modal would in X-marked conditionals
shifts the antecedent situation to some non-past time. Under her account, the temporal interpretation of the antecedent is determined by the interaction of aspect in
the antecedent with this non-past time.
Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009) takes the difference between past and pluperfect Xmarked conditionals to be aspectual. The antecedent of a past X-marked conditional
with an eventive predicate contains a perfective aspect. Given the denotation of
perfective in (226), the antecedent with perfective aspect states that the running
time of the event described is included in a non-past time. Therefore, the temporal
location of the antecedent of past X-marked conditionals is necessarily in a non-past
time.
(226) Where P is a property of events, and ei is an event pronoun,
Jperfective-ei Kg,w (P) = λt. λw’. P(Jei Kg,w ) ∧ ∃ s (s < w’ ∧Jei Kg,w (s)= 1

∧τ(s) ⊂ t)
Arregui (2005, 2007) proposes that stative verbs denote properties of times,
and thus can directly combine with tenses. The antecedent of a past X-marked
conditional with a stative predicate describe a non-past state.
The antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals contains perfect aspect.
Given the denotation of perfect aspect in (227), an antecedent with perfect aspect
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states that the running time of the situation described precedes a non-past time.
This does not restrict the set of possibilities for the temporal location of the event.
The event itself can be past, present or future.
(227) Jperfect-ei Kg,w (P) = λt. λw. ∃e (P(Jei Kg,w ∧ ∃ s (s < w & e occurs in s &
τ(s) < t))
An important advantage of Arregui’s account is that it takes the role of aspect
in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals seriously. In the last chapter, I have
shown that aspect in the antecedent of Farsi conditionals determines the temporal
orientation of the situation described. Imperfective aspect in antecedents of Farsi
conditionals typically refers to present and future situations (in X-marked conditionals it can also refer to past). Perfect aspect in antecedents of Farsi conditionals
refers to past and future situations. Theories that take aspect in the antecedent of
X-marked conditionals to be fake Iatridou (2000, 2009); Ippolito (2013); Crowley
(2022) need to spell out mechanisms by which aspects can be bleached of its usual
meaning. Moreover, they have to explain why such bleaching does not occur in
Farsi. As noted earlier, imperfective and perfect aspects in the antecedent of Farsi
X-marked conditionals exhibit their typical properties. I have argued for the realness of aspect based on three observations. Firstly, I have shown that the general
incompatibility of the pluperfect and Farsi stative verbs be and have, as in (228), also
holds in the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals, as shown in (229).
(228)

a. *qablan xune dašte bud-am
before house have.pp aux.pst-1sg
‘I had had a house before.’
b. *qablan puldar bude budam.
before rich
be.pp aux.pst-1sg
‘I had been rich before.’

(229)

a. *agar xune dašte bud-am, ejare ne-mi-dad-am.
if
house have.pp aux.pst-1sg rent neg-impf-give.pst-1sg
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‘I had had a house, I wouldn’t have to pay rent.’
b. *agar puldar bude budam,
xune mi-khar-id-am
if
rich
be.pp aux.pst-1sg house impf-buy-pst-1sg
‘If I had been rich, I would have bought a house.’
Moreover, we have seen that the stative predicate know which is generally incompatible with perfect aspect, can only appear in the antecedent of imperfective
X-marked conditionals.
(230)

a. agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’
b. *agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro daneste
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra know-pp
bud,
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
aux-pst-3sg winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’

Lastly, we have also seen that counterfactual generic statements can only be
expressed with imperfective aspect in the antecedent. This was illustrated by the
contrast in (205), repeated her as (231).
(231)

a. Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt mi-xor-d-and, dandun-ha-šun
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat impf-eat-pst-3pl, tooth-pl-their
saf ne-mi-bud.
flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
b. #Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt xor-de bud-and,
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat eat-pp aux-pst-3pl,
dandun-ha-šun saf ne-mi-bud.
tooth-pl-their flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
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Under an approach like Arregui’s which takes the antecedent of the pluperfect
X-marked conditional to contain a real perfect aspect, it is no mystery that aspectual
restrictions are maintained in X-marked conditionals.
Can the past orientation of past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi be
derived from the interaction of imperfective aspect and the non-past time provided
by the modal? I do not think so. Imperfective aspect in other types of Farsi conditionals is not compatible with a past interpretation. Therefore, the past orientation
must have another source.
We have seen that past imperfective X-marked conditionals pattern with the
present tense conditionals in terms of settledness, as opposed to zero tense conditionals. This suggests that their antecedent does not contain a zero tense, as
Arregui proposes for English. Perhaps the nature of tense pronouns in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals is subject to cross-linguistic variation. Arregui
(2005, 2009), like (Ippolito 2003), takes X-marked conditionals to have a past tense
in the highest position of their structures. Therefore, we can couple her proposal
with the modification that was suggested to Ippolito’s. The antecedent of a past
imperfective X-marked conditional in Farsi contains a shiftable present tense, thus
it can be interpreted relative to the c-commanding past tense. I will elaborate this
idea in Chapter Four.

Interim summary
In sum, in this section I have argued that the past orientation of past imperfective
X-marked conditionals in Farsi poses a problem for the ambiguous past approach
which takes the one layer of the past tense in X-marked conditionals to lack its temporal meaning. Given that Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals have only
one layer of past tense, which presumably has a modal function, there is no deictic
past tense in the structure of these conditionals to which their past orientation can
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be attributed to.
The problem is not as fatal for the uniform past approach. According to this
view, there is a deictic past tense in the structure of all X-marked conditionals.
Therefore, the past orientation of Farsi past imperfective X-marked conditionals can
be explained with the interaction of the shiftable present tense in the antecedent
and the c-commanding deictic past tense.
Lastly, I have also argued that Farsi data lends support to (Arregui 2007)’s
position that aspect in X-marked conditionals are not bleached of its meaning. I
have reasoned for this view based on the fact that the incompatibility of perfect
aspect with stative verbs, as well as its incompatibility with generic readings, is
also maintained in X-marked conditionals.

3.3.2

Strength of Counterfactuality

We have seen two cases where English X-marked conditionals do not imply that
their antecedent is False: (i) Future Less Vivid conditionals, and (ii) Anderson-type
examples. It has been widely assumed that X-marked conditionals do not carry a
counterfactuality presupposition. Rather, the antecedent falsity of X-marked conditional is an implicature. (Anderson 1951, Stalnaker 1975, Karttunen & Peters 1979,
Palmer 1986).
Stalnaker (1975) provides another argument against counterfactuality as a presupposition. He shows that X-marked conditionals can be used to conduct a modus
tollens argument, as in (232). If counterfactuality were presupposed, asserting the
falsity of the antecedent would be uninformative. However, the modus tollens
argument in (232) goes through without producing redundancy. Therefore, we
can conclude that the falsity of antecedent proposition is only implicated.
(232) The knife was clean.
But if the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the kitchen
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knife.
Therefore, the butler did not do it.

(Stalnaker 1975)

von Fintel (1998) also brings up the case in (233), attributing it to Stanley Peters. In the context below, both X-marked and O-marked conditionals10 are equally
felicitous.
(233) X: Kennedy was shot by a lone gunman.
Y: Kennedy was shot by two gunmen.
Z: Look guys. You gotta admit this.
a. If two gunmen had shot Kennedy, then two guns would have been found.
So, let’s find out...
b. If two gunmen shot Kennedy, then two guns must have been found. So,
let’s find out...

(von Fintel 1998)

von Fintel (1998) argues that a successful theory of X-marked conditionals should
account for the fact that they do not have a complementary distribution with Omarked conditionals. With Stalnaker (1975), he concludes that antecedent falsity
should be derived pragmatically.
We have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals cannot be interpreted as Future
Less Vivid (208b), and are infelicitous in Anderson-examples (210). Moreover,
Farsi X-marked conditionals, as shown in (234), are infelicitous in Stanley Peter’s
case discussed earlier in (233).
(234) X: Kennedy was shot by a lone gunman.
Y: Kennedy was shot by two gunmen.
Z: Look guys. You gotta admit this.
10 As

we have said earlier, O-marked conditionals are characterized as lacking X-marking. Although the conditionals in (233) are not minimal pairs (must vs. would), they still show the point
that O-marked and X-marked conditionals are sometimes felicitous in the same context.
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a. #agar do nafar be Kennedy šellik karde bud-and,
do ta tofang
if
two person to Kennedy shoot do.pp aux.pst-3pl, two cl gun
peida šode
bud.
find become.pp aux.pst.3sg
If two gunmen had shot Kennedy, then two guns would have been found.
b. agar do nafar be Kennedy šellik karde baš-and, do ta tofang
if
two person to Kennedy shoot do.pp aux.∅-3pl, two cl gun
peida šode
ast.
find become.pp aux.pres.3sg
If two gunmen shot Kennedy, then two guns must have been found.
So, let’s find out...
Before reviewing different proposals about the strength of counterfactuality, I
want to rule out one obvious option to account for strong antecedent falsity of Farsi
X-marked conditionals. That is to simply say that they are different from their
English counterparts in presupposing the falsity of their antecedent. The felicity
of Farsi X-marked conditionals in modus tollens arguments, as in (235) shows that
this option is not tenable.
(235) The knife was clean.
agar pishkhedmat in kar ro kar-de bud,
ma ru-ye chagu xun
if
butler
this work ra do-pp aux.pst.3sg we on-ez knife blood
peida mi-kard-im.
chagu tamiz-e; pas
pishkhedmat in kar
found impf-do.pst-1pl. knife clean-is therefore butler
this work
ro na-kar-de ast.
ra neg-do-pp aux.3sg
‘If the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the kitchen knife. The knife
was clean; therefore, the butler did not do it.’
Lastly, as we have seen earlier, there are contexts like (174), repeated here as
(236), where both X-marked conditionals and zero tense conditionals are felicitous.
(236) Context: The investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and
announces that they can confirm that Oswald was in fact the murderer. John and
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his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte bud
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’
b. I’m not convinced but
agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘if Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
As I explained in Chapter Two, this context doesn’t specify whether the antecedent proposition (p) has been accepted by all participants in discourse. All
we know is that the police has reached the conclusion that Oswald is the murderer.
John may not accept this claim. The zero tense conditional is felicitous as long
as context doesn’t presuppose p or its negation, irrespective of whether they are
asserted or not. The settledness requirement on the felicitous use of X-marked
conditionals is also satisfied in this context, as the projected context in which the
proposition uttered by the police is negotiated and accepted, entails the falsity
of antecedent proposition. Thus, both zero tense and X-marked conditionals are
felicitous. However, only the claim with the zero tense conditional is true. The Xmarked conditional claim is false, because it is not given that Kennedy would have
been murdered anyway even if Oswald hadn’t killed him.
The example in (236) is very important, as it shows that even in the case of
Farsi where the antecedent falsity associated with X-marked conditionals is strong,
we still need a theory that does not predict complementarity of X-marked and Omarked conditionals (von Fintel 1998).
The examples in (237) and (238) provide further evidence for the pragmatic
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nature of strong counterfactuality of Farsi X-marked conditionals. These example
show that there are cases where Farsi X-marked conditionals do not necessarily
imply the falsity of their antecedents. However, this option seems to be only available to the past oriented past imperfective X-marked conditional. The pluperfect
X-marked conditional in (237b) and (238b) is not felicitous in the same context11 .
(237) Context: Aria has borrowed Farshid’s car. He calls Farshid and tells him: It’s foggy
everywhere. There was a turn where...
a. agar shans ne-mi-avar-d-am,
tah-e
darre mi-oft-ad-am.
if
luck neg-impf-bring-pst-1sg bottom-ez valley impf-fall.pst-1sg
‘if I wasn’t lucky, I (with the car) would fall into a valley.’
b. #agar shans na-yavorde bud-am,
,
tah-e
if
luck neg-bring-pp aux-pst-1sg bottom-ez valley
darre
mi-oft-ad-am.
impf-fall.pst-1sg
‘if I hadn’t been lucky, I (with the car) would have fallen into a valley.’
Farshid: Are you really calling so early in the morning to say this?
Aria: well, I wasn’t lucky...
adapted from a post on Twitter12
(238) Context: I ask Rodica why she went to the store yesterday and not any other day.
a. (chon)
agar dirooz
mi-raf-t-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday impf-go-pst-1sg, discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I went yesterday, I would get a discount.’
b. *(chon) agar dirooz
rafte bud-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday go-pp aux-pst-1sg discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I had gone yesterday, I would have gotten a discount.’
11 Later in this chapter, I discuss cases where Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals are also used

without implying antecedent falsity.
12 Thanks to Masoud Jasbi for showing me this example.
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3.3.2.1

Stalnaker (1975); von Fintel (1998), and von Fintel & Iatridou (2020)

According to von Fintel’s formalization of Stalnaker’s proposal, which is also adopted
by von Fintel & Iatridou (2020), O-marked conditionals carry no presupposition.
von Fintel (1998) proposes a default pragmatic constraint according to which the
domain of quantification is contained in the context set. Given this constraint, Omarked conditionals are felicitous when all antecedent worlds in the domain of
quantification are within the context set.
(239)

a. O-marked conditionals: presupposition: ∅
b. Default pragmatic constraint: D(w) ⊆ C
(von Fintel 1998; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020)

X-marked conditionals carry a presupposition that the domain of quantification
is partly outside the context set.
(240) X-marked conditionals: presupposition: D(w) 6⊆ C
(von Fintel 1998; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020)
The domain widening approach accounts for the distribution of O-marked and
X-marked conditionals in English. I will not go through all the cases here, I refer
the reader to von Fintel (1998). But let us see how the domain widening approach
account for Stanley Peter’s case.
The domain widening approach maintains that X-marking signals that the domain of quantification is partly outside the context set. von Fintel (1998) proposes
that there are different possibilities to understand why an X-marked form which
signals domain widening has been used:
(241)

a. The antecedent is counterfactual.
b. The domain of quantification is widened for some other reason.
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c. The speaker wants to avoid a direct signal that the antecedent is epistemically possible.
The hearer is free to interpret X-marked conditionals as meaning any of the
options above. As for Stanley Peter’s case, von Fintel (1998) argues that the use
of the X-marked conditional is ‘the more diplomatic way of mediating here’. The hearer
interprets the X-marked conditional as meaning that the speaker does not want to
make a potentially offensive utterance by using the O-marked conditional which
directly signals that the antecedent is possible. The X-marked conditional is diplomatically neutral with respect to possibility of the antecedent proposition being
true.
von Fintel (1998) and Stalnaker (1975) were not concerned with the role of the
past tense morphology in the domain widening presupposition associated with
X-marked conditionals. As such, their account does not really explain the role
of past morpheme in X-marked conditionals. As a result, there are not enough
tools in the approach to explain the cross-linguistic variation in the strength of
counterfactuality as observed in Farsi.

3.3.2.2

Iatridou (2000)

Iatridou (2000) provides an account of how the counterfactuality can be derived as
a conversational implicature, taking into account the contribution of the past tense
morphology. She argues that the cancelability of counterfactuality in X-marked
conditionals is similar to the cancelable implicature in the following conversation:
(242) A: What do you think about Peter and Ian?
B: Well, I like Ian.
The fact that B has chosen not to talk about his feelings toward Peter can give
rise to the implicature that B does not like Peter. But B has not asserted this. He
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can later add that he, in fact, like Peter and cancel this implicature. Iatridou (2000)
argues that the cancelability of counterfactuality can be accounted for in a similar
way. The speaker of an X-marked conditional discusses the relationship between
the proposition in the antecedent (p) and the proposition in the consequent (q),
and makes their utterance to be about a set of worlds (the topic worlds) to which
the actual world does not belong. In interpreting the X-marked conditional, the
hearer pragmatically reasons that the reason why speaker chooses to talk about p
worlds instead of the actual world, is that they do not think that the actual world is
a p world.
Following Lewis (1973) and Stalnaker (1975), Iatridou (2000) argues that Xmarked conditionals are not a statement about all worlds in which p is true but
only about a subset of them, i.e. the topic worlds do not exhaust all the p worlds.
The speaker of an X-marked conditional merely states that the actual world is not
among the p worlds that they are talking about. It does not necessarily follow that
the actual world is not among the p worlds. When the counterfactuality of an Xmarked conditional is canceled, it is first asserted that the topic worlds exclude the
world of the speaker (i.e. the actual world), and it is subsequently asserted that
the set of p worlds includes the worlds of the speaker. This means that the set of p
worlds is large enough to contain the topic worlds and the utterance world, but the
topic worlds excludes the utterance world.
Iatridou (2000) points out that the temporal past tense morphology shows a
similar cancelability property. Consider the example below in which the speaker
utters the following two sentences:
(243)

a. John was in the classroom.
b. In fact, he still is.

The speaker of (243a) asserts that at the topic time the situation S (John is in the
classroom) holds and that the topic time excludes the utterance time. But it doesn’t
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necessarily follow that the “situation” time excludes the utterance time. This is only
an implicature that arises because the speaker has chosen to talk about the topic
time and not the utterance time. The speaker can later add (243b) which asserts
the situation time includes the utterance time. The situation time is large enough
to include both the topic time and the utterance time, with the former excluding
the latter.
Now let’s see how Iatridou’s account handles Farsi data. Like English, if the
Farsi speaker uses the temporal past (choosing to talk about the topic time instead
of the utterance time), it gives rise to the implicature that they don’t think the topic
time includes the utterance time. This implicature gets canceled if the speaker later
adds that the topic time includes the utterance time.
(244)

a. John tu kelas bud.
John in class be.pst.3sg
‘John was in the classroom.’
b. dar vaghe, hanooz ham hast.
in fact
still
too be.3sg
‘In fact, he still is.’

However, this implicature cannot be canceled when “past” ranges over worlds.
As we have seen the antecedent falsity of Farsi X-marked conditionals cannot be
canceled. This raises the question why the implicature associated with (T(x) excludes C(x)) can be canceled when x ranges over times but not when it ranges over
worlds. Furthermore, it’s not clear what is the source of the difference between
Farsi and English in the strength of counterfactuality.

3.3.2.3

Mackay (2019a)

Mackay (2019a) proposes an account that derives the distribution of X-marked and
O-marked conditionals pragmatically from the presupposition of the past tense
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morphology in X-marked conditionals, while avoiding the problems Mackay (2015)
mentions for ambiguous past approaches of Iatridou (2000) and Schulz (2014).
Mackay’s proposal is similar in spirit to those of Stalnaker (1975) and von Fintel
(1998). The O-marked conditional is the unmarked form, and its modal base is the
factive common ground. The X-marked conditional presupposes that their modal
base is a proper subset of the factive common ground. This is in contrast with
Stalnaker and von Fintel’s proposals that O-marked and X-marked conditionals
differ in their relation to the presupposition of the whole common ground. Mackay
(2019a) argues that such a departure is needed to account for intuitions about
conditionals that are asserted in contexts where the speakers’ presuppositions are
false. He explains this with the example below by Edgington (1995). Assume
the conditional (245) is uttered in a context where it is wrongly presupposed that
dancing will make it rain the next day. At such a context, at every world in the
context at which we dance, it rains the next day. Further suppose that the speakers
dance, and it does not rain.
(245) If we dance, it will rain tomorrow.
The conditional (245) is judged false in such a scenario, since the speakers danced
and then it did not rain. However, a view that takes the domain of the O-marked
conditional to be within the context set (the whole common ground) wrongly predicts (245) to be true.The reason is, Mackay (2019a) argues, ‘if the world selected for
an O-marked conditional is in the context set even when the world of evaluation is not, then
the selected world at which the speakers dance must be one at which it does rain’.
Given that ambiguous past approaches have problems accounting for the past
orientation of Farsi past imperfective conditionals, Mackay’s proposal falls short
of explaining the role of past tense in X-marked conditionals cross-linguistically.
Moreover, the variation in the strength of counterfactuality remains unexplained.
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3.3.2.4

Leahy (2018)

Leahy (2011, 2018) provides a pragmatic account of the antecedent falsity inference associated with the X-marked conditional, according to which the X-marked
conditional is the unmarked form, and thus carries no presupposition. O-marked
conditionals, in contrast, presuppose that their antecedents are epistemically possible. He defines the notion of epistemic possibility as follow:
(246) A proposition is epistemically possible for a speaker s iff it is consistent with
the set of proposition that the speaker knows, as modulated by their purposes in the conversation at hand.
The antecedent falsity of X-marked conditionals is derived as a presuppositional implicature from the pragmatic principle of Maximize Presupposition (Heim
1991), defined in (247).
(247) Maximize Presupposition
If φ and ψ are contextually equivalent alternatives, and the presuppositions
of ψ are stronger than those of φ, and are met in the context of utterance,
one must use ψ in c.
Presuppositions of X-marked and O-marked conditionals are asymmetrically
ordered by logical strength, where O-marked conditionals carry the logically stronger
presupposition. Together with Maximize Presupposition, the use of the X-marked
conditional in a context gives rise to the implicature that the speaker has reason
to believe that the presupposition of the logically stronger alternative, i.e. the Omarked conditional, is not met in the context. That is, the antecedent proposition
is not epistemically possible for the speaker.
Leahy (2011, 2018) argues that the use of X-marked conditionals does not generate the antecedent falsity implicature in Anderson’s examples and modus tollens
arguments (Stalnaker 1975), because the O-marked conditional is infelicitous in
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such cases, and thus does not count as a contextual alternative to the X-marked
conditional.
(248)

a. This was done with stiletto. # But if the butcher did it, he used a cleaver.
So it wasn’t the butcher.
b. # If he took arsenic, he showed just exactly the symptoms that he in fact
showed.
(Leahy 2018)

Leahy (2018) admits, however, that his account is not developed to capture
non-counterfactual uses of X-marked conditionals. For instance, Crowley (2022)
mentions that Leahy’s proposal fails to account for cases brought up by von Fintel
(1998), where both O-marked and X-marked conditionals are equally felicitous, as
shown in (233).
Leahy’s account suffers from two problems: (i) This analysis does not explain
the role of past morpheme in X-marked conditionals. (ii) Cross-linguistic variations in the strength of counterfactuality remains unexplained.

3.3.2.5

Crowley (2022)

Crowley (2022) proposes an account that combines insights from Leahy (2011,
2018) and Mackay (2019a). Like Leahy, he takes X-marking to lack a direct presuppositional or truth-conditional contribution. The antecedent falsity inference
associated with X-marked conditionals arises from the competition with their Omarked alternatives, which are presuppositionally stronger. Crowley (2022) suggests that both O-marked and X-marked conditionals carry a presupposition that
their modal base is a subset of the factive common ground (represented by the
notation c T ).
(249) Subset Property of Modal Bases
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Given a world w, a context c and a modal M f such that X and O can appear
in the immediate scope of M f , f (w) ⊆ c T .
(Crowley 2022)
O-marked conditionals further presuppose that their modal base is identical to
the factive common ground.
(250) Presupposition of O-marked conidtionals

∀w0 ∈

T

f (w) ∩ φ : w0 ∈

T T
c .

(Crowley 2022)
This is attributed to the universal projection of the presupposition of an operator
O, defined in (251a), that sits in the immediate scope of restricted modal quantifier
in O-marked conditionals, as the LF (251b) illustrates.
(251)

a. JOKc, f = λp. λw : w ∈

T T
c . p=1

b. [[ Nec [i f φ]][O ψ]]
(Crowley 2022)
The competition between X-marked and O-marked conditionals give rise to the
implicature that the modal base of the X-marked conditional is a proper subset of the
factive common ground, as proposed by Mackay (2019a). Crowley (2022) argues
that the hearer then derives the meaning that presuppositions are being suspended
in the interpretation of X-marked conditionals (Stalnaker 1975; von Fintel 1998).
Crowley’s analysis is aimed to account for two desiderata stated in (252a) and
(252b).
(252)

a. Desideratum 1
It should be possible to interpret X-marking in an embedded position
relative to the modal that it is associated with.
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b. Desideratum 2
X-marking in the antecedent and main clause of conditionals can be
attributed to separate instances of X-marking operators.
(Crowley 2022)
One of the motivations for the first desideratum comes from the obligatory use
of X-marking with counterfactual desire expressions like wish as in (253).
(253) I wish I had a car now.
Following von Fintel (2012), Crowley (2022) argues that the appearance of Xmarking in such constructions cannot be due to agreement with a higher instance of
X-marking. Crowley (2022) also takes X-marking in non-SOT languages like Russian and Japanese, which do not otherwise have agreement-induced occurrences
of the past tense, further evidence that X-marking is not necessarily get assigned
from a higher X-marking operator.
He reasons for the second desideratum on the basis of the X-marking pattern
in languages like Spanish where the antecedent of the X-marked conditional bears
past subjunctive morphology while the consequent takes a conditional form.
I will discuss counterfactual desire expressions in the last section. Here, I want
to mention that, as Crowley (2022) acknowledges, it doesn’t follow from different
morphological forms in the antecedent and the consequent that there are multiple
operators involved in conditionals. There are more substantial problems with this
approach though. It has no explanation for the robust cross-linguistic generalization that many unrelated languages use past tense morphology for X-marking.
Crowley (2022) claims that all morphologies that are involved in X-marking are
vacuous. This hypothesis which he dubs as Generalized Vacuity Hypothesis is stated
below.
(254) Generalized Vacuity Hypothesis
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For all morphological forms that can serve as X-marking, all interpretations
of these forms, whether modal or not, are associated with a semantically
vacuous function in the LF of the expression containing the morphology.
(Crowley 2022)
Farsi data shows that this hypothesis cannot be correct. Both tense and aspect in
X-marked conditionals show some of their normal semantic functions. Moreover,
any theories that take X-marking to be semantically vacuous fails to account for
the two important observations made by Ippolito (2013). The first observation is
that future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals strongly imply falsity of their
antecedent, as the infelicity of such conditionals in Anderson-type example (255)
suggests.
(255) # If Charlie had gone to Boston by train tomorrow, Lucy would have found
in his pocket the ticket that she in fact found. So, he must be going to Boston
by train tomorrow.
If both tense and aspect are semantically vacuous, as Crowley (2022) claims,
what gives rise to the strong counterfactuality of future oriented pluperfect X-marked
conditionals?
The second observation is that the future-less-vivid conditionals cannot be used
in contexts where presuppositions of their antecedent are not met.
(256) John was training for the Boston Marathon last summer when he unexpectedly died.
a. # If John ran the Boston Marathon next spring, he would win.
b. If John had run the Boston Marathon next spring, he would have won.
Note that according to Crowley’s proposal, the pragmatic inference associated
with X-marked conditionals is not the antecedent falsity, but suspension of presuppositions from the hypothetical domain of a conditional. As discussed by Crowley
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(2022), the antecedent falsity is only one of motivations for suspending a presupposition. Another motivation may be that the hypothetical proposition is unlikely.
The question, however, is why the suspended presupposition in (256a) cannot be
the existence presupposition. Moreover, we have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals do not have a future less vivid interpretation. They imply the antecedent
falsity, not unlikelihood, as the infelicity of (257a) shows.
(257) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow. The chance of winning
is 0.15%.
a. #agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. agar latary ro be-bar-am,
green card mi-gir-∅-am
if
lottery ra impf-win-∅-1sg green card impf-get.pres-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
Therefore, I conclude that the approached proposed by Crowley (2022) cannot
explain the role of past morpheme in X-marked conditionals. It also fails to capture
variations within and across languages in the strength of counterfactuality associated with X-marked conditionals.

3.3.2.6

Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013)

Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013) derives the felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals
from the semantic impact of tense and aspect. As discussed earlier, she takes the
past tense in X-marked conditionals to shift the time of the accessibility relation
to the past. This approach predicts that X-marked conditionals are felicitous in
contexts where the antecedent proposition cannot be true in any world historically
accessible at the utterance time. O-marked conditionals are predicted to be false in
such contexts, because when the time of the accessibility relation is the utterance
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time, quantification cannot be over antecedent-worlds that are not compatible with
the actual world at the utterance time.
Ippolito (2013) makes important observations about contrasts between simple
past and non-past pluperfect X-marked conditionals in their felicity conditions. The
first observation is what she calls presupposition asymmetry which concerns the fact
that the simple past X-marked conditional is infelicitous when the presupposition
of its antecedent of is not met in the context of utterance, as shown in (258). This is
true even in cases where the antecedent is truly counterfactual (e.g. (258a)).
(258) John is dead.
a. #If he were in love with Mary (now), he would ask her to marry him.
b. If he had been in love with Mary (now), he would have asked her to
marry him.
(Ippolito 2013)
Under Ippolito’s account, the reference time of conditionals plays an important
role in their felicity. The presuppositions of a conditional must be satisfied at the
reference time. As the reference time of the simple past X-marked conditional is
the utterance time by default, the presuppositions of this type of conditionals must
hold at the utterance time. The infelicity of the simple past X-marked conditional
in (258a) then follows from the fact that the presupposition of this conditional is
incompatible with what is possible at the utterance time. As the context in (258)
says John is dead at the utterance time, the existence presupposition, i.e. the presupposition that John exists, is not satisfied.
She accounts for the felicity of the pluperfect conditional in (258b) by proposing
that non-past pluperfect conditionals have two layers of past scoping over the whole
conditional. The role of the second past is to move the reference time of the whole
conditional to a contextually salient past time. As the reference time is a past time,
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any presupposition in the antecedent must be compatible with what is possible in
the actual world at a past time. As the reference time in the pluperfect conditional
is a past time, this presupposition needs to be satisfied in a past time not at the
utterance time. Therefore, the fact that John is dead at the utterance time doesn’t
affect the felicity of the pluperfect conditional in this context.
The second observation, what she calls the time asymmetry observation, is that
the simple past X-marked conditional is felicitous only if the eventuality in the
antecedent has not already happened. The examples in (221), repeated here as
(259), illustrate this fact.
(259) John had chicken pox last year during the summer exam period. It was a disaster.
a. Bad timing. #If he were sick with chicken pox next summer instead, it
would be much better.
b. Bad timing. If he had been sick with chicken pox next summer instead,
it would have been much better.
(Ippolito 2013)
To account for the infelicity of (259a), Ippolito (2013) makes two assumptions.
First, she argues that the antecedent of this conditional is interpreted referentially.
It is about a salient eventuality of John’s being sick. Following Kratzer (1998a),
she assumes that aspectual operators take a predicate of events as their argument,
and return a predicate of times. Unlike Kratzer (1998a) who takes aspect heads
to existentially quantify over the event argument of the predicate, Ippolito (2013)
proposes that the aspectual operators introduce an event pronoun as the argument
of the event predicate. Secondly, she proposes that eventive and stative predicates
carry the possibility presupposition defined below.
(260) The Possibility Presupposition
For any eventuality v, let v be possible at time t and world w just in case v
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has not already ended at any time t’ < t in w.

(Ippolito 2013)

She explains that (259a) is infelicitous because the possibility presupposition
of the antecedent which requires the salient eventuality of John being sick to be
possible tomorrow is not satisfied at the utterance time. The reason is that the
contextually salient eventuality of John’s being sick has occurred, and ended yesterday. Therefore, the infelicity of (259a) follows from the anaphoric interpretation
of the event argument of the predicate in the antecedent, and the possibility presupposition. In the pluperfect conditional, however, the possibility presupposition
is required to be compatible with the set of worlds historically accessible at a past
time (presumably some past time before the time when John got sick in the actual
world). Therefore, the fact that this presupposition is not compatible with the state
of the actual world is irrelevant to felicity of this conditional.
As mentioned before, Ippolito (2013) shows that the antecedent falsity inference
associated with non-past pluperfect X-marked conditionals is strong, and cannot be
cancelled. This is confirmed by the infelicity of such conditionals in Anderson-type
reasoning.
(261) # If Charlie had gone to Boston by train tomorrow, Lucy would have found
in his pocket the ticket that she in fact found. So, he must be going to Boston
by train tomorrow.
(Ippolito 2013)
In 3.1.2.3, I have also noted that future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot have Future Less Vivid interpretations. This was demonstrated with
example (208a), repeated here as (262).
(262) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
lottery, I would have gotten a green card.
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#If I had won the

When the presuppositions of the antecedent are met at the time of utterance,
the use of the non-past pluperfect X-marked conditional strongly implies that the
antecedent is false.
(263) John is alive.
a. If John played his last game tomorrow, he would win.
b. If John had played his last game tomorrow, he would have won.
(Ippolito 2013)
She derives the strong counterfactuality of non-past pluperfect X-marked conditionals via the principle of Maximize Presupposition. She argues that simple past
and non-past pluperfect X-marked conditionals form a scale where the simple past
X-marked conditional is presuppositionally stronger. Therefore, when the speaker
uses the presuppositionally weaker alternative, the hearer derives the inference that
some presuppositions of the antecedent are not consistent with the context at the
utterance time. For instance the use of (263b) in a context where the existence
presupposition is met, triggers the inference that John’s playing his last game tomorrow is not a possibility at the utterance time.
Before discussing Farsi data, I want to bring up a potential counter-example to
Ippolito’s analysis of the contrast between simple past and non-past pluperfect Xmarked conditionals. Given that aliens do not exist (at least as far as we know) and
their arrival to earth is not a possible future event, Ippolito’s analysis in terms of the
principle of Maximize Presupposition falsely predicts that the presuppositionally
stronger alternative (pluperfect) must be used in (264).
(264)

a. If aliens came to earth tomorrow, they would kill us all.
b. #If aliens had come to earth tomorrow, they would have killed us all.

Let’s now look at Farsi. We have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals strongly
imply the falsity of their antecedent. There is no difference in strength of counter148

factuality between future past imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals.
They are both infelicitous in a context where the antecedent proposition is still
realizable, irrespective of how unlikely it is.
(265) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow. The chance of winning
is 0.15%.
a. #agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. #agar latary ro borde bud-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra win-pp aux-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I had won the lottery, I would have gotten a green card.’
However, the two types of conditionals contrast in their felicity conditions. It’s
infelicitous to use the pluperfect in contexts where a counterpart of the situation
described in the antecedent hasn’t already been realized in the actual world.
(266) John is in hospital. His team will play an important game tomorrow.
a. agar John farda
bazi mi-kard,
team-esh mi-bor-d.
if
John tomorrow play impf-do.pst.3sg, team-his impf-win.pst.3esg
‘ If John played tomorrow, his team would win.’
b. #agar John farda
bazi karde bud,
team-esh
if John tomorrow play do.pp aux.pst.3sg team-his
mi-bor-d.
impf-win.pst.3sg
‘If John had played tomorrow, his team would have won.’
The examples in (267) and (268) show that in contexts where a counterpart of
the situation describe by the antecedent proposition hasn’t already been realized,
the pluperfect X-marked conditional is infelicitous irrespective of whether or not
the existence presupposition of the antecedent is not satisfied at the utterance time.
(267)

a. agar farda
ye asb-e
šaxdar mi-did-am,
xošhal
if
tomorrow a horse-ez unicorn impf-see-pst-1sg happy
mi-šod-am
impf-become-pst-1sg
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If I saw a unicorn tomorrow, I’d be happy.
b. # agar farda
ye asb-e
šaxdar dide bud-am,
xošhal
if
tomorrow a horse-ez unicorn see-pp aux-pst-1sg happy
mi-šod-am
impf-become-pst-1sg
#If I had seen a unicorn tomorrow, I would have been happy.
(268) Mostafa is dead. He loved Larry David. A new season of “Curb Your Enthusiasm”
which will be released tomorrow.
a. agar Mostafa in film ro mi-did-id,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra impf-see.pst-3sg, very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watch this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
b. # agar Mostafa in film ro dide bud,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra see.pp aux.pst-3sg, very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watch this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
My intuition about the contrast in (268) is that the use of perfect aspect implies
that it was in principle possible for Mostafa to watch the movie, but he didn’t. Since
the movie is made after Mostafa’s death, the conditional with pluperfect aspect is
anomalous.
When the situation described in the antecedent has already been realized, both
past imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals are equally felicitous, as
illustrated in (269a). This is in contrast with English where only the pluperfect
X-marked conditional is felicitous in this context, as was shown in (259).
(269) John had chicken pox last year during the summer exam period. It was a disaster.
a. bejash agar tabestan-e ba’d abele morghan mi-gereft,
keili
instead if
summer-ez next pox chicken impf-get.pst.3sg much
behtar bud.
better be.pst.3sg
‘If he got chicken pox next summer instead, it would be much better.’
b. Bejash agar tabestan-e ba’d abele morghan gerefte bud,
keili
instead if
summer-ez next pox chicken get-pp aux.pst.3sg much
behtar bud.
better be.pst.3sg
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‘If he had gotten chicken pox next summer instead, it would have been much
better.’
Ippolito’s observations are important in understanding pragmatic inferences
and felicity conditions of different types of X-marked conditionals. No other theory
we have discussed so far, has a way of explaining these observations. I have brought
up data from Farsi and English which are problematic for the account proposed by
Ippolito (2013) according to which the (in)compatibility of presuppositions of a
conditional with the state of the world at the reference time is what determines the
felicity of X-marked conditionals. First, as we have seen past imperfective X-marked
conditionals, which have only one layer of past, are felicitous in contexts where
presuppositions of its antecedent aren’t satisfied. Secondly, pluperfect X-marked
conditionals can be infelicitous in such contexts.
Farsi data suggests that the contrast between these two X-marked conditionals
is about whether or not the situation described in the antecedent has already been
realized. Future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals in both Farsi and English can be used when the situation described in the antecedent has already been
realized. The difference between the two languages is that while in English only
pluperfect can be used in contexts where the situation described in the antecedent
has already been realized (the simple past X-marked conditional is infelicitous),
both imperfective and pluperfect X-marked conditionals in Farsi are felicitous in
such contexts. In contexts where the situation described in the antecedent has
not already been realized, Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals are infelicitous.
Moreover, the strong counterfactuality of Farsi X-marked conditionals remains unexplained in Ippolito’s approach, just like all other approaches we have discussed
so far.
I conclude that a successful account of felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals should be able to explain Ippolito’s observations, as well as the observed
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cross-linguistic variations. However, the approach proposed by Ippolito (2003,
2006, 2013) is not able to tackle this task.

3.3.2.7

Arregui (2005, 2007)

Arregui (2005, 2007) proposes an account where that the difference between felicity
conditions of the simple past and the pluperfect X-marked conditionals follow from
their aspectual differences. The antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals
contain a silent perfective aspectual head. Pluperfect X-marked conditional, in
contrast, contains a perfect aspectual head.
The contrast in (270) shows that the simple past X-marked conditional whose
antecedent contains an eventive predicate is infelicitous in contexts where the situation described in the antecedent is known to be contrary-to-fact.
(270) (continuation) Suppose that your plants die before you leave on holidays, and you
cancel your request. I would feel sorry, but also relieved.
You: Don’t worry about looking after my plants. They died yesterday.
Me: I am sorry, but also a bit relieved.
a. If your plants had died next week, I would have been very upset.
b. #If they died next week (instead), I would be very upset.
(Arregui 2005, 2007)
A simple past antecedent whose main predicate is stative can be used to describe
a counterfactual situation in the future, as the example in (271) illustrates.
(271) You: I’m worried about my plants.
Me: Your plants do not have enough light. If they had enough light, they
would be fine.
(Arregui 2005, 2007)
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Arregui (2007) argues that contrasts in felicity conditions of simple past and
pluperfect X-marked conditionals arise from the differences between the perfective
and the perfect aspect. The perfective is deictic, but the perfect aspectual head is
crucially not deictic. The denotations of the perfective and perfect aspect heads are
given below.
(272)

a. J perfective- ei Kg,w = λP λt λw0 ( P(Jei Kg,w )) & ∃s (s < w0 &
Jei Kg,w (s) = 1 & τ (s) ⊂ t)

b. J perfect Kg,w = λP λt λw0 ∃e0 ( P(e) & ∃s (s < w0 & e occured
in s & τ (e) < t)
(Arregui 2007)
She proposes that a deictic event pronoun presupposes that the event is true of
some spatiotemporal region in the actual world. Therefore, the felicitous use of a
deictic event pronoun requires that this pronoun have a denotation in the actual
world. As there is a perfective operator in simple past X-marked conditional in
(270b), the antecedent carries the presupposition that the deictic event pronoun ei
has a denotation in the actual world. The modal quantifies over worlds in which
the event that is presupposed to occur in the actual world is an event of your plants
dying next week. In the context where your plants have already died yesterday, the
actual world can’t be a world in which your plants die next week. Therefore, the
antecedent is not defined and the conditional is infelicitous.
In the pluperfect X-marked conditional, perfect aspect existentially binds the
event argument in the argument structure of the antecedents predicate. The proposition in the antecedent is true in every possible world in which some event of your
plants dying next week is true of a spatiotemporal region before ti . Since perfect
aspect is not deictic, there is no presupposition that the event in question occurs in
the actual world. Therefore, there is no incompatibility between the actual course
of events and the properties of the antecedent event.
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To account for the felicity of the simple past antecedents whose main predicate
is stative (e.g. 271), Arregui (2005) argues that unlike eventive verbs which denote
properties of events, stative verbs denote properties of times. Therefore, tenses,
which denote temporal intervals, can directly combine with stative VPs. As the
antecedent doesn’t contain a deictic perfective aspect, the antecedent doesn’t carry
the presupposition that the event in question is true in the actual world.
We have seen that the contrast in felicity conditions of past imperfective and
pluperfect X-marked conditionals in Farsi do not quite match the contrast between
English simple past and pluperfect X-marked conditionals. However, if Arregui
(2007) is right in assuming that the antecedent in English simple past X-marked
conditionals contains a perfective aspect, the different behavior of Farsi past imperfective conditionals can be attributed to properties of imperfective aspect. For
instance, we can assume that imperfective aspect like perfect aspect is not deictic.
This, however, doesn’t explain why pluperfect X-marked conditionals in Farsi can
only be felicitous when the situation described in the antecedent has already been
realized. Moreover, Arregui’s approach cannot capture the strong counterfactuality
of Farsi X-marked conditionals.

3.3.2.8

Concluding thoughts

In this section, I have reviewed several proposals about pragmatic inferences and
felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals. Here, I want to lay out what an ideal
theory about pragmatics of X-marked conditionals should be able to explain.
(i) There are contexts in which both O-marked and X-marked conditionals are
felicitous: Stanley Peter’s example (233) in English, and (236) in Farsi. We therefore, need a theory that does not predict complementarity of X-marked and Omarked conditionals (von Fintel 1998).
(ii) The antecedent falsity of some X-marked conditionals is cancelable: Future
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Less Vivid (206) and Anderson-type examples (209) in English, past oriented past
imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi (238). This points to the conclusion
which has been reiterated in the literature on X-marking (Stalnaker 1975; von Fintel
1998; Iatridou 2000; Leahy 2018; Mackay 2019a, among others) that the antecedent
falsity is a pragmatic inference (see Zakkou (2020) for a different view).
(iii) The antecedent falsity of some X-marked conditionals is strong: infelicity
with Future Less Vivid interpretation ((208b) in Farsi and (262) in English) and
with Anderson-type examples ((210) in Farsi and (261) in English).
(iv) Contrasts in felicity conditions of simple/imperfective past and future pluperfect X-marked conditionals in English and Farsi (discussion in 3.3.2.6 and 3.3.2.7)
(v) The role of past tense in giving rise to antecedent falsity inference in Xmarked conditionals.
Iatridou (2000), Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013), and Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009)
focus on deriving the felicity conditions of X-marked conditionals from the past,
and are not concerned with the distribution of O-marked conditionals. Thus, they
have not discussed (i).
All approaches we reviewed have discussed the cancelability of the antecedent
falsity inference, and can capture (ii). We just need to figure out why the past
oriented past imperfective X-marked conditionals are different from other Farsi Xmarked conditionals in the strength of counterfactuality.
As we have seen, none of these approaches can straightforwardly explain (iii).
In fact, only Ippolito (2013), and to some extent Mackay (2019a), have discussed
cases where the information of the antecedent falsity is difficult to cancel. As these
approaches have attributed the strong antecedent falsity to the presence of two layers of past morphology, they cannot capture the strong counterfactuality of future
oriented past imperfective, and past oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals in
Farsi. Therefore, we have to look elsewhere to explain cross-linguistic variations in
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the strength of counterfactuality in X-marked conditionals.
Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013), and Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009) are the only approaches that have discussed (iv). But we have seen that Farsi data is challenging
for both of these approaches.
Iatridou (2000), Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013), Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009), and
Mackay (2019a) have taken the role of the past morphology in the semantic and
pragmatic properties of X-marked conditionals seriously. Stalnaker (1968); von
Fintel (1998); Leahy (2011, 2018), and Crowley (2022), on the other hand, have
put the role of past morphology aside. Leahy (2011, 2018) and Crowley (2022), in
particular, do not assign any semantic contribution to X-marked conditionals, and
thus they fall short of accounting for (iii)-(v).
I conclude that although the approaches reviewed here have their strengths and
weaknesses, none can fully capture the points mentioned in (i)-(v).

3.4

Summary

The morphological, semantic, and pragmatic properties of X-marking across languages are too similar to be accidental. I maintain what has been the tradition
in the linguistic literature on X-marking since Iatridou (2000), that the task of a
theory of X-marking should be to derive the semantic, and pragmatic properties
of X-marking from their linguistic ingredients. A successful theory should ideally
define a cross-linguistically uniform role to the recurring X-marking morphology,
i.e. past, while explaining variations among languages with respect to properties
of X-marking.
We have seen that both Farsi and English X-marked conditionals can appear in
contexts where the antecedent is true. Therefore, the antecedent falsity associated
with X-marked conditionals should be derived pragmatically in both languages.
However, the cases where an X-marked conditional can be felicitously used without
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implying the falsity of its antecedent are different in Farsi and English. In Farsi
this option is limited to past oriented past imperfective X-marked conditionals.
Moreover, both languages show that there are cases where the antecedent falsity
inference is hard or impossible to cancel. A theory of X-marking should be able to
explain and derive different degrees of strength for the counterfactuality implication associated with X-marked conditionals.
We have also observed that the antecedent of past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi, which presumably only contain one layer of the past morphology
can have a past orientation. Therefore, I have concluded that a theory of X-marking
should allow for one layer of the past tense morphology to convey a temporal
past meaning while simultaneously making its contribution to X-marking. This
is only possible under a uniform past approach to X-marking. An ideal theory of
X-marking should also explain why this option is not available to other languages
like English.
In the next chapter, building on Farsi data, I will develop an account of conditionals that can better tackle these tasks.
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CHAPTER 4
An Anchor semantics for conditionals

Building on the Farsi facts that were introduced in Chapter Three, my main goal
in this chapter is to explain cross-linguistic variation in the strength of the antecedent falsity inference associated with X-marked conditionals and the temporal orientation of their antecedent. I have argued that the past orientation of Xmarked conditionals containing only one layer of past necessitates a uniform past
approach. This chapter advances a uniform past approach that can derive differences between O-marked and X-marked conditionals from the contribution of past
tense to determining the domain of quantification of X-marked conditionals (like
past-as-modal approaches), while maintaining a unified temporal semantics for past
tense morphology (like past-as-past approaches). Therefore, this approach will be
a marriage between what are called past-as-past and past-as-modal approaches by
Schulz (2014). I will argue that a version of Arregui’s account that is coupled with
an accompanying account of O-marked conditionals in Anchor Semantics (Kratzer
2020) delivers the necessary features of a middle-ground approach.
I start this chapter by introducing Anchor Semantics (Kratzer 2020) and presenting my analysis of conditionals in this framework. I argue that there are two
tenses in conditional constructions that contribute to semantics and pragmatics of
conditionals: the tense of the modal (the temporal specification of the situation
variable which modals take as first argument), and the tense of the antecedent

158

(the temporal specification of the situation denoted by the antecedent). In many
languages as in Farsi, however, the information carried by the two tenses will be
packed into the temporal morphology found in conditional antecedents.
I then demonstrate how this proposal accounts for the pattern of Farsi conditionals. I motivate a view in which Farsi and English differ with respect to properties
of tense in antecedents of conditionals associated with the expression of counterfactuality. I then frame the typological picture arising from the addition of Farsi
data.

4.1

Anchor semantics for conditionals

This section has three parts. In the first part, I introduce the main ingredients of
Anchor Semantics for modals Kratzer (2020) and sketch the semantics of conditionals in this framework. The discussions in this part is heavily built on Kratzer
(2020). In the second part of this section, I turn to the semantics and pragmatics of
O-marked conditionals within the framework of Anchor Semantics. I also provide
an analysis of the difference between the two types of O-marked conditionals in
Farsi ( present tense and zero tense conditionals). Lastly, I present my proposal
about the semantics of X-marked conditionals.

4.1.1

Preliminaries

A uniform past approach maintains that past tense morphology always contributes
temporal information. In the presuppositional theory of tenses that I have adopted
in this dissertation, the contribution of deictic tenses is to put temporal constraints
on the value of variables ranging over situations contained in the aspectual phrase
the tense combines with. There is no deictic constraint on the situations zero tenses
refer to. The denotation of deictic tenses (present and past) and zero tense which
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were given in (22), are repeated below.
(273)

a. Jpresenti Kg = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ◦ τ (si ). P(s) = 1, where si is the speech
situation by default.1

b. Jpast j Kg = λPhs,ti . λs : τ (s) ≺ τ (s j ). P(s) = 1, where s j and is the
speech situation by default.
c. J∅Kg = λPhs,ti . P
Assuming a Kratzerian view of conditionals, I take if -clauses to restrict the
domain of modals. I adapt the proposal of Anchor Semantics (Kratzer 2020) for
modals according to which the quantification domain of modals is determined by
taking a situation from the actual world and considering the set of possible worlds
that have an exact match of that situation. Following Kratzer (2013, 2020) (who
adopts the terminology of Hacquard (2006)), let us refer to this situation as the
anchor of the modal. Let us further assume that modals take an anchor situation as
their first arguments. The quantification domain of a universal modal, then, is the
set of all2 the possible worlds that have a counterpart of the anchor situation.
(274) Factual Domain Projection
For any part of a (maximal) situation s, f act (s) is the set of possible (maximal) situations that have an exact match3 of s.
(Kratzer 2020)
Now that we have introduced a situation variable, we have to say something
about possible values of this variable. Like other variables, the value of the anchor
1 This is the denotation of the English present tense.

We have seen that the denotation of the Farsi

present tense, given below, is different.
(i)

Jpresenti Kc,g =λPhs,ti . λs : τ (si )  τ (s). P(s) = 1.

2 Adopting the Psst! restriction of Lewis (1996), Kratzer (2020) clarifies that we are ignoring worlds
with hallucinations, manipulated brains in vats, and countless other deviation from normality-until forced to
face those possibilities.”
3 The exact match of s is a counterpart of s, assuming the most stringent counterpart relation.
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situation depends on its place in the structure. In an unembedded sentence, the
anchor situation takes its value from the evaluation situation. As Kratzer (2020)
puts it “modal anchors are the kinds of things that can be made salient and referred to
in realistic utterance situations”. Given the importance of the value of the anchor
situation, Kratzer (2020) gives this consequence of Anchor Semantics a name.
(275) Modal Anchor Impact
The anchor situation of a modal is identical to the evaluation situation4 of
the smallest constituent that contains the modal and its scope.
(Kratzer 2020)
As the value of the modal anchor is a contextually salient situation, we expect
a considerable amount of indeterminacy in the semantics of modal claims. That
is somewhat true, but we also have intuitions about the truth-conditions of modal
claims. Thus, anchor situations cannot be just any situation. (Kratzer 2020) proposes that the Diversity Condition, defined in (276), constraints the choice of modal
anchors.
(276) Diversity Condition
Choose an anchor so that the projected domain has both worlds where the
modal’s prejacent is true and worlds where it is false.
(Kratzer 2020)
If the quantification domain of all modals satisfy the Diversity Condition, all
statements with necessity modals will be false, as the truth-conditions of necessity modals require its prejacent to be true in all the worlds of its domain. This
undesirable consequence of the Diversity Condition can only be avoided if the
domain of a necessity modal is further restricted to exclude worlds in which the
4 It’s

important to note that the evaluation situation is not necessarily the speech situation.
“Evaluation arguments are possible situations with possible worlds as limiting case”(Kratzer 1989, 2020).
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prejacent is false. Therefore, we need to assume that the domain projected from
the anchor situation can be lexically, or contextually restricted. Modal restrictions,
which I assume to be projected into syntax as an argument of the modal, provide
a tool to ignore certain possibilities. Again, if modal claims are to be informative at all, we cannot ignore just any possibilities. We need some principles that
help us systematically determine which worlds can be excluded from the domain
of modals. (Kratzer 2020) proposes that contextual restrictions have to be provided
from the prospective common ground, which is the common ground as it stands after
the claim in question has been made and negotiated (Stalnaker 2014; Mandelkern
2020). Given the importance of this component of Kratzer’s proposal, let us give it
a name:
(277) Prospective contextual Modal Restrictions
Modal restrictions have to be provided from the prospective common ground.
Before going through the relation between modal restrictions and prospective
common ground, I should say more about the notion of prospective common ground
and a related theoretical notion that I will also make use of: the projected common ground. The common ground prior to a new utterance represents the set of
propositions commonly accepted by all participants in the discourse. Utterances
are proposals to update the common ground so as to include the uttered proposition (Stalnaker 2014). They do not automatically update the common ground
(Stalnaker 2014). Proposals need to be negotiated and resolved for the update to
go through. Not all proposals get accepted. There may be disagreements between
participants. A proposition might have already been proposed by a participant in
discourse without being yet among the shared beliefs of all participants. Farkas &
Bruce (2010) propose a discourse representation model in which there is a component that keeps track of unnegotiated propositions ( what they call Table). I
adopt a similar model proposed by Biezma & Goebel (to appear). Since we do not
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need all the tools in their discourse model, I will only present a simplified version.
The only tools in the model we need are a Stalnakerian common ground, which is
the set of commonly accepted propositions in a conversation (by all conversants),
and a waiting room Fc to track proposals pending evaluation. It is either empty
(if there is nothing awaiting evaluation), or it encodes a copy of the current local
context together with the modification proposed (this is the projected context). Let
us represent the context set corresponding to the propositions in the actual common
ground with Cs, and the projected context set representing the set of all worlds that
are in the intersection of all the propositions in the projected common ground with
CsF .
(278) A context c is a tuple hCs, F i whose elements are characterized as:
a. lc = Cs0 is a local context.
i. Cs = {w : w ∈

T

CG}, where CG is the Stalnakerian Common

Ground
b. Fc is either a local context or ∅ . Call CsF the projected context.
Adapted from Biezma & Goebel (to appear)
Let us see how context updates proceed with an example. When there is nothing
pending evaluation (as in a discourse initial situation), the waiting room is empty.
Now assume that A asserts the sentence it is raining, with propositional content p
relative to this initial context with an empty waiting room. Utterances of declaratives are proposals to update Cs whose effect is to remove worlds not compatible
with the new proposition (signaled by ⊕ in Biezma & Goebel (to appear)). This
is what will be recorded in the waiting room F . Let us call the projected common
ground reflecting the changes to the actual common ground proposed by this new
utterance prospective common ground.
(279) assert: c1 + passert( it is raining )q = hCsc1 , lc1 ⊕ J it is raining Ki
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a. Fc1 = ∅
b. lc1 ⊕ J it is raining K = Csc1 ∩ J it is raining K

⇒ prospective context set CsF1
The difference between projected and prospective common ground is their relation to the time of utterance. The prospective common ground is the common
ground after the new utterance has been made, which reflects the modification
proposed by the newly asserted proposition. The projected common ground is the
common ground against which the new utterance is made. That is, the common
ground prior to the new utterance, which is modified based on previously asserted
but unnegotiated propositions. For instance, if the sentence ‘we cancel the trip’ is
asserted after ‘it is raining’ and before ‘it is raining’ is accepted by all participants
in discourse, CsF1 in (280) will be the projected context against which ‘we cancel
the trip’ is uttered. This distinction will be important for the discussion of factual
conditionals in Section 4.1.2.2.
(280) assert: c2 + passert( we cancel the picnic )q =

hCsc2 , (lc2 ⊕ J we cancel the picnic Ki
a. Fc2 = lc1 ⊕ J it is raining K = Csc1 ∩ J it is raining K

⇒ projected context set CsF1
b. lc2 ⊕ J we cancel the picnic K = CsF1 ∩ J we cancel the picnic K

⇒prospective context set CsF2
Following Stalnaker (2014) and Mandelkern (2020), Kratzer (2020) maintains
that an unembedded claim with a necessity modal should have “the pragmatic effect of proposing to adjust the current common ground (if required) so that the adjusted,
prospective common ground entails restrictions that make the claim true.”
Without adding more, the proposal predicts weak truth-conditions for modal
claims. Let us see why. A Stalnakarian common ground is the set of propositions
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that are presupposed to be true. But what is presupposed to be true doesn’t have to
be true. As Kratzer puts it, ‘the context set representing a Stalnakarian common ground
does not have to include the actual world.’ A scenario where the presuppositions of the
context are not all true shows the need to modify the current proposal.
Imagine a context in which Matt presupposes wrongly that rain is the only
explanation for wet shoes. Suppose further that John stepped in a puddle close
to his apartment. Matt lives in the same building, and sees him in the hallway. He
looks at John’s shoes and whispers (281) to his friend.
(281) It must be raining outside.
We first need to determine the value of the anchor situation. The value of the
anchor situation comes from the evaluation situation. The modal claim is not embedded, thus the value of the anchor situation is a contextually salient situation.
A plausible anchor s0 supplied from the context in which (281) is uttered, could
be a present temporal slice of John’s actual appearance. The domain projected
from s0 would be the set of possible worlds that have exact matches of the present
temporal slice of John’s actual appearance. The projected domain from this anchor
has worlds where it is raining outside, and worlds where it is not raining outside.
The Diversity Condition is therefore satisfied. By uttering the modal statement
(281), Matt acknowledges the possibility that it is not raining outside. At the same
time, he is proposing to adjust the common ground so as to eliminate this possibility. Without sharing his belief that wet shoes can only be explained by rain
(according to Matt’s belief, wet shoes completely rule out worlds in which it is not
raining), the statement is odd. But let us assume that his friend holds the same
belief. If all it takes for a modal statement to be true is that the prejacent is true
in all of the worlds in the domain as determined by the anchor and contextual
restrictions taken from the prospective common ground, (281) is predicted to be
true. This prediction is incorrect. We judge Matt’s statement as false in spite of
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his beliefs. To avoid this problem, we must add that for a modal claim with a
strong necessity modal must to be true, the world of the anchor situation has to
be in the context set5 . Given the conditions that the modal restriction p comes from
the prospective common ground, and the world of the anchor is in the context set,
it follows that modal restrictions have to be compatible with presuppositions of the
factive common ground. The domain of quantification of must is the prospective
factive common ground, that is the common ground whose presuppositions are all
true, and where the consequent has been negotiated.
Following Kratzer (2020), I take (282) as the denotation of must. (283) represents the truth-conditions of Matt’s statement in (281).
(282) JKc,g = λs. λp : p ∩ C 6= ∅. λq. (ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ p → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤
w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 ))))

(Adapted from Kratzer (2020))
(283) JIt must be raining outsideKc,g = λs. [ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ p →

∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 )

& it is raining outside(s00 )))]
a. Building the domain
λq. (wsi ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ ( g( j)) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤
w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 ))))
i. Anchor situation
Jsi Kc,g(i/s) = g(i ) = si
ii. Modal restriction
Jp j Kc,g = g( j)= [λs : { wet shoes in s}]
b. Prejacent
λs. it is raining outside(s)
5 Kratzer

(2020) states the condition as follows: “the prejacent must be true in the world of anchor”.
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c. Combining the modal, anchor and prejacent
ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ ( g( j)) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w &
Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & it is raining outside(s00 )))
The relation Match in the formula is the analogue of Arregui’s modal part of relation.
(284) Given two situations si and s j , we will use ≤m to talk about the ‘modal part
of’ relation, and define it as follows: si ≤m s j iff si has a counterpart in s j
(i.e. there is some st such that st is a counterpart of si and st ≤m s j )
(Arregui 2009)
R represents a contextually supplied relation that maps the match of the anchor situation to a situation where the modal’s prejacent is evaluated. The truthconditions states that in all the worlds projected from the anchor situation (∀w(w ∈
f act (s0 )) and in which the modal restriction p holds (∩ p), the match of the anchor
situation bears the contextual relation R to a situation in which the prejacent q is
true. The constraint that the context (C) includes the world of anchor (ws ) together
with the condition that modal restrictions should come from prospective Common
Ground keeps the truth-conditions of the modal claim strong.
We have now the necessary ingredients of the Anchor Semantics to develop our
semantics of conditionals. The only thing we need to add is that the modal restriction in conditionals has an overt realization as the if -clause. Following Kratzer
(1979, 2012), I assume that there is a covert necessity modal in the structure of bare
conditionals. I take this modal to be strong like must, thus the semantics of bare
conditional ‘if p, q’ will be the same as (282).
Adding the semantic contribution of the antecedent proposition in a compositional manner, we will have the following as the truth-conditions of a bare conditional sentence.
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(285) J if p, q Kc,g = λs. ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. p(s000 ) →

∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))]

(286) The structure of necessity modals and bare conditionals
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ModalP

ModalP
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To see how this works, consider the example (287) in a context where it is
wrongly presupposed that rain is the only explanation for wet shoes. Matt and
his friend are in a windowless space. They want to go for a walk and are discussing
if it is raining outside. Matt asserts (287).
(287) If John enters with wet shoes, it is raining outside.
Again, we need to know the value of the anchor situation. The conditional in
(287) is not embedded, so the value of the anchor situation should come from the
evaluation situation of the conditional. The role of the anchor situation is to anchor the interpretation of the conditional to facts salient in the evaluation situation.
A plausible anchor s0 coming from the evaluation situation of (287), could be a
present temporal slice of Matt’s actual knowledge state. The domain projected from
s0 (the set of worlds that have exact matches of the anchor situation s0 ) satisfies the
Diversity Condition, as there will be worlds in the domain in which it is raining
outside, and worlds in which it is not raining outside. By using the conditional in
(287), Matt conveys that he is ignoring the possibility of John’s not entering with
wet shoes, and claims that the consequent is true in all remaining worlds in the
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domain. Given the assumption that bare conditionals contain the a strong modal,
they also come with the constraint that the world of anchor is in the context set.
This constraint together with our assumption that modal restrictions come from the
prospective common ground entails that the antecedent has to be compatible with
the presuppositions of factive common ground. The prospective factive common
ground does not validate Matt’s statement because it cannot completely rule out
possibilities that are compatible with the if-clause (John wearing wet shoes) but
where the consequent is false (it’s not raining outside); thus, the conditional is
predicted to be false.
Having set up the necessary tools, I can now move on to the semantics of Omarked and X-marked conditionals. My goal is to show how quantification domains of O-marked and X-marked conditionals are constructed from their modal
anchors and additional restrictions coming from the if-clause and the context, delivering their truth-conditions.

4.1.2

O-marked conditionals

I start with giving an overview of the semantics of O-marked conditionals. I will
then turn to the differences between the two types of O-marked conditionals: factual and hypothetical conditionals.

4.1.2.1

Overview

Let me illustrate how the domain of an O-marked conditional is constructed with a
familiar example from Stalnaker (1975), given in (288). The discussion presented
here is adapted from Kratzer (2020) who discusses a non-conditional version of
this example with must. Assume (288) is asserted by Holmes, a consultant on a big
murder case, where after a long investigation, the butler and the gardener are the
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only remaining suspects.
(288) If the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did.
First we need to know the value of the anchor situation. The conditional is not
embedded, so the anchor situation should come from the situation of the evaluation. The anchor situation also picks up the local evaluation time which in unembedded cases is the time of utterance. A plausible anchor s0 coming from the
situation in which (288) is uttered, could be a present temporal slice of Holmes’
actual process of investigation and reasoning that led Holmes to come to conclusion
that the murderer is either the butler or the gardener.
The domain projected from s0 would then be the set of possible worlds that
have exact matches of the present temporal slice of Holmes’ actual process of investigation and reasoning, as it relates to this murder case. The projected domain
from this anchor has worlds where the butler did the murder, and worlds where
the gardener did it. The Diversity Condition is therefore satisfied. Holmes conveys
that his process of investigation and reasoning does not completely rule out the
gardener’s innocence. The if-clause conveys that he is ignoring the possibility that
the butler is the murderer. The truth-conditions of (288) is given in (289).
(289) JIf the butler didn’t do it, the gardener didKc,g = λs. [ws ∈ C &

∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. the butler didn’t do it (s000 ) →
∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) &

the gardener did it (s00 )))]
The truth-conditions in (289) state that in all the worlds that contain an exact
match of Holmes’ process of investigation and reasoning, and where the common
ground is adjusted so that the possibility of butler being the murderer is eliminated, the counterpart situation of Holmes’ process of investigation and reasoning
is linked to situations where the gardener is the murderer, with a suitable R relation.
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The modal in O-marked conditionals come with the condition that the context set
has to include the world of the anchor situation (the actual world). Moreover,
given that modal restrictions come from the prospective common ground, it follows
that the modal restriction has to be compatible with presuppositions of factive
common ground. Thus, (289) amounts to saying that the consequent is true in
the prospective factive common ground in which the possibility of the butler being
the murderer is ignored.
There are other possibilities Holmes is ignoring. For instance, the possibility
that he might have done some mistake in the process of investigations, and have
wrongly ruled out a possible suspect. Nevertheless, he’s proposing to adjust the
common ground so as to make his claim true. Trusting his expertise, his interlocutors might accept his proposal, or reject it by bringing up the possibility that
someone else, the butcher for instance, might be the murderer. In this case, worlds
in which the butcher did the murder should be added to the current common
ground, making Holmes’ claim false.

4.1.2.2

Factual vs. hypothetical conditionals

We are not done yet. Farsi has taught us that morphosyntax can subdivide the
category of O-marked conditionals into factual and hypothetical conditionals. It is
the properties of tense in the antecedent of conditionals that determine the interpretation of O-marked conditionals. Conditionals with zero tense in their antecedent
are interpreted as hypothetical conditionals (the interpretation that is normally
assigned to traditionally-called ‘indicative’ conditionals). Conditionals whose antecedents contain present tense are interpreted as factual. The contrast between
the two types of O-marked conditionals was illustrated with a series of examples
in Chapter Two and Three.
The trees in (290) and (291) illustrate the structures of zero tense and present
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tense, ignoring the contribution of aspect for now.
(290) The structure of zero tense conditionals
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(291) The structure of present tense conditionals
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We have seen that the two conditionals differ in their felicity conditions. To
refresh our minds, consider the scenario described in (292). Since in this context
the truth of antecedent is open, only a zero tense conditional is felicitous.
(292) Context: The police holds a press conference, and announces that they are investigating the speculation that Oswald might not be the murderer, but nothing is
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certain. John and his friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Zero tense Perfect O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
b. Present tense Perfect O-marked
#Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
In contrast, when the truth of the antecedent is entailed in the context, as is the
case with (293), only a present tense conditional is felicitous.
(293)

a. Present tense Perfect O-marked
Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh oftaade ast,
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence fall.pp aux.pres.3sg
jang-e jahani-e
sevvom ham mi-tavan-∅-ad ettefagh
war-ez worldwide-ez third also impf-can-pres-3sg occurrence
be-oft-ad
impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars have happened, a third world war can also happen.
b. Zero tense Perfect O-marked
#Agar do ta jang-e jahani
ettefagh oftaade baš-ad, jang-e
if
two cl war-ez worldwide occurrence fall.pp aux.∅-3sg war-ez
jahani-e
sevvom ham mi-tavan-∅-ad ettefagh
worldwide-ez third also impf-can-pres-3sg occurrence
be-oft-ad
impf-fall-∅-3sg
If two world wars have happened, a third world war can also happen.
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There are, however, cases where both zero tense and present tense conditionals
are felicitous in the same context. As we saw in (143), repeated here in (294), both
zero tense and present conditionals are felicitous in contexts where the antecedent
proposition has been already asserted, but it is not yet accepted by all participants
in discourse. In the example (294), for instance, the context is not automatically
updated to entail that Oswald wasn’t the murderer, just because the police has
said so. Participants might disagree, and reject this claim. The zero tense conditional is felicitous as long as the context doesn’t yet entail the truth or falsity of the
antecedent proposition, irrespective of whether or not it is already asserted. The
present tense conditional is also felicitous, since the projected context in which the
claim made by the police is accepted, entails the antecedent proposition.
(294) Context: Investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and announces that they can confirm that Oswald wasn’t the murderer. John and his
friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
a. Zero tense Perfect O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
b. Present tense Perfect O-marked
Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
To formally encode the presupposition of present tense conditionals, we need a
discourse representation model that not only keeps track of presuppositions of the
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context, but also keeps track of pending proposals to update the contexts. We need
such a model because factual conditionals are felicitous both when the truth of their
antecedent is already entailed in the context as in (293), and when the truth of their
antecedent will be entailed in the projected context where pending propositions are
accepted, as in (294). Felicity of zero tense conditionals, on the other hand, is only
sensitive to propositions that are already entailed in the context and is not affected
by pending propositions in the context. In Section 2.3 of Chapter Two, we have
also seen that only present tense conditionals can be used in examples like (295),
in which the antecedent proposition has been uttered by an interlocutor and the
speaker of the conditional is challenging its truth.
(295) My friend Joe, whom you haven’t met, is very smart.
Oh yeah?
a. Present tense O-marked
agar enqadr bahuš ast,
čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.pres.3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
b. Zero tense O-marked
#agar enqadr bahuš baš-ad, čera puldar n-ist?
if
so
smart be.∅-3sg why rich
neg-be.pres.3sg
If he’s so smart why isn’t he rich?
I sketched the discourse model of Biezma & Goebel (to appear) I have adopted
in (278), repeated here in (296).
(296) A context c is a tuple hCs, F i whose elements are characterized as:
a. lc = Cs0 is a local context.
i. Cs = {w : w ∈

T

CG}, where CG is the Stalnakerian Common

Ground
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b. Fc is either a local context or ∅ . Call CsF the projected context.
Adapted from Biezma & Goebel (to appear)
As I mentioned earlier, we distinguish between the projected common ground
which is the common ground adjusted to include previously asserted but unnegotiated propositions), and prospective common ground, which represent a future common ground in which the new assertion has been negotiated. Here we are concerned with the projected common ground prior to the assertion of present tense
conditionals. We have all the necessary tools to encode presuppositions of the deictic and zero tenses in Farsi. I propose that deictic tenses (represented by tense+ )
in Farsi presuppose that the proposition is settled in a context set relative which
the utterance is made (either projected context (the local context) or the actual
context). The relevant notion of settledness is defined below.
(297) Settledness
A proposition p is settled relative to a context Cs if and only if p is entailed
in Cs or if ¬ p is entailed in Cs.
Zero tense presupposes that the proposition is unsettled in the actual context set,
that is neither its truth nor its falsity is entailed in the context set. The definition of
unsettledness is given below.
(298) Unsettledness
A proposition p is unsettled relative to a context Cs if and only if neither p
is entailed in Cs nor ¬ p is entailed in Cs.
Presuppositions of present tense and zero tense O-marked conditionals are given
in (299a) and (299b), respectively.6
6 Following

the literature on ‘mood’, I have defined the felicity conditions of present tense and
zero tense O-marked conditionals in terms of presupposition. However, I have not provided
any argument for their presuppositional nature. An in-depth study of the nature of the felicity

176

(299) Presuppositions of O-marked conditionals
a. [if p-tense+ ,q] is felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected
context set (CsF ) or the actual context set (‘settledness’)
b. [if p-∅,q] is felicitous if
Cs ∩ r 6= Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is the actual context set
(‘unsettledness’)

There are two points I need to clarify. First, I should note that the presuppositions defined above are familiar from the proposals about presuppositions of
indicative mood (Farkas 2003) and subjunctive mood (Mari & Portner 2018). At
this point it seems that these presuppositions can be attributed to the contribution
of mood. But I will show that conditionals that have morphological specifications
of so-called indicative mood (carrying the tensed variant of imperfective aspect),
but tense in their antecedent is not interpreted deictically, do not carry settledness
presupposition. I will come back to this in Section 4.2.1.2.
Another thing I need to mention is that there is no O-marked conditionals in
Farsi that carry past tense morphology in their antecedent7 . In Chapter Two, I
have reported that German-like languages, in which the current relevance seems
to force the use of the present perfect, represent a pattern where it is infelicitous to
use the simple past in the antecedent of conditionals to describe a past situation.
The example (127), repeated here as (300) illustrates this fact about Farsi (see the
conditions associated with deictic and zero tense clauses is outside the scope of this dissertation
and requires exploring other environments in which both present tense and zero tense can occur,
such as the complement of think and negated know.
7 Following Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013); Arregui (2005, 2007, 2009); Mackay (2019a), I’m assuming that X-marker past is structurally outside of the antecedent, and is only morphologically realized
in the antecedent.
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examples given in (129) for German, 130) for Dutch). Instead, the present perfect
has to be used in such contexts .
(300) *Agar John dirooz
raghs-id/
mi-raghs-id,
Mary ham
if
John yesterday dance-perf.pst.3sg/ impf-dance-pst.3sg, Mary too
raghs-id/raghs-ide
ast.
dance-perf.pst.3sg/dance-pp axu.pres.3sg
‘If John danced yesterday, Mary danced too.’
So, although (299a) is the presupposition of deictic tenses in Farsi, in practice we
only see it with present tense in the antecedent of conditionals. Why past tense in
these languages cannot be embedded in the antecedent of conditionals is an independent question which I leave for future study. The point I want to get across is that
the infelicity of past tense in antecedent of Farsi conditionals is an independent fact.
If past tense was not independently infelicitous in the antecedent of factual conditionals, we would expect it to carry the same settledness presupposition defined in
(299a).
Now let us see how the presuppositions in (299) work with the example in
(294). First we need to know the value of the anchor situation. The conditional is
not embedded, so the anchor situation should come from the evaluation situation
of the conditional. The situation variable also picks up the evaluation time, which
in this case is the time of utterance. A plausible anchor s0 coming from the situation
in which (294) is uttered, could be a present temporal slice of the actual situation
of the police press conference that John and his friend are watching.
The domain projected from s0 would then be the set of possible worlds that
have exact matches of the present temporal slice of the police press conference. The
projected domain from this anchor has worlds where someone other than Oswald
killed Kennedy, and worlds where Oswald killed Kennedy. The Diversity Condition is therefore satisfied. John conveys that the police press conference does not
completely rule out Oswald’s innocence. The if-clause conveys that he is ignoring
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the possibility that Oswald is the murderer.
Both zero tense and present tense conditionals are O-marked conditionals, and
have the same truth conditions. The truth conditions of (294), as well as presuppositions of zero tense and present tense conditionals, are given below.
(301) J(294)Kc,g = λs. [ws ∈ C &

∀w(w ∈ f act (s)& ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy (s000 ) →
∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 )

& someone else killed Kennedy(s00 )))]
a. [if p-present,q] is felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context
set (CsF ) or the actual context set
b. [if p-∅,q] is felicitous if
Cs ∩ r 6= Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is the actual context set
The truth conditions in (301) state that all the worlds that contain an exact
match of the police press conference, and where the common ground is adjusted
so as to the possibility of Oswald being the murderer is eliminated, the counterpart
situation of the police press conference is linked to situations where someone else
is the murderer, with a suitable R relation. Given the condition that the context set
should include the world of anchor, (289) amounts to saying that the consequent is
true in the prospective factive common ground in which the possibility of Oswald
being the murderer is ignored.
The presupposition of both present tense and zero tense conditionals are met in
this context. The antecedent proposition has been asserted by the police. However,
the statement made by the police does not automatically update the context set.
Until the claim made by the police is negotiated and accepted by all interlocutors,
the context set will still have worlds in which the antecedent proposition is true and
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worlds in which the antecedent proposition is false. The presupposition of the zero
tense conditional is satisfied. The present tense conditional is also felicitous because
the projected context, which reflects the changes to context set after the pending
proposal by the police is accepted, entails the truth of the antecedent. The use of
the present tense conditional adds that the information carried by the antecedent
proposition already exists in the context.
One last thing to mention is that the present tense O-marked conditional whose
antecedent is the opposite of the proposition asserted in the context, as in (302),
is infelicitous. The zero tense O-marked conditional (303), on the other hand, is
felicitous.
(302) Context: Investigation is complete. The police holds a press conference, and announces that they can confirm that Oswald wasn’t the murderer. John and his
friend are watching the press conference.
John to his friend:
Present tense O-marked
#(amma) agar Oswald Kennedy ro košte ast,
edalat
(but)
if
Oswald Kennedy ra kill-pp aux.pres.3sg justice
ejra
šode
ast.
implementation become.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘But if Oswald killed Kennedy, justice has been served.’
(303) Zero tense O-marked
(amma) agar Oswald Kennedy ro košte baš-ad, edalat
(but)
if
Oswald Kennedy ra kill-pp aux.∅.3sg justice
ejra
šode
ast.
implementation become.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘ But if Oswald killed Kennedy, justice has been served.’
This seems to be a problem for our analysis of present tense conditionals. The
antecedent is compatible with the presuppositions of factive common ground and it
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is settled in the projected context set; thus, the present tense O-marked conditional
(302) is wrongly predicted to be felicitous. Utterances are made relative a context
set, which can either be the actual (global) context or the projected (local) context.
There can be linguistic clues identifying the intended context set relative to which
the utterance is made.
Since the antecedent (modal restriction) is entailed in the prospective common
ground, by uttering (302) the speaker is proposing the common ground to become such that the police’s statement is false. Had it been the projected context set
relative to which the utterance was made, the prospective common ground could
not have entailed the antecedent proposition. Signaling the contrast between the
projected context set and the actual context set with respect to the truth of police’s
statement, the use of “but” indicated that the utterance (302) has been made relative
to the actual context set in which the antecedent proposition is not settled. Since
the truth or falsity of the antecedent proposition is not settled in the context set
relative to which the conditional is asserted, only the zero tense conditional (303)
is felicitous.
Now that I have discuss the two types of O-marked conditionals, I can move to
the semantics of X-marked conditionals in Anchor Semantics.

4.1.3

X-marked conditionals

Following Arregui (2005, 2009), I take the role of the past tense in X-marked conditionals to determine the temporal specification of the anchor situation, which
in turn anchors the interpretation of conditionals on particular actual world facts.
The account proposed by Arregui (2009) which I adopt here ties the resolution of
similarity relation invoked by X-marked conditionals (Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968)
to the semantics of tense. According to this view, not all facts in the actual world
affect the truth-value of X-marked conditional. The role of past tense in X-marked
181

conditionals is then to identify the features of the world relevant for similarity
(Arregui 2009).
While I remain agnostic about the exact position of this past tense, I adopt
the dominant view in the literature that past tense is not structurally inside the
antecedent. It can be so low as to only c-command the anchor situation, or so high to
c-command the whole conditional (depending on the theory of tense one adopts).
What matters is that its meaning contribution directly affects the value of the anchor
situation, so it has to c-command the anchor situation. In the remainder of this
chapter, I assume the following structure for X-marked conditionals in which past
tense c-command the whole conditional(Ippolito 2003, 2006, 2013; Arregui 2005,
2007, 2009, a.o.).
(304) The structure of X-marked conditionals
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On the face of it, the only difference between X-marked and O-marked conditionals is the temporal specification of their anchor situation. The pastness of the
anchor situation, however, affects the semantics and pragmatics of X-marked conditionals. Unlike present anchor situations coming from the evaluation situation,
they do not invoke the condition that the world of the anchor has to be in the context
set.8 Thus, they have weaker truth conditions, as given below.
8 Past

anchor situations are also responsible for invoking similarity relation in the semantics of
X-marked conditionals (Arregui 2009).
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(305) J(304)Kc,g = λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (s). [∀w(w ∈ f act (s j ) ∩ p → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤
w & Match(s0 , s j ) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)

The question is: Why is there a connection between the temporal specification
of the anchor situation and the condition that the world of the anchor has to be in
the context set (which together with the Prospective Contextual Modal Restrictions
results in the condition that the antecedent has to be compatible with the factive
context set). Although I admit that this is to a degree stipulative, I believe that
the Anchor Semantics framework provides us with necessary tools to be able to
better motivate the pragmatic constraint often assumed on O-marked conditionals
(Stalnaker 1975; von Fintel 1998; Mackay 2019a). Note that the condition is invoked
when the conditional is not embedded under a past tense, and thus the value of
anchor situation is identical to the evaluation situation (Modal Anchor Impact). We
can assume that in unembedded cases the anchor situation is the maximal evaluation
situation (world of evaluation). Factual Domain Projection requires all worlds that
maximally match the actual world to be considered. The initial domain of modals,
therefore, will be all worlds that are in the factive context set. In contrast, past
tense in X-marked conditionals indicates that the value of anchor situation is a past
situation which by definition is not a maximal situation. This will invoke a local
notion of similarity, where only certain facts in the actual world matter and the rest
do not matter (Arregui 2009). I will, however, continue to simply stipulate that
O-marked conditionals come with the condition that the world of the anchor has
to be in the context set and leave it a subject for future research to systematically
motivate this constraint.
Do O-marked conditionals also have a present tense c-commanding the anchor
situation and specifying its temporal location (as illustrated in (306))? or do they
lack a higher tense and the anchor situation simply takes its temporal specification
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from the situation of utterance? These are empirical questions on which there is no
consensus (See discussion in (Abusch 1997; Condoravdi 2001; Mackay 2019a)).
(306) An option for the structure of O-marked conditionals
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Note that the result for the temporal location of the anchor situation will be the
same. Since the only thing that is important to my analysis is for the anchor situation of O-marked conditionals to be a present situation, and both options (having a
present tense scoping over O-marked conditionals or not) produce the same result
in this regard, I will set this issue aside in the rest of this dissertation.
Let us summarize the relation between the temporal specification of the anchor
situation and restrictions on the domain of quantification. When the anchor situation of modals is a present situation, the context set is required to include the world
of anchor. Together with the Prospective Contextual Modal Restrictions, given in
(277), this amounts to saying that the antecedent has to be compatible with the
information of factive context set. When the anchor situation of modals is a past
situation, there is no such constraint. This renders weaker truth conditions for Xmarked conditionals.

Time of anchor & the domain of quantification
(307)

a. Present anchor: ws ∈ C
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b. Past anchor: None

Let me illustrate the effect of having a past anchor situation with the example
(308) from Arregui (2009). Suppose (308) is asserted by Ana, who has two cats
at home. Suppose further that Ana has a friend called Sara who is very allergic to
cats.
(308) If Sara had visited my house last Monday, she would have sneezed.
First we need to know the value of the anchor situation. The conditional is not
embedded, so the anchor situation should come from the evaluation situation of the
conditional. Given the contribution of the past tense, it should be a past situation
which is part of the history of the actual world. A plausible anchor s j is a past
temporal slice of Sara’s actual state of body. The domain projected from s j would
then be the set of worlds that have exact matches of this past temporal slice of Sara’s
actual state of body. The projected domain from this anchor has worlds in which
Sara sneezed and worlds in which she didn’t. Sara’s allergy doesn’t make her sneeze
all the time. Therefore, the Diversity Condition is satisfied. Ana conveys that Sara’s
actual state of body doesn’t completely rule out the possibility of Sara not sneezing.
The if-clause conveys that she is ignoring the possibility that Sara didn’t come to
her house. The truth-conditions of (308) is given in (309).
(309) J If Sara had visited my house last Monday, she would have sneezed. Kc,g =
λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (s). [∀w(w ∈ f act (s j ) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w.

Sara has visited my house last Monday (s000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w
& Match(s0 , s j ) & R(s00 , s0 ) & Sara has sneezed (s00 )](s)

The truth-conditions in (309) state that in all the worlds that contain an exact
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match of the past temporal slice of Sara’s actual state of body, and once the possibility of her not going to Ana’s house is eliminated, the counterpart situation of the
past temporal slice of Sara’s actual state of body is linked to situations where Sara
has sneezed, with a suitable R relation.
But when we discussed O-marked conditionals, we said that we can’t ignore just
any possibilities, and that the modal restrictions have to come from the prospective
common ground. Are we in trouble if it is already presupposed in the common
ground that Sara didn’t go to Ana’s house last Monday? No, this is where the
pastness of the anchor situation plays its role. All it takes for an X-marked conditional to be true is for the restriction to completely exclude all worlds in which
the consequent is false.
To see how this difference between O-marked and X-marked conditionals plays
out, consider the famous Oswald-Kennedy contrasts where the O-marked conditional (310a) is judged true, and the X-marked (310b) is false.
(310)

a. If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.

(O-marked)

b. If Oswald hadn’t kill Kennedy, someone else would have. (X-marked)
The anchor situation for the O-marked conditional (310a) has to come from
the evaluation situation, thus has to be a present situation. Let us take the actual
situation of police’s investigating Kennedy’s murder in the present as the anchor
situation. The domain projected from this anchor has worlds in which Kennedy’s
murderer is Oswald and world’s in which Kennedy’s murderer is some one else.
Therefore, the Diversity Condition is satisfied. Given that it is common ground that
Kennedy is dead, all of the worlds in the prospective factive common ground are
worlds in which Kennedy has been murdered. The if-clause restriction excludes
all the worlds in which Oswald killed Kennedy. Therefore, the conditional claim is
true.
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Now let us consider the X-marked conditional in (310b), which comes with the
past temporal constraint on the value of the anchor situation. Assume that the anchor situation is the actual past situation of Kennedy’s having enemies. The domain
projected from this anchor satisfies the Diversity Condition, as there will be world
in the domain where the consequent is true, and world in which it is false. The
claim is that once the possibility of Oswald being Kennedy’s murderer is ignored,
all the remaining worlds are worlds in which Kennedy is killed by someone other
than Kennedy. This is false because this restriction alone cannot exclude all of the
worlds in which the consequent is false. However, worlds in which Kennedy wasn’t
murdered at all are not necessarily excluded by the if-clause restriction. Therefore,
(310b) is false.
Let me illustrate the difference between O-marked and X-marked conditionals
with another example. Consider the contrast given in (311).
(311) It is not snowing in Boston now.
a. #If it is snowing in Boston now, it will be cloudy.

(O-marked)

b. If it was snowing in Boston now, it would be cloudy.

(X-marked)

The truth conditions for the two conditionals are given below. Note that the two
conditionals only differ in the temporal information of their anchor situations.
(312)

a. O-marked
J If it is snowing in Boston now, it will be cloudy Kc,g =
λs. [ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s)& ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w.

it is snowing in Boston now (s000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w &
Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & it is cloudy in Boston (s00 )))]
b. X-marked
J If it was snowing in Boston now, it would be cloudy Kc,g =
λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (s). [∀w(w ∈ f act (s j )& ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w.
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it is snowing in Boston now (s000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w &
Match(s0 , s j ) & R(s00 , s0 ) & it is cloudy in Boston (s00 )))](s)
First we need to know the value of the anchor situation for each of these conditionals. Let us start with the O-marked conditional. Since the conditional is not
embedded, the value of its anchor situation comes from the situation of utterance.
A plausible anchor for the O-marked conditional in (311a) can be a present temporal slice of Boston’s actual geographic coordinates. The domain projected from
s0 , would then be the set of possible worlds that have exact matches of the present
temporal slice of Boston’s actual geographic coordinates. The projected domain
from this anchor has worlds where it is cloudy in Boston now, and worlds where
it isn’t. The Diversity Condition is therefore satisfied. The speaker conveys that
Boston’s actual geographic coordinates does not completely rule out the possibility
of sky being non-cloudy. The if-clause conveys that the speaker is ignoring the
possibility that it is not snowing in Boston now. But we have seen that not all
possibilities can be ignored. The restriction should come from the prospective
common ground where the consequent is negotiated. Since the context set has to
include the world of the anchor, and it is not snowing in the world of anchor, the
prospective common ground cannot have snowy worlds in them. Therefore, (311a)
is infelicitous. Moreover, in the absence of other restrictions that can eliminate
non-cloudy worlds, the claim in the consequent cannot be true in the world of
the anchor. (311a) is also predicted to be infelicitous in contexts entailing that
it is not cloudy in Boston now, since the condition that the consequent has to be
true in the world of anchor cannot be satisfied in such cases. Therefore, (311a)
can only be felicitously uttered where both the consequent and the antecedent are
compatible with the common ground at the time of the utterance. I should also note
that in contexts entailing that it is cloudy in Boston now, (311a) is predicted to be
infelicitous. O-marked conditionals require the world of anchor to be in the context
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set. All worlds in the context set are cloudy worlds. Therefore, in such contexts the
Diversity Condition cannot be satisfied irrespective of what anchor we choose.
Now let us consider the X-marked conditional in (311b). The anchor is a past
situation. A plausible anchor can a past temporal slice of Boston’s actual geographic coordinates. The domain projected from s0 , would then be the set of possible worlds that have exact matches of the past temporal slice of Boston’s actual
geographic coordinates. Just like O-marked conditionals, the projected domain
from this anchor has worlds where it is cloudy in Boston now, and worlds where
it isn’t. The Diversity Condition is therefore satisfied. The speaker conveys that
Boston’s actual geographic coordinates does not completely rule out the possibility
of sky being non-cloudy. The if-clause conveys that the speaker is ignoring the
possibility that it is not snowing in Boston now.
In this case, however, whether or not snowy worlds are independently eliminated from the current common ground does not affect the felicity of (311b). Since
the anchor is a past situation, the condition that the context set includes the world
of the anchor is not invoked. (311b) is predicted to be felicitous in contexts entailing
that it is cloudy in Boston now, as long as the if-clause restriction completely rules
out the possibility of the consequent being false.

4.2

Accounting for Farsi and English contrasts

Now that I have laid out my proposal about the semantics and pragmatics of Xmarked conditionals, I can demonstrate how this proposal tackles the complex pattern of X-marking in Farsi and English. I will start with the discussion of antecedent
falsity inference, and then turn to the issue of temporal orientation of antecedents.
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4.2.1

Strength of counterfactuality

My aim here is to account for observations we made earlier about the antecedent
falsity inference associated with X-marked conditionals in English and Farsi. We
have seen that X-marked conditionals in both languages can appear in contexts
where the antecedent is true ((233) in English, and (236) in Farsi). Farsi and
English, however, differ in which environments allow for X-marked conditionals
to be felicitously used without implying the falsity of their antecedent. In Farsi,
this option is limited to the past oriented past imperfective X-marked conditional.
Moreover, there are cases in both English and Farsi where the antecedent falsity
inference is hard to impossible to cancel.

4.2.1.1

English

I start by discussing cases where English X-marked conditionals are used without
implying the falsity of their antecedents. In Section 3.3.2 of Chapter Three, we have
seen three such cases (Future Less Vivid conditionals, modus tollens arguments,
and Anderson-examples). I also explain Stanley Peters’ example where both Omarked and X-marked conditionals are equally felicitous.

Future Less Vivid
Let us start with Future Less Vivid cases. Consider the examples below.
(313)

a. O-marked
If I win the lottery tomorrow, I will buy a house.
b. X-marked
If I won the lottery tomorrow, I would buy a house.

First we need to know the value of the anchor situation for each of these conditionals. Let us start with the O-marked conditional. Since the conditional is not
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embedded, the value of its anchor situation comes from the evaluation situation.
Thus, it is a present situation. We have to pick the anchor situation so that the
domain projected from it satisfies the Diversity Condition. That is, the projected
domain has to have worlds where I will buy a house and worlds where I won’t
buy a house. A plausible such anchor can be a present slice of the actual situation
of me having a particular lottery ticket (either a winning or a losing one). The
projected domain then will be the set of worlds that have an exact match of the
present slice of the actual situation of me having a lottery ticket. The if-clause
conveys that in making the modal claim, I am ignoring the possibility that I won’t
win the lottery. O-marked conditionals require the world of anchor (the actual
world) to be included in the context set. Given that the consequent is a claim about
the future, and that the the truth of the antecedent is still open, the requirement that
the context set includes the world of anchor is not in principle violated. So, (313a)
is predicted to be felicitous. While this prediction is borne out, speakers seem to
prefer its X-marked counterpart in (313b). Why is that? To answer this question,
we should first see why (313b) is felicitous.
The anchor for the X-marked conditional has to be a past temporal slice of an
actual situation in the history of the evaluation situation. Let us assume that the
anchor for (313b) is a past temporal slice of the actual situation of me having a
particular lottery ticket. The projected domain then will be the set of worlds that
have an exact match of the past slice of the actual situation of me having a lottery
ticket. The domain projected from this domain satisfies the Diversity Condition, as
it includes worlds where I will buy a house and worlds where I won’t buy a house.
The use of a modal claim conveys that the anchor situation does not completely
rule out the possibility of me not buying a house. The if-clause conveys that I am
ignoring the possibility that the I won’t win the lottery. In the case of X-marked
conditionals, all it takes for (313b) to be true is that worlds where I won’t buy a
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house are completely ruled out by ignoring the possibility that the I won’t win the
lottery.
Given that O-marked and X-marked conditionals can express the same propositional content, I follow Leahy (2011, 2018) in taking them to be potential contextual equivalents in some contexts, as in (313). As we have said in Section 4.1.3,
O-marked conditionals render stronger truth-conditions because they presuppose
that the world of anchor is the context set whose effect is that the antecedent is
compatible with the information of factive context set. X-marked conditionals presuppose nothing. Like Leahy (2011, 2018), we can derive the antecedent falsity
(unlikelihood) implicature associated with X-marked conditionals from the Principle of Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991).
(314) Maximize Presupposition
If φ and ψ are contextually equivalent alternatives, and the presuppositions
of ψ are stronger than those of φ, and are met in the context of utterance,
one must use ψ in c.
Let us apply Leahy’s insight to the example (313). The O-marked conditional
(313a) and the X-marked conditional (313b) carry the same assertoric information
but the O-marked conditional is a stronger alternative. Assuming that the speaker
obeys the principle of Maximize presupposition, the use of the X-marked conditional implies that the speaker does not believe the stronger alternative is true; thus,
we infer that the speaker believes that the antecedent is likely to be false.

Modus tollens arguments
Now consider the contrast in the felicity of O-marked and X-marked conditionals
in the modus tollens argument (Stalnaker 1975), given in (315).
(315) The knife was clean.
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a. But if the butler had done it, we would have found blood on the kitchen
(X-marked)

knife.

b. # But if the butler did it, we found blood on the kitchen knife.
(O-marked)
Therefore, the butler did not do it.
The anchor situation for O-marked conditionals is a present temporal slice of
an actual situation part of the evaluation situation. The anchor situation should be
chosen in a way that the Diversity Condition will be satisfied. That is, the projected
domain should have both worlds where we found blood on the knife, and worlds
where we didn’t. Given that the context has made it salient that the knife was clean,
finding a salient situation in the context from which bloody knife worlds project
seem like a challenge, to say the least.9 Even if we assume that such a situation can
be found, since the worlds where we found blood on the knife are already excluded
from the context, there can’t be any prospective factive common ground in which
the consequent is true. Thus, the O-marked conditional is correctly predicted to be
infelicitous.
The anchor for X-marked conditionals, on the other hand, is a past situation. A
plausible anchor can be a past temporal slice of the actual murder situation. The
domain projected from this anchor would then be the set of possible worlds that
have exact matches of the past temporal slice of the actual murder situation. This
domain satisfies the Diversity Condition as there would be worlds in which we
found blood on the knife, and worlds where we didn’t. All it takes for (315a) to
be true, is for the if-clause restriction to completely rule out worlds in which the
consequent is false. Assuming that interlocutors agree that the butler couldn’t have
had time to clean the knife after the murder, the conditional claim can be accepted
9 von

Fintel (1998) also explains the infelicity of O-marked conditionals in modus tollens arguments in terms of violation of consequent variety which is the equivalent of the Diversity Condition.
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to be true.

Anderson-examples
Similar reasoning is behind the contrast in the felicity of O-marked and X-marked
conditionals in Anderson-example, given below. Stalnaker (1975) notes that the
O-marked conditional in (316b) cannot be used to reason for the truth of the antecedent.
(316)

a. If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly the symptoms that he does in fact show.

(X-marked)

b. #If Jones took arsenic, he shows just exactly the symptoms that he does
(O-marked)

in fact show.

The anchor for O-marked conditionals is a present slice of an actual situation
that is part of the evaluation situation. The anchor should be chosen in such a
way that the Diversity Condition is satisfied. That is, the projected domain from
the anchor has to include worlds in which Jones shows his current symptoms, and
worlds where he shows different or no symptoms. Similar to what we said about
the modus tollens case in the previous section, since Jones’ current symptoms are
salient in the context, it is not possible to find an anchor situation that satisfies the
Diversity, which is why (316b) is infelicitous.
The anchor situation of the X-marked conditional has to be a past situation. Let
us take as the anchor a past temporal slice of Jones’ actual state of the body. The
domain projected from this anchor would then be the set of possible worlds that
have exact matches of the past temporal slice of Jones’ actual state of the body.
This domain satisfies the Diversity Condition as there would be worlds in which
Jones shows his current symptoms, and worlds where he shows different or no
symptoms. The current context that entails his current symptoms does not affect
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the projected domain from a past situation. All it takes for the X-marked conditional
(316) to be true, is for the if-clause restriction to completely rule out worlds in which
he shows different or no symptoms. Assuming that interlocutors agree that taking
arsenic can only lead to the symptoms under discussion, the X-marked conditional
(316) can be accepted to be true.

Stanley Peters’ example
Lastly, let us take into account Stanley Peters’ example in (233), repeated here in
(317), where both O-marked and X-marked conditionals are equally felicitous.
(317) X: Kennedy was shot by a lone gunman.
Y: Kennedy was shot by two gunmen.
Z: Look guys. You gotta admit this.
a. If two gunmen had shot Kennedy, then two guns would have been found.
(X-marked)

So, let’s find out...

b. If two gunmen shot Kennedy, then two guns must have been found. So,
(O-marked)

let’s find out...

(von Fintel 1998)
First we need to know the value of the anchor situation for each of these conditionals. A plausible anchor for the O-marked conditional is a present slice of Z’s
actual process of reasoning as it relates Kennedy’s death. The domain projected
from this anchor will be worlds that have an exact match of the present slice of
Z’s actual process of reasoning. This domain does in fact satisfy the Diversity
Condition, as there are worlds in the domain where two guns have been found, and
worlds where two guns have not been found. Z conveys that their own process of
reasoning does not completely rule out the falsity of the consequent. The if-clause
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conveys that he is ignoring possibilities other than the possibility of two gunmen
shooting Kennedy.
We know the mere act of asserting a propositions does not automatically update
the context set, but it has to be negotiated first. In the scenario described in (317),
none of X’s and Y’s assertions has been accepted by all interlocutors. Therefore,
the context does not independently rule out any subsets of the worlds in the domain. The conditional claim is that the consequent is true in all the worlds in
the prospective factive common ground where the if-clause is true. Therefore, Z’s
statement can be judged true, depending on whether or not the interlocutors agree
that ignoring the possibility of Kennedy not being shot by the two gunmen will
completely rule out the possibility of not finding two guns.
The anchor for the X-marked conditional is a past situation. A plausible anchor can be a past temporal slice of Kennedy’s actual murder scene. The projected
domain from this anchor satisfies the Diversity Condition. If the restriction in the
if-clause can completely exclude worlds in which two guns have not been found,
the conditional claim can be true.

4.2.1.2

Farsi

Having demonstrated how our proposal accounts for the distribution of X-marked
conditionals in English, I will turn to explaining the Farsi facts introduced in the
previous chapters.
The first point I want to establish is that X-marked conditionals in Farsi carry a
deictic tense in their antecedent whose role is to specify the temporal location of the
antecedent. My first argument for this view comes from the settledness presupposition. We have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals pattern with present tense Omarked conditionals in the presuppositions of their antecedent. The morphological
appearance of the imperfective marker in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals
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provides further evidence for the existence of deictic tense within the antecedent.
We have seen that the imperfective aspect in Farsi has two morphological representations whose distribution depends on the presence and the absence of deictic tense.
In X-marked conditionals, the deictic tense variant of the imperfective morpheme
mi- is used. Therefore, I take (318) to be the structure of X-marked conditionals in
Farsi ( I will provide more arguments for this choice in the next section where I
discuss the typology).
(318) The structure of Farsi X-marked conditionals
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Given that Farsi X-marked conditionals have a deictic tense in their antecedent,
they also come with the presupposition that the proposition is settled in the projected common ground. As I mentioned earlier, settledness is a presupposition
of deictic tenses. However, since past tense does not appear in the antecedent of
any Farsi conditionals to specify the temporal location of the antecedent, we only
see it with present tense. Putting together the truth conditions of O-marked and
X-marked conditionals, with the presupposition of the deictic and zero tenses in
Farsi, we will have the followings (I put aside the contribution of aspect for the
moment):
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(319) Zero tense O-marked (hypothetical)
J[λs [[[ s] [TP [T ∅] [ p]]] [TP

q]]] Kc,g =

λs. [ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. p(s000 )

→ ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))]
is felicitous if
Cs ∩ r 6= Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is the actual context set
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte baš-ad,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.∅.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
(320) Present tense O-marked (factual)
J [λs [[[ s] [TP [T pres] [

p]]] [TP

q]]] Kc,g =

λs. [ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. p(s000 )

→ ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))]
felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context set
(CsF ) or the actual context set
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte ast,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pres.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro košte ast.
another-indf him ra kill.pp aux.pres.3sg
‘If Oswald didn’t kill Kennedy, someone else did.’
(321) X-marked
J[pastk [λs j [[ s j ] [TP [T pres] [ p]]][TP q]]]Kc,g =

λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (s). [∀w(w ∈ f act (s j ) & ∃s000 . s000 ≤ w. p(s000 )

→ ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s j ) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)
felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context set
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(CsF ) or the actual context set
a. Agar Oswald Kennedy ro na-košte bud,
kas-e
if
Oswald Kennedy ra neg-kill-pp aux.pst.3sg, person-ez
digar-i
ou ro mi-košt.
another-indf him ra impf-kill.pst.3sg
‘If Oswald hadn’t killed Kennedy, someone else would have.’

Future Less Vivid
We have seen that Farsi X-marked conditionals cannot have a Future Less Vivid
interpretation. In a lottery scenario, only a zero tense O-marked conditional is
felicitous.
(322) The result of the DV-lottery will be announced tomorrow.
a. Imperfective X-marked
#agar latary ro mi-bord-am,
green card mi-gereft-am
if lottery ra impf-win-pst-1sg green card impf-get.pst-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
b. Imperfective Zero tense O-marked
agar latary ro be-bar-am,
green card mi-gir-∅-am
if
lottery ra impf-win-∅-1sg green card impf-get.pres-1sg
‘If I won the lottery, I would get a green card.’
Earlier in this section, I have explained why English O-marked conditionals
(313a) are predicted to be felicitous in such contexts. Farsi O-marked conditional
work in the same way, so I will not repeat this. Why are Farsi X-marked conditionals
infelicitous? The reason comes from the presupposition of their antecedent. The
antecedent of X-marked conditionals presuppose that the antecedent proposition
is settled in the projected common ground. But the outcome of the lottery is not
determined yet, and no one has claimed that they know the outcome. The presupposition of the present tense in the antecedent of (322a) is not satisfied, thus it is
infelicitous.
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Modus tollens arguments
The felicity pattern of Farsi O-marked and X-marked conditionals in modus tollens
arguments matches that of their English counterparts, so it is explained in a similar
way.
(323) knife was clean
a. Pluperfect X-marked
agar pishkhedmat in kar ro kar-de bud,
ru-ye chagu xun
if
butler
this work ra do-pp aux.pst.3sg on-ez knife blood
peida šode
bud.
found become.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If the butler had done it, blood would have been found on the knife. ’
b. Zero tense perfect O-marked
#agar pishkhedmat in kar ro kar-de baš-ad, ru-ye chagu xun
if
butler
this work ra do-pp aux.∅.3sg on-ez knife blood
peida šode
ast.
found become.pp aux.pst.3sg
‘If the butler had done it, blood must have been found on the knife. ’
c. #agar pishkhedmat in kar ro kar-de ast,
ru-ye chagu
if
butler
this work ra do-pp aux.pst.3sg on-ez knife
xun peida šode
ast.
blood found become.pp aux.ast.3sg
‘If the butler has done it, blood has been found on the knife. ’
Therefore, the butler did not do it.
The only thing to be added to our explanation for (315) is to show how the settledness presupposition of deictic tense in the antecedent of X-marked is satisfied:
the antecedent proposition has to be settled in the projected common ground. The
conditional claim is that the consequent is true in all the worlds in the domain after
eliminating worlds in which the antecedent is false. Since the context already entails that the consequent is false (knife is clean), the argument is only valid if the falsity of the antecedent is also entailed in the context set. If the context set had worlds
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in which the antecedent is true, the conditional claim in (323a) would be false.
Assuming that the argument is valid, the falsity of antecedent must be entailed
in the context set; thus, the settledness presupposition of the deictic tense in the
antecedent is satisfied. Moreover, as the antecedent is settled in the context set, and
not merely in the projected context set, the zero tense conditional is infelicitous.10
In fact, both zero tense (323b) and present tense (323c) O-marked conditionals
are predicted to be infelicitous in the given context, because the antecedent is not
compatible with the presuppositions of the factive common ground. The present
tense O-marked conditional and the X-marked conditional carry the same assertoric
information but the present tense O-marked conditional is a stronger alternative.
Assuming that the speaker obeys the principle of Maximize presupposition, the use
of the X-marked conditional implies that the speaker does not believe the stronger
alternative is true; thus, we infer that the speaker believes that the antecedent is
false.

Anderson-examples
Now let us consider the Anderson-example in Farsi. We have seen that Farsi pluperfect X-marked conditionals cannot be used to reason for the truth of the antecedent.
Only a perfect zero tense conditional (324b) is compatible with the continuation
”We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles”.
(324)

a. Pluperfect X-marked
#agar bimar sorxak gerefte bud,
daghighan in
if patient measles catch-pp aux.pst.3sg exactly
this
alayem-i
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan
symptoms-indf that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show
mi-daad.
impf-give-pst-3.sg

10 Note

that despite the fact that the truth of consequent is already entailed, the conditional is not
trivial contra Stalnaker (1975)
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‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he
shows now.
b. Zero tense perfect O-marked
agar bimar sorxak gerefte bash-ad, daghighan in
if
patient measles catch-pp aux.∅-3sg exactly
this
alayem-i
ke alan neshan mi-dah-∅-ad
ra neshan
symptoms-indf that now show impf-give-pres-3.sg ra show
mi-dah-∅-ad
impf-give-pres-3.sg
‘If the patient had the measles, he would have shown exactly the symptoms he
shows now.
We conclude, therefore, that the patient has the measles.
The infelicity of the X-marked conditional follows from the fact that the truth of
the antecedent is not settled in the projected context set. Otherwise, the argument
for the truth of the antecedent would be uninformative. The challenge, however,
is to explain why there is a difference between Farsi and English in the felicity of
their O-marked conditionals. von Fintel (1998) provides an illuminating case in
English, which he attributes to Paul Portner, where the O-marked conditional is
judged better than its X-marked counterpart in Anderson type of reasoning.
(325)

a. I will claim that Jones took arsenic. ??If Jones had taken arsenic, he
would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact
show. [So, it is likely that he took arsenic.]
b. Better: I will claim that Jones took arsenic. If Jones took arsenic, he
showed just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. [So, it
is likely that he took arsenic.]

(von Fintel 1998)

This example, I believe, points to an explanation in terms of QUDs, and I offer
a tentative proposal below. In the default mapping of conditionals to discourse,
the antecedent is understood to set up a question under discussion (QUD), which
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the consequent provides an answer to (Haiman 1978; Ebert et al. 2014; Biezma &
Goebel to appear). Thus, it is the consequent that presents at-issue content in a
default mapping. The QUD can be characterized as ‘What is true at the selected
p-worlds?/ what if p?’. The reverse of this mapping is also possible (Von Fintel
2001; Biezma 2011; Arregui & Biezma 2016). In the reverse mapping, the at-issue
content is presented by the proposition in the antecedent. The QUD for the reverse
mapping can be characterized as ‘What are the propositions p such that for all selected
worlds in which p is true, q is true?/ When q?’. The antecedent is understood as an
exhaustive answer to this question. Von Fintel (2001); von Fintel (2009) argues that
this is the reason behind the strengthening interpretation of certain conditionals.
Take the famous example by Geis & Zwicky (1971), for instance. Only with the
reversed mapping, a strengthening interpretation arises.
(326) QUD: Under which conditions will you give me five dollars?
If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars.
If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t give you five dollars.
(327) QUD: How can I earn five dollars?
If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you five dollars.

6

If you don’t mow the lawn, I won’t give you five dollars.

As the context clarifies in (325), this mapping has been reversed here. The
at-issue content is the proposition denoted by the if-clause. The QUD for this
conditional can be paraphrased as ‘When does Jones show the symptoms he shows? or
what explains q? The antecedent is understood to provide an exhaustive answer to
this question. As we expect, they also trigger a strengthening inference that if not
p, not q.
(328) If Jones hadn’t take arsenic, he wouldn’t have shown the symptoms that he
does in fact show.
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He does in fact show the symptoms. Therefore, he took arsenic.
As von Fintel (2009) and Biezma (2011) argue, to obtain the reverse mapping
we need help from context, or from linguistic devices such as focus particles. The
use of zero tense in the antecedent, which signals the truth of the proposition is an
open issue (unsettled), can be taken as a linguistic clue that the reverse mapping
is possible. I propose that in such cases, the anchor should be chosen so that
the projected domain has to satisfy the Diversity Condition with respect to the
antecedent proposition. That is, it should include worlds in which the antecedent
is true and worlds in which the antecedent is false. Given the reverse mapping and
the presence of zero tense in the antecedent of (324b), which requires the context
set to include both p-worlds and ¬ p-worlds, we know that the Diversity Condition
is satisfied. The speaker claims that the remaining worlds after eliminating ¬ pworlds from the projected domain from the anchor, are all worlds in which the
consequent is true. Since O-marked conditionals require the context to include the
actual world (the world of anchor), and the patient does in fact show the symptoms
he shows, the prospective factive common ground entails that consequent is true.
Therefore, (324b) is correctly predicted to be felicitous.

Stanley Peter’s example
The last case we need to explain is Stanley Peters’ case, where only the O-marked
conditional in Farsi is felicitous.
(329) X: Kennedy was shot by a lone gunman.
Y: Kennedy was shot by two gunmen.
Z: Look guys. You gotta admit this.
a. Pluperfect X-marked
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#agar do nafar be Kennedy šellik karde bud-and, do ta tofang
if
two person to Kennedy shoot do.pp aux.pst-3pl, two cl gun
peida šode
bud.
find become.pp aux.pst.3sg
If two gunmen had shot Kennedy, then two guns would have been found.
b. Zero tense perfect O-marked
agar do nafar be Kennedy šellik karde baš-and, do ta tofang
if
two person to Kennedy shoot do.pp aux.∅-3pl, two cl gun
peida šode
ast.
find become.pp aux.pres.3sg
If two gunmen shot Kennedy, then two guns must have been found.
So, let’s find out...
The infelicity of the X-marked conditional is due to the fact that the settledness
presupposition of the deictic tense in the antecedent is not satisfied. The felicity of
the zero tense O-marked conditional is explained in the same way that we explained
317. The only to thing to highlight is that the truth or falsity of the antecedent is
not entailed in the context set, thus the presupposition of zero tense is satisfied.
Note that in the same context, a present tense O-marked conditional is also
infelicitous, as the settledness presupposition of the deictic tense in the antecedent
is not satisfied.
(330) #agar do nafar be Kennedy šellik karde and, do tofang peida šode bud.
if one person to Kennedy shoot do.pp aux.pst-3pl, one cl gun find become.pp
aux.pst.3sg
If two gunmen have shot Kennedy, then two guns have been found.
(330) is felicitous in a context where the speaker only addresses Y (“Z: Look
Y. You gotta admit this.”), signaling that they’re ignoring X’s utterance. With X’s
proposal being dismissed, the projected common ground will only contain Y’s utterance; thus, the settledness presupposition is satisfied. However, (329a) remain
infelicitous in this context as well. The reason is that the continuation “let’s find
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out” indicates that the antecedent is compatible with the presuppositions of the
context. Since both the X-marked and O-marked conditionals express the same
assertoric information and the O-marked conditional is a stronger alternative, the
use of X-marked conditional is banned due to principle of Maximize Presupposition
requires.

Past-oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals
How about cases where Farsi X-marked conditionals do not imply the falsity of
their antecedent?
(331) Context: Aria has borrowed Farshid’s car. He calls Farshid and tells him: It’s foggy
everywhere. There was a turn where...
a. agar shans ne-mi-avar-d-am,
tah-e
darre mi-oft-ad-am.
if
luck neg-impf-bring-pst-1sg bottom-ez valley impf-fall.pst-1sg
‘if I wasn’t lucky, I (with the car) would fall into a valley.’
b. #agar shans na-yavorde bud-am,
,
tah-e
if
luck neg-bring-pp aux-pst-1sg bottom-ez valley
darre
mi-oft-ad-am.
impf-fall.pst-1sg
‘if I hadn’t been lucky, I (with the car) would have fallen into a valley.’
Farshid: Are you really calling so early in the morning to say this?
Aria: well, I wasn’t lucky...
(332) Context: I ask Rodica why she went to the store yesterday and not any other day.
a. (chon)
agar dirooz
mi-raf-t-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday impf-go-pst-1sg, discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I went yesterday, I would get a discount.’
b. *(chon) agar dirooz
rafte bud-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday go-pp aux-pst-1sg discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I had gone yesterday, I would have gotten a discount.’
As (331) and (332) show, such cases seem to be limited to past oriented past
imperfective X-marked conditionals. To answer this question, I have to first explain
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how these conditionals can have a past oriented interpretation. So, I will come back
to this question after I have discussed the temporal orientation of Farsi X-marked
conditionals. The first point to establish about these cases is that their contexts
make it clear that their anchor situations are past situations. In the case of (331),
the anchor situation is the actual past situation of the car on the dangerous turn. In
the case of (332), the anchor situation is the actual past situation of Rodica’s plan
to go to store. Interestingly, (331) can be interpreted as implying the falsity of its
antecedent as Farshid’s response shows. He thought that Aria called just to tell him
he survived a dangerous turn. But Aria’s response clarifies that the antecedent of
(331) is in fact true. Note that (331) is not construed factually, as factual conditionals are infelicitous with first person antecedents (334), unless someone other than
the speaker has suggested that the antecedent proposition is true (334).
(333) #agar shans na-yavarde ∅-am,
tah-e
darre oftade
if
luck neg-bring-pp aux-pres-1sg bottom-ez valley fall.pp
∅-am
aux-pres-1sg
If I haven’t been lucky, I (with the car) have fallen into a valley.
(334) A:You are not really smart.
B: Oh yeah?
agar bahuš n-ist-am,
čera olampiad barande šo-d-am?
if
smart neg-be.pres.1sg why Olympiad winner become-pst.1sg
If I’m not smart, why did I win Olympiad?
Given that the anchor situations in these cases are past situations, the conditionals will be necessarily X-marked. Moreover, building on the proposal presented
in 4.2.1.2 about the existence of present tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals, I will argue that in such cases the present tense in the antecedent is not
interpreted deictically. We have said that settledness is the presupposition of deictic
tenses (the reason we have only seen it with present tense is that for independent
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reasons, past tense in Farsi does not appear in the antecedent of Farsi conditionals).
Therefore, when the present tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditional is
not interpreted deictically, the past oriented imperfective conditional is felicitous
in contexts where settledness is satisfied and in those where it is not.
In sum, I have argued that the strong antecedent falsity of Farsi X-marked conditionals arise from the settledness presupposition of the deictic tense in their antecedent. English X-marked conditionals have a zero tense in their antecedent ( I
will discuss this further in the section about typology ), thus they do not carry a
settledness presupposition. Unlike zero tense in Farsi, however, the English zero
tense does not require the proposition to be unsettled. They simply lack any presupposition (Schlenker 2005).
As discussed in Section 3.3.2.6 of Chapter Three, Ippolito (2003, 2006, 2013)
argue that the future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals also strongly imply
the falsity of their antecedents. In the next section, I will discuss the differences
between future oriented pluperfect and (imperfective) past X-marked conditionals.

4.2.1.3

Pluperfect vs. (imperfective) past

We have observed that both in Farsi and English, there is a contrast in felicity conditions of future oriented pluperfect and (imperfective) past X-marked conditionals.
The details of this contrast, however, are different in Farsi and English. Ippolito
(2003, 2006, 2013) take the difference between the two conditionals to be the number of the past tense morphemes, which affects the strength of counterfactuality.
Arregui (2005, 2007), on the other hand, take the contrast in felicity of the two
conditionals to arise from their aspectual differences. The data is complex and
a proper study of the contrast is outside the scope of this dissertation. While I
cannot propose an analysis of the contrast, I want to bring up some data that points
to a solution in terms of aspectual differences between the two conditionals, as
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proposed by Arregui (2005, 2007).
I have argued that the antecedent falsity inference associated with future oriented pluperfect and past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi are equally
strong11 , and cannot be cancelled. Whether or not the the presuppositions of the
antecedent are satisfied in the context of utterance, in the manner discussed by
Ippolito (2013), does not play a role in the felicity of future oriented pluperfect
and past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi. This was shown in (268),
repeated here as (335).
(335) Mostafa is dead. He loved Larry David. A new season of “Curb Your Enthusiasm”
will be released tomorrow.
a. Past imperfective X-marked
agar Mostafa in film ro mi-did-id,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra impf-see.pst-3sg very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
# agar Mostafa in film ro dide bud, kheili
mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra see.pp
aux.pst-3sg very
impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
What is shared between the felicity conditions of the future oriented pluperfect
conditionals in Farsi and English is that in a scenario where a counterpart of the
situation described by the antecedent has already been realized, a future oriented
pluperfect conditionals can be used. We saw this in (259b) and (269b), repeated
here in (336a) and (336b).
(336) John had chicken pox last year during the summer exam period. It was a disaster.
11 Only

past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals are felicitous in contexts where the
falsity of their antecedent is not settled.

209

a. Bad timing. If he had been sick with chicken pox next summer instead,
it would have been much better.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
Bejash agar tabestan-e ba’d abele morghan gerefte bud,
instead if
summer-ez next pox chicken get-pp aux.pst.3sg
keili behtar bud.
much better be.pst.3sg
‘If he had been sick with chicken pox next summer instead, it would have been
much better.’
The infelicity of (337b) in the scenario described below shows that it is not
enough for a counterpart of the situation described by the antecedent of a future
oriented pluperfect conditional to just have been planned. It has to have already
been realized in the actual world.
(337) Team A has an important game tomorrow. Some of its best players are injured, and
cannot play. They are expected to fully recover in a week.
a. Past imperfective X-marked
Agar Team A hafte-ye dige bazi mi-kard,
mi-bor-d
If
Team A week-ez other play impf-do.pst.3sg impf-win.pst.3esg
If Team A played next week, they would have won.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
#Agar Team A hafte-ye dige bazi karde bud,
If
Team A week-ez other play do.pp aux.pst.3sg
mi-bor-d
impf-win.pst.3esg
If Team A had played next week, they would have won.
In the last chapter, we have seen a problem for Ippolito’s account of the contrast
between future oriented pluperfect and (imperfective) past X-marked conditionals.
Future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals in both English and Farsi show
a similar pattern. As illustrated with English examples (338) and Farsi examples
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(339), pluperfect X-marked conditionals are infelicitous to make a counterfactual
statement about non-existent objects.
(338)

a. If aliens came to earth tomorrow, they would kill us all.
b. #If aliens had come to earth tomorrow, they would have killed us all.

(339)

a. Past imperfective X-marked
agar farda
ye asb-e
šaxdar mi-did-am,
xošhal
if
tomorrow a horse-ez unicorn impf-see-pst-1sg happy
mi-šod-am
impf-become-pst-1sg
If I saw a unicorn tomorrow, I’d be happy.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
# agar farda
ye asb-e
šaxdar dide bud-am,
xošhal
if
tomorrow a horse-ez unicorn see-pp aux-pst-1sg happy
mi-šod-am
impf-become-pst-1sg
#If I had seen a unicorn tomorrow, I would have been happy.

Given the fact that predictions of Ippolito’s two past layers account are not borne
out out in Farsi, and that I have independently argued that aspect in the antecedent
of Farsi X-marked conditionals is real, I am more sympathetic to Arregui’s account
that takes the contrast between future oriented pluperfect and (imperfective) past
X-marked conditionals to arise from their aspectual differences. A further argument in favor of an aspectual account of this contrast comes from the differences between past oriented pluperfect and past imperfective X-marked conditionals. While
antecedents of both pluperfect and past imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi
can describe a past situation, pluperfect X-marked conditionals are felicitous only
when all referential items have a referent at the past situation described by the
antecedent. For instance, since the referential DP this movie doesn’t have a referent
in any past situation where Mostafa was alive, (340b) is infelicitous.
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(340) Mostafa died six years ago. He loved Larry David. Yesterday, we watched the new
season of “Curb Your Enthusiasm” which was just released the same day.
a. Past imperfective X-marked
agar Mostafa in film ro mi-did-id,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra impf-see.pst-3sg very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
# agar Mostafa in film ro dide bud,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra see.pp aux.pst-3sg very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
When this movie refers to a movie that co-existed with Mostafa as in (341b),
both pluperfect and past imperfective X-marked conditionals are felicitous. Note
that past oriented pluperfect X-marked conditionals, unlike future oriented ones,
can be used in contexts where a counterpart of an event described by the antecedent
hasn’t happened.
(341) Mostafa died a year ago. He loved action movies. Yesterday, we watched an old
action movie.
a. Past imperfective X-marked
agar Mostafa in film ro mi-did-id,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra impf-see.pst-3sg very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
agar Mostafa in film ro dide bud,
kheili mi-xand-id
if
Mostafa this film ra see.pp aux.pst-3sg very impf-laugh-pst.3sg
If Mostafa had watched this movie, he would have laughed a lot.
Ippolito’s approach cannot capture the observation that pluperfect and (imperfective) past X-marked conditionals that have the same temporal orientation
(i.e. future in English, past and future in Farsi) show some differences in their
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felicity conditions. I do not aim to propose a full analysis of these contrasts, but
an idea that seems promising to me is to attribute the source of contrasts to the
semantic properties of the perfective aspect embedded under perfect, as Arregui
(2007) proposes. An additional argument in favor of this view comes from the
contrast between perfective and imperfective zero tense conditionals. As mentioned in Chapter Two, the choice of aspect in the antecedent results in semantic
and pragmatic difference between the two conditionals. One such difference is the
felicity of these conditionals in hypothesizing about non-existent object, as in (342).
Similar to the contrast observed between imperfective and pluperfect X-marked
conditionals in (339), the perfective zero tense conditional (342b) cannot be used
to talk abut a non-existent object like unicorn. (342b) implies that unicorns exist
and that there is a real possibility that they enter the room, hence the infelicity.
(342)

a. agar ye asb-e
šaxdar vared-e otagh be-šav-ad,
man farar
if
a horse-ez unicorn enter-ez room impf-become.∅-3sg, I
flee
mi-kon-∅-am
impf-do-pres-1sg
if a unicorn enters the room, I will ran away.
b. #agar ye asb-e
šaxdar vared-e otagh sho-d,
man
if
a horse-ez unicorn enter-ez room become-perf.∅-3sg, I
farar mi-kon-∅-am
flee impf-do-pres-1sg
if a unicorn enters the room, I will ran away.

As discussed earlier, Arregui (2005, 2007) takes the perfective to be deictic.
Since a deictic event pronoun presupposes that the event is true of some spatiotemporal region in the actual world, the felicitous use of a deictic event pronoun requires that this pronoun have a denotation in the actual world. It is also well
known that perfective aspect in modal environments give rise to actuality entailment (Bhatt 1999; Hacquard 2018, a.o.). I have provided arguments that the the perfect form of verbs in Farsi that does not additionally carry an imperfective marker,
embeds a perfective aspect. I leave the proper study of the role of perfective aspect
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in giving rise to the contrasts observed between pluperfect and (imperfective) past
X-marked conditionals in Farsi and English a topic for future research.
With this, I will move on to discussing how our proposal explains the observations we have made about the temporal orientation of antecedents of X-marked
conditionals in Farsi.

4.2.2

Temporal orientation of antecedents

The three types of Farsi conditionals we have discussed have an imperfective and
a perfect version. In the last chapter, I have shown that aspect in the antecedent
of Farsi conditionals puts restrictions on the temporal orientation of antecedents.
Conditionals whose antecedent is marked with imperfective aspect cannot refer to
a past situation unless there is a deictic past tense in the structure of conditionals,
which is only the case with X-marked conditionals. Conditionals with a perfect antecedent cannot describe present situations. My goal in this section is to derive the
temporal orientation of antecedents of Farsi X-marked conditionals compositionally
from the semantic contribution of their tense and aspect.
Let us first start with past-oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals whose
structure is given below.
(343) The structure of imperfective X-marked conditionals
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S
λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ). JSKc,g (s)
past j

S

S
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ModalP

ModalP
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TP
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λs : τ (si/k )  τ (s).∀s0 : s0 ≤ s.JvPK(s0 )

T

AspP
λs.∀s0

presentk/i

: s0 ≤ s.JvPK(s0 )

Asp
Imperfect

vP
JvPK

As discussed earlier and shown in (343), antecedents of Farsi X-marked conditionals contain present tense. To refresh our memory, the denotations of present
tense and imperfective aspect are given in (344).
(344)

a. Jpresenti Kc,g =λPhs,ti . λs : τ (si )  τ (s). P(s) = 1.
b. JimperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∀s0 : s0 ≤s & there exists a contextually
salient relation R such that R(s)(s0 ). P(s0 ) = 1

Putting these two together, the denotation of the antecedent of past imperfective
X-marked conditionals will be (345).
(345) J [tP Presenti [aspP Imperfective [vP P] ] ] Kc,g = λs : τ (si )  τ (s) ∀s0 :
s0 ≤ s. JvPK(s0 ) = 1

The denotation in (345) states that the situation s described by the antecedent is
a homogeneous situation (that is P is true in all of its subsituation), and it overlaps
with or follows the minimal temporal slice of the contextually salient situation si .
As discussed in Section 2.2.1 of Chapter Two, present tense in Farsi is shiftable (i.e.
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it is not always deictic). It can be interpreted relative to a situation variable si whose
value comes from either the global or the local context. When si takes its value
from the global context of the utterance via an assignment function, the antecedent
situation is interpreted as either present or future. What happens when si takes its
value from the local context of the antecedent?
There are two ways to explain the past orientation of past imperfective X-marked
conditionals. First, we can assume, following Arregui (2009), that both anchor
situation and the present tense in the antecedent are in the scope of a binder.
(346)

[Past j [ λsk [[[ sk ][ if .... presk .... ]] [ q ]]]]

In this case, the antecedent situation is presupposed to overlap with/follow the
minimal temporal slice of sk , which is a past situation; thus, the antecedent can be
interpreted as referring to a past situation.
Another option is to say that the situation variable si takes its value from the local context. I will not go through the details of local contexts Schlenker (2009), and
methods by which they are computed. Following Mackay (2019b), I just assume
that the local context for a conditional’s antecedent is the set of worlds consistent
with the modal base, here the set of worlds projected from the anchor situation, at
any world in the global context. The value of the situation variable si will be the
anchor situation which is the salient situation in the local context.
The truth conditions of present and future oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals, where the present tense is not bound and is interpreted deictically are
given in (347).
(347) Present/future oriented imperfective X-marked
a. Building the domain
λq. (∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 : τ (si )  τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∀s0000 : s0000 ≤
s000 .JvPKc,g (s0000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) &
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R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 ))))
i. Anchor situation
Jsk Kc,g(k/s) = g(k )
ii. RestrictP
λs : τ (si )  τ (s).∀s0 : s0 ≤ s.JvPKc,g (s0 ); where si is the speech
situation.
b. Consequent
λs. JqKc,g (s)
c. Combining modal, anchor, antecedent and consequent

∀w(w ∈ f act (s) & ∃s000 : τ (si )  τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∀s0000 : s0000 ≤
s000 .p(s0000 )

→ ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))
d. Combining past tense and the conditional
J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presi ] [AspP

[Asp impf] [ p]]]] [TP

q]]]Kc,g is only defined for sk such that τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ) where s j is the

speech situation by default; if defined, J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presi ]
[AspP

[Asp impf] [ p]]]] [TP

q]]]Kc,g =

λs. [∀w(w ∈ f act (sk ) & ∃s000 : τ (si )  τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∀s0000 : s0000 ≤
s000 .p(s0000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , sk )
& R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)
where si is the speech situation
felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context
set (CsF ) or the actual context set
(348) provides the truth conditions of past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals, where the present tense is bound and interpreted relative to the past
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situation sk . Note that past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals do not
carry a settledness presupposition because present tense in the antecedent is not
interpreted deictically. They do not require the proposition to be unsettled either
(that is the presupposition of the morphological zero tense in Farsi). Like English
X-marked conditionals, past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals in Farsi
lack any settledness presupposition.
(348) Past oriented imperfective X-marked
J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presk ] [AspP [Asp impf] [ p]]]] [TP q]]]Kc,g
is only defined for sk such that τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ) where s j is the speech situation by default; if defined, J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presk ] [AspP
[Asp impf] [ p]]]] [TP

q]]]Kc,g =

λs. [∀w(w ∈ f act (sk ) & ∃s000 : τ (sk )  τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∀s0000 : s0000 ≤
s000 .p(s0000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , sk )
& R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)
felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context set
(CsF ) or the actual context set
Now we can answer the question of why past oriented imperfective X-marked
conditionals in Farsi do not always imply the falsity of their antecedent. We saw
this in (332), repeated here in (349a).
(349) Context: I ask Rodica why she went to the store yesterday and not any other day.
a. Imperfective X-marked
(chon)
agar dirooz
mi-raf-t-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday impf-go-pst-1sg, discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I went yesterday, I would get a discount.’
b. Pluperfect X-marked
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*(chon) agar dirooz
rafte bud-am,
taxfif
mi-gereft-am.
(because) if
yesterday go-pp aux-pst-1sg discount impf-get.pst-1sg
‘Because if I had gone yesterday, I would have gotten a discount.’
Given the past orientation of (349a), present tense in the antecedent is not interpreted deictically, and thus (349a) does not carry a settledness presupposition. The
conditional can be felicitously used in contexts where settledness is not satisfied. In
contrast, the pluperfect X-marked conditional in (349b) whose antecedent contains
deictically interpreted present perfect, is not felicitous in such a context.
One might ask why we cannot simply say that the tense specifying the temporal
location of the antecedent of past oriented imperfective X-marked conditionals is
past. There are two problems with this view. First, given that these conditionals have the same morphological representation as present and future oriented
imperfective X-marked conditionals, we would have to stipulate a morphological
mechanism that deletes the past tense in the antecedent. Moreover, we would need
to explain why the same morphological mechanism is absent in English, as the
antecedent of English simple past X-marked conditionals can never have a past
orientation. The second problem with this view is that it mischaracterizes the
typological picture. In the next section, I will show that these readings seem to
only be available in languages that have a shiftable present tense. Finally, I want to
add that since present and future oriented X-marked conditionals contain present
tense and Farsi present tense is shiftable, we expect it to be able to shift in the right
environment. So, irrespective of whether past tense can or cannot appear in the
antecedent of X-marked conditionals, the prediction for shiftable present languages
is that their X-marked conditionals (assuming that their X-marker is past) can also
render past orientation when the antecedent contains present tense.
Now let us look at the pluperfect X-marked conditionals. In Section 2.2.2.2 of
Chapter Two, I have argued that the present perfect is a higher aspect that can
embed a perfective or an imperfective aspect. Given that imperfective aspect has
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a morphological realization in Farsi, we know that a present perfect that does not
carry imperfective marker embeds perfective aspect (e.g. on the basis of the same
aspectual restrictions in both perfective and present perfect with the stative verb
know, and the impossibility of having a generic or habitual reading with a present
perfect that does not additionally carry an imperfective marker). In this chapter,
we have seen that the same holds for the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals. Given that the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals does not
carry an imperfective marker, I take (350) to be the structure of pluperfect X-marked
conditionals, whose antecedent contains present tense and perfect aspect.
(350) The structure of pluperfect X-marked conditionals
S
λs : τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ). JSKc,g (s)
past j

S

S

λsk

(JModalPKc,g (JqKc,g ))
q

ModalP

ModalP
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sk
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Asp
perfective
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The contrast in (351) shows that the verb know which is generally incompatible
with perfect and perfective aspect, cannot appear in the antecedent of pluperfect
X-marked conditionals.
(351)

a. Imperfective X-marked
agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro mi-dunes-t,
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra impf-know-pst-3sg
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’
b. Pluperfect X-marked
*agar Ava dirooz/emrooz/farda
javaab ro daneste
if
Ava yesterday/today/tomorrow answer ra know-pp
bud,
barande-ye mosabeghe mi-šod.
aux-pst-3sg winner-ez competition impf-become.pst-3sg
‘If Ava knew the answer yesterday/today/tomorrow, she would win/have won
the competition.’

(352) shows that counterfactual generic statements cannot be expressed with a
pluperfect X-marked conditional.
(352)

a. Imperfective X-marked
Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt mi-xor-d-and, dandun-ha-šun
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat impf-eat-pst-3pl, tooth-pl-their
saf ne-mi-bud.
flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs ate meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
#Agar dainasur-ha-ye Dracorex gušt xor-de bud-and,
if
dinosaur-pl-ez Dracorex meat eat-pp aux-pst-3pl,
dandun-ha-šun saf ne-mi-bud.
tooth-pl-their flat neg-impf-be-pst-3sg
If Dracorex dinosaurs had eaten meat, their teeth wouldn’t have been flat.
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The denotations of perfect aspect that embeds a prefective aspect, as well as the
denotation of perfective aspect is given in (353) (See Chapter Two).
(353)

a. Jperfect [perfective]Kc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ∃s’: τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s) & ↓P(s’) = 1
b. JperfectiveKc,g = λPhs,ti . λs. ↓P(s) = 1 where ↓ represents minimal
situations.
i. A situation is a minimal situation in which a proposition p is true
iff it has no proper parts in which p is true.

Given the denotation of present tense in (344a), and the denotation of perfect
aspect in (353a), we will have (354) as the denotation of the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals.
(354) J [tP Presenti [aspP Perfect [ aspP Perfective [vP P] ] ] ] Kc,g =
λs : τ (si )  τ (s). ∃s’: τ (s0 ) ≺ τ (s) & ↓ P(s0 ) = 1

According to (354), the antecedent denotes a function with a domain restricted
to situations s that overlap or follow the minimal temporal slice of a contextually
salient situation si , i.e. the speech time. The function is true of a situation s only
if there is a minimal situation s0 exemplifying the proposition described by the
antecedent which precedes the minimal temporal slice of situation s ( which itself overlaps with or follows the speech time). Again, since present tense in Farsi
is shiftable, the value of si can come from either the global or the local context.
When si takes its value deictically from the global context of the utterance via the
assignment function, s can be either a present or future situation. Note that the
result state overlaps or follows the speech time, but the situation exemplifying the
proposition described by the antecedent that precedes it can be in past, present,
or future. The reason the present orientation is not available is that the presence
of perfective aspect, which we have seen is cross-linguistically incompatible with
present oriented interpretations.
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The truth conditions of pluperfect X-marked conditionals, where the present
tense is not bound and is interpreted deictically are given in (355).
(355) Past/future oriented pluperfect X-marked
J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presi ] [AspP [Asp perfect] [AspP [Asp perfective]
[p] ]]]][TP q]]]Kc,g is only defined for sk such that τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ) where s j

is the speech situation by default; if defined, J[past j [λsk [[ s] [TP [T presi ]
[AspP

[Asp perfect] [AspP

[Asp perfective] [p] ]]]][TP

q]]]Kc,g =

λs. [∀w(w ∈ f act (sk ) & ∃s000 : τ (si ) ≺ τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∃s0000 : τ (s0000 ) ≺
τ (s000 ). ↓ p(s0000 )

→ ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , sk ) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)
where si is the speech situation
felicitous if
Cs ∩ r = Cs where r = { p, ¬ p} and Cs is either the projected context set
(CsF ) or the actual context set
Given that present tense in the antecedent can be bound and be interpreted
with respect to the past anchor situation, we expect to find pluperfect conditionals
whose truth conditions are like (356).
(356) Past oriented pluperfect X-marked
J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presk ] [AspP [Asp perfect] [AspP [Asp perfective]
[p] ]]]][TP q]]]Kc,g is only defined for sk such that τ (s j ) ≺ τ (sk ) where s j

is the speech situation by default; if defined, J[past j [λsk [[ sk ] [TP [T presk ]
[AspP

[Asp perfect] [AspP

[Asp perfective] [p] ]]]][TP

q]]]Kc,g =

λs. [∀w(w ∈ f act (sk ) & ∃s000 : τ (sk ) ≺ τ (s000 ) & s000 ≤ w. ∃s0000 : τ (s0000 ) ≺
τ (s000 ). ↓ p(s0000 ) → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , sk )
& R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))](s)
According to (356), the antecedent denotes a function with a domain restricted
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to situations s that overlap or follow the minimal temporal slice of si . The present
tense is bound by the past tense which also specifies the temporal location of the
anchor situation, so si is a past situation. The function is true of a situation s only
if there is a minimal situation s0 exemplifying the proposition described by the
antecedent that precedes the minimal temporal slice of situation s. Since the result
state s is a past situation, the situation preceding it can only be a past situation.
We cannot distinguish between (355) and (356) via the temporal orientation of
these conditionals because pluperfect X-marked conditionals can describe a past
situation in both cases. We expect, however, to find past oriented pluperfect conditionals that do not carry a settledness presupposition, as present tense in their
antecedent is not interpreted deictically. The example (357) shows that we do in fact
find such cases. (357) describes a rule as it held ten years ago, which might or might
not hold at the present. Note that despite the fact that the truth or falsity of the
antecedent is not settled, both the past oriented imperfective X-marked conditional
and the past oriented pluperfect X-marked conditional are felicitous.
(357)

a. Imperfective X-marked
dah sal-e piš
qanoon in tor-i
bud
ke agar
ten year-ez before rule
this case-indf be.pst.3sg that if
danevju-ha dars-ešun ro 5 sale
tamum ne-mi-kard-and,
"
student-pl
studies-their ra 5 in-years finish neg-impf-do.pst-3sg,
exraj mi-šod-and
fired impf-get-pst-3sg
Ten years ago, the rules were such that if students didn’t finish their studies
within 5 years, they would get fired.
b. Pluperfect X-marked
dah sal-e piš
qanoon in tor-i
bud
ke agar
ten year-ez before rule
this case-indf be.pst.3sg that if
danevju-ha dars-ešun ro 5 sale
tamum na-karde bud-and,
"
student-pl
studies-their ra 5 in-years finish neg-do.pp aux.pst-3sg,
exraj mi-šod-and
fired impf-get-pst-3sg
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Ten years ago, the rules were such that if students didn’t finish their studies
within 5 years, they would get fired.
How about the temporal orientation of X-marked conditionals in English? We
have seen that there are two proposals about the temporal orientations of antecedents
of X-marked conditionals. The first approach which is defended by Ippolito (2013)
take the antecedent of simple past X-marked conditionals to contain a present tense,
and the antecedent of pluperfect X-marked conditionals to contain a past tense. We
can explain the differences between Farsi and English regarding the availability
of past orientation for X-marked conditionals that only have one layer of the past
morphology by appealing to the “shiftability” property of the present tense in the
two languages. Since English present tense is not shiftable, it is always interpreted
relative to the evaluation situation provided by the global context of utterance.
The problem with this approach is that it has to assign a denotation to English
present tense in the antecedent of conditionals, which is different from its normal
denotation outside of antecedent conditionals. As we have seen in Chapter Two,
Klein (1992); Giorgi et al. (1997); Pancheva & Von Stechow (2004) argue that there
is cross-linguistic variation in the semantics of the present tense. While present
tense in Farsi can freely refer to future events, the ungrammaticality of the sentences
in (59) shows that English present cannot.
(358)

a. # Fred is sick in 10 days.
b. # It {rains/is raining} next week.

(Pancheva & Von Stechow 2004)

The antecedent of an X-marked conditional that contains an eventive predicate,
however, necessarily gets a future interpretation (See Kaufmann (2005) for a relevant discussion about future interpretation of present tense in conditionals).
(359)

a. If it rains next week, we will cancel our trip.
b. If it rained next week, we would cancel our trip.
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Note that adding the assumption that modals shift the temporal location of
clauses in their scope, as proposed by Enç (1996), would not help either. Given
that the antecedent clause is assumed to carry present tense, for such an analysis
to work we would need to further assume that English present tense is shiftable in
the antecedent of conditionals.
Arregui (2005, 2007) proposes a different approach according to which the antecedent of an X-marked conditional in English contains a zero tense. It is the interaction of aspect and the future orientation of the modal that accounts for the temporal orientations of antecedents. Under Arregui’s approach, X-marked conditionals
in Farsi and English differ in having a present tense or a zero tense antecedents. In
what comes next, I want to show that the typology of X-marking is better explained
under this second approach.

4.3

SoT property and the typology of X-marking

Given that the occurrence of the past tense on the antecedent predicate of X-marked
conditionals is not interpreted as a temporal constraint on the situation denoted by
the antecedent, past tense morphology in X-marked conditionals has been thought
to be fake (Iatridou 2000; Arregui 2009). There are other structures where past
tenses do not contribute their deictic meaning. The sequence of tense (SoT) phenomenon is a well known example of this. The connection between X-marked conditionals and sequence of tense has been alluded to in the linguistics literature on
the topic (Iatridou 2000, 2009; Arregui 2009; Ippolito 2006; Romero 2014; Bjorkman
2015). However, the fact that not all languages that mark X-marking via past tense
morphology exhibit SoT property is taken to be an argument against the view that
takes the two phenomena to be related (Crowley 2022). However, the typological
picture arising with the addition of Farsi data points to a deep connection between
morphological realizations and interpretations of embedded tenses and X-marking.
226

Building on cross-linguistic work on the behavior of embedded tenses, Ogihara
& Sharvit (2012) describe the typology as consisting of two types of languages: (i)
SoT languages where a past under past can receive a simultaneous reading. (ii)
Shiftable Present (non-SoT) languages where a present under past can receive a
past interpretation. There is a huge body of the literature on the complex crosslinguistic pattern of the distribution and interpretation of embedded tense (Abusch
1997; Sharvit 2003; Ogihara 1994; Grønn & Von Stechow 2010, and Kauf & Zeijlstra
(2018), to name a few). Here, I just want to draw attention to relations between the
typology of embedded tenses to that of X-marking.
In a referential theory of tense, SoT phenomenon can be explained with the
notion of zero pronouns Kratzer (1998a) which lack any deictic features, and whose
morphology and interpretation depends on a real deictic pronoun in the structure.
Under this view, in SoT languages an embedded past tense can be the morphological realization of a zero tense pronoun that has taken its morphological features via
agreement with a higher real past tense (Demirdache & Lungu 2008, 2011; Arregui
2009).
As mentioned earlier, (Arregui 2005, 2007, 2009) makes a direct connection
between SoT and X-marking, by proposing that the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in English contains a zero tense pronoun, as shown in (360).
(360) English X-marked conditionals: past [if p-∅i , q]
I have proposed that the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in Farsi contains
a present tense (I have shown that past tense cannot appear in the antecedent of
Farsi conditionals). In Chapter Two, I provided data showing that Farsi is a nonSoT shiftable present language.
(361) Farsi X-marked conditionals: past [if p-pres, q]
This seems to suggest that SoT and non-SoT languages differ in properties of
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tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. While SoT languages have a
zero tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals, in non-SoT languages antecedents of X-marked conditionals carry a present tense.
(362)

a. past [if p-∅i , q]

b. past [if p-pres, q]

SoT

Shiftable present (non-SoT)

This cannot be quite right though. Many languages, SoT (Italian) and non-SoT
(Russian), use a past subjunctive in X-marked conditionals.
(363) Russian
Esli by Džon umira-l,
s
nim
by-l by doktor
if subj John die.impf-pst with he.instr be-pst subj doctor
‘If John were dying, the doctor would be with him.’ Bjorkman & Halpert (2017)
In fact, Iatridou (2000) make the following cross-linguistically robust generalization.
(364) Past Subjunctive Generalization:
In languages that have a paradigm for past subjunctive such as German, the
antecedent of X-marked conditionals appears in past subjunctive.
It should, however, be noted that the subjunctive has been often analyzed as the
morphological realization of zero (or anaphoric) tenses (Ferreira 2017; Pica 1984;
Picallo 1984; Johnson 1985; Landau 2004). As Iatridou (2000) notes, not all languages with a subjunctive have a paradigm for a past subjunctive. Farsi subjunctive
forms, for instance, only show aspectual distinctions, and are unspecified for tense.
This is important because only in languages with a paradigm for past subjunctive
can the morphology in the antecedent of (362a) represent both the past associated
with X-marking (past) and zero tense in the antecedent clause. Thus we can revise
(362) as the following:
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(365)

a. past [if p-∅i , q]

b. past [if p-pres, q]

SoT

Shiftable present (non-SoT)

past subjunctive morphol-

present tense morphology in

ogy in the antecedent

the antecedent

Obviously more cross-linguistic research is needed before making any definitive statement about the typology. However, data from languages whose patterns
of embedded tenses and X-marking have been studied seems to confirm our descriptive generalization in (365). To show this, let me briefly discuss X-marked
conditionals of three non-SoT languages that lack a paradigm for past subjunctive:
Hungarian, Hebrew, and Japanese.
Bringing the data in (366), Bartos (2006) notes that Hungarian is a non-SoT
language whose present tense is shiftable. The present tense on the embedded
verb alszik in (366) indicates that the time of Marie’s sleeping overlaps with the
past event of Peter’s saying (Cowper & Hall 2008).
(366) Péter azt mondta, hogy Mari alszik.
Peter it.acc say.pst.3sg that Marie sleep.pres.3sg
‘Peter said that Marie was asleep.’
Lacking a paradigm for a past subjunctive, Hungarian doesn’t seem to have a
morphological way of realizing the structure in (365a). Instead, Hungarian has a
dedicated X-marker -nA (von Fintel & Iatridou 2020).
(367) Ha János tudná
a választ,
Mari is tudná
a választ.
if János know–na the answer-acc Mari too know–nA the answer-acc
If János knew the answer, Mari would know the answer.
(von Fintel & Iatridou 2020)
Why doesn’t Hungarian use the same strategy as Farsi for X-marking? Although
I am not claiming that I have a good answer to this question, past oriented X-marked
conditionals in Hungarian seem illuminating.
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(368) Ha János tud-ta
vol-na a választ,
Mari is tudta
if János know.pst.3sg be–na the answer-acc Mari too know.pst.3sg
volna a választ.
be–na the answer-acc
‘If János had known the answer, Mari would have known the answer too.’
(von Fintel & Iatridou 2020)
As (368) shows, when past tense morphology is added to the antecedent verb,
the X-marker -nA can no longer attaches to the main predicate. This seems to
suggests that there is a ban against co-occurrence of tense and mood morphology
in Hungarian. What makes Farsi different is that the present tense morpheme in
Farsi is null, and thus there’s a slot for the X-marker past morpheme to be morphologically realized on the verb.
Hebrew represents a non-SoT language that uses two strategies to express Xmarking in conditionals. Like Hungarian, it has a dedicated X-marker if (Nevins
2002; Karawani 2014), as the example (369) from Karawani (2014) shows.
(369) luu yadati, hayiti
ofa
uga
if.cf know.pfv be.pst.1sg bake.ptc.sf cake
‘If I had known, I would have baked a cake.’

(Karawani 2014)

In addition to this strategy, Hebrew also uses its past morphology in X-marked
conditionals. If our typological realization is on the right track, we expect to find the
trace of a shiftable present tense in the antecedent of these conditionals in Hebrew.
The example (370) shows this prediction is borne out.
(370) Pim hayiti
yodaP-at
et ha-mespa
Rim ha-zoXim, hayiti
if be.pst.1sg know.ptc-sf acc the-numbers
the-winning be.pst.1sg
zoXa
b-a-loto.
win.ptc-sf in-the-lottery
If I knew the winning numbers, I would win the lottery.
If I had known the winning numbers, I would have won the lottery.
(Karawani 2014)
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As the English translations show, the conditional statement can be a counterfactual claim about the present or the past, just like Farsi. Karawani (2014) discusses the past orientation of (370) in details, and I will not be able to do justice
to her account here. Given her ambiguous past approach, she cannot attribute the
past-orientation of (370) to the X-marker past which functions as a modal in her
approach. Therefore, she takes hayiti yodaPat to be ambiguous between a past participle and a present participle. In its past orientation, it is a past participle embedded under the past X-marker, where one layer of past is morphologically deleted.
Note, however, that Hebrew is not a SoT language, and thus lacks a tense deletion
rule. Karawani (2014) herself mentions that the form yodaPat, which she calls the
participle form, receives a present tense interpretation in the matrix clause (Doron
2010). It is interpreted according to the rules of sequence of tense in embedded
clauses . That is, it is interpreted either as simultaneous with the matrix predicate,
or with the speech time (Sharvit 2003). Therefore, I take the past orientation of
(370), as further evidence that non-SoT languages can have a shiftable present in
the antecedent of their X-marked conditionals.
Lastly, let us now look at Japanese, another non-SoT language. X-marked conditionals that strongly imply the falsity of their antecedent have a past marker -ta in
the consequent(Ogihara 2008). The antecedent of these conditionals can combine
with one of the fossilized conditional forms -reba and -tara.
(371) Mary-ga asita/kinoo
Mary-nom tomorrow/yesterday
{ku-reba/ki-ta-ra/#ku-ru-to},
kaigi-ni
de-ta daroo.
{come-cond/come-pst-ra/come-pres-to} meeting-loc join-pst modal
‘If Mary had come tomorrow/yesterday, she would have joined.’
(Mizuno & Kaufmann 2018)12
Here, I want to draw attentions to the morphological appearance of -tara which
12 This

is Ogihara’s gloss for ta-ra. Mizuno & Kaufmann (2018) glossed it as cond.
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as Ogihara (2008) glosses, contains the past marker ta. Neither Mizuno & Kaufmann (2018) nor Mizuno & Kaufmann (2018) provide a gloss for ra. However,
this morpheme suspiciously looks like the present morpheme ru. Interestingly,
like what we see in Farsi and Hebrew, the antecedent can have a past or future
orientation (Ogihara 2008). Moreover, Japanese has another fossilized from -ruto
which Ogihara (2008) glosses as a combination of the present tense and an unanalyzed morpheme to. As the example in (371) shows, -ruto is not possible when
a counterfactual reading is intended. Ogihara (2008) gives (372) as a felicitous
example with -ruto (a past oriented O-marked reading). He notes that the use of
-ruto strongly suggests that there were multiple occurrences of Saburo’s coming
here.
(372) (Mosi) Saburo-ga koko-ni ku-ru-to,
Hanako-ga
(if)
Saburo-nom here-to come-pres-to, Hanako-nom
yorokon-da(-daroo)-ne.
be-pleased-perhaps-ending
‘when Saburo came here, Hanako would have been pleased.’

(Ogihara 2008)

It seems plausible to me that ta-ra and ru-to are sequences of the present and
past morphemes whose semantic contribution in conditionals is hard to pin down,
as is the case with the X-marker past. I leave this as a topic of future study.
To sum up, we have seen that non-SoT languages that lack a paradigm for past
subjunctive develop an alternative way for X-marking. Some develop a dedicated
X-marker (Hungarian, Hebrew). Those which use their past morphology for Xmarking either use their shiftable present in the antecedent (Farsi, Hebrew, Japanese?),
or a dedicated marker for the antecedent of conditionals (Japanese). The table
below provides the typological picture emerging out of the analysis.
Cross-linguistic data suggests that the morphological option languages have at
their disposal to represent past tense and zero tense morphology simultaneously
(SoT, past subjunctive morphology) is directly related to the morphology appear232

past subjunctive
3
3
7
7
7
7
7
7

SoT
3
7
3
3
7
7
7
7

dedicated X-marker
7
7
7
7
3
3
7
7

shiftable present
7
3
7
3
3
3
3
3

Language
Italian
Russian
English, French
Modern Greek
Hungarian
Hebrew
Japanese
Farsi

Table 4.1: Typological picture for morphology of X-marking
ing in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. Languages that do not have such
an option (a subset of non-SoT languages) develop other morphological means
in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. A typological prediction we make is
that languages that use deictic tenses in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals,
and whose deictic tenses come with settledness presuppositions exhibit a strong
antecedent falsity inference associated with X-marked conditionals. I leave this as
a topic for future study.
Before ending this section, I also want to highlight that the uniform past approach has a clear advantage over the ambiguous past approach in explaining the
past orientation of antecedents with one layer of past in shiftable present languages.
It is not clear to me how the ambiguous past approach could maintain a temporal
meaning for an X-marker past whose function is supposed to be modal.

4.4

Wishes and Weak necessity

So far, we have only talked about X-marking in conditionals. However, Iatridou
(2000) makes the important cross-linguistic observation that many languages use
the same morphology that appear in X-marked conditionals to talk about unattainable desires. As (373) shows, antecedent X-marking morphology appears on the
complement of wish, and it conveys that the complement is contrary-to-fact.
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(373) I wish that I had a car now.
I do not have a car.
There are languages that also use consequent X-marking morphology on a desire predicate like want to express the meaning of wish, referred to as ‘transparent
wish’ by von Fintel & Iatridou (2020). Spanish is one such language.
(374)

a. Si fuera
más alto sería
un jugador de baloncesto.
If be.3sg.pst.subj more tall be.3sg.cond a player of basketball
If s/he was taller, s/he would be a basketball player.
(X-marked conditionals in Spanish)
b. Querría
que fuera
más alto de lo que es.
Want.3sg.cond that be.3sg.pst.subj more tall than it that be.3sg
I wish s/he was taller than s/he is.
(Transparent wish in Spanish)

Providing data from a wide variety of languages, von Fintel & Iatridou (2020)
conclude that the generalization (375) about the morphological commonality between X-marked conditionals and unattainable desires holds cross-linguistically.
According to this generalization, consequent X-marking morphology appears on
the embedding verb want, and antecedent X-marking morphology appears on the
complement of want.
(375) The Conditional/Desire generalization
a. X-marked conditional: if pant , qcons
b. unattainable desires: I wantcons that pant
Fintel & Iatridou (2008) and von Fintel & Iatridou (2020) show that in addition to X-marked conditionals and unattainable desires, X-marking also appears
with weak necessity modals in many languages. For instance, the strong necessity
modal must in Hungarian can take the X-marker -nA, and express the meaning of
weak necessity. Weak necessity modals like ought to are distinguished from strong
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necessity modals like must and obliged to, by the fact that they are entailed by the
strong necessity claim.
(376) Péter-nek el kell-ene mosogat-ni-a az edény-ek-et, de senki nem
Peter-dat prt must-na was-inf-3sg the dish-pl-acc but noone not
követeli
meg tőlle
require-3sg.subj-3.obj part 3.sg.abl
Peter ought to do the dishes, he is not obliged to.
Without -nA on the strong necessity modal, the sentence will be a contradiction.
(377) #Péter-nek el kell mosogat-ni-a az edény-ek-et, de senki nem
Peter-dat prt must was-inf-3sg the dish-pl-acc but noone not
követeli
meg tőlle
require-3sg.subj-3.obj part 3.sg.abl
Peter has to do the dishes, he is not obliged to.
As von Fintel & Iatridou (2020) discuss, the generalization is too robust to be
accidental. Therefore, any theory about the semantic contribution of X-marking
should cover its uses in all cases where it appears: X-marked conditionals, X-marked
desires, and X-marked necessity modals. They argue that the domain widening
approach (Stalnaker 1968; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020) which takes X-marking to
signal that the domain of quantification goes beyond the default, comes very close
to the meaning contribution of X-marking. The problem, they argue, is how to
derive the domain widening effect from the past tense morphology, a task that
current theories cannot successfully tackle.
Given that X-marking morphology can appear on the complement of desire
predicates like wish, where there is clearly no higher past tense in the structure, von
Fintel & Iatridou (2020) argue that a theory about the role of the past morphology
in X-marking should allow it to be interpreted in an embedded position relative to
the modal that X-marking is associated with.
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4.4.1

Farsi

X-marking does not appear with weak necessity modals in Farsi, but the expression
of unattainable desires is specified by X-marking morphology on the complement
of desire predicates, or on both desire predicates and its complement. There is no
lexical item specific to the expression of unattainable desires in Farsi.
In what follows, I present a brief overview of the expression of unattainable
desires in Farsi. Focusing on the morphology of desire expressions and their complements, I will show that Farsi provides further empirical support for the Conditional/Desire generalization (von Fintel & Iatridou 2020).
Some desire predicates in Farsi can bear X-marking morphology to convey that
the content of the desire is not attainable. Firstly, there is a desire particle kaaš which
can take either zero tense O-marked complements or X-marked ones13 . When the
complement is O-marked as in (378) and (379), the sentence conveys attainable
desires of the speaker. Aspect in the complement clause restricts the temporal
orientation of the content of the desire. O-marked complements with imperfective
aspect describe present and future situations, as shown in (378).
(378)

Imperfective zero tense O-marked complements
a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. You hope Rodica will come.
kaaš be-ay-ad
kaaš impf-come-∅-3sg
I hope she comes.
(attainable desire in the present about a future situation )

13 Expressions of attainable desires are not compatible with present tense O-marked complements.

(i)

Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. You hope Rodica will come.
# kaaš mi-ay-ad
kaaš impf-come-pres-3sg
I hope she comes.
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b. Context: Ava need to answer one more question to win the competition. You
hope Ava knows the answer.
kaaš javab ra be-dan-ad
kaaš answer ra impf-know-∅-3sg
I hope she knows the answer.
(attainable desire in the present about a present situation )
O-marked complements with perfect aspect describe past and future situations,
as shown in (379).
(379) Perfect zero tense O-marked complements
a. Context: You’re entering a party. You hope Rodica is already there.
kaaš umade baš-ad.
kaaš come-pp aux.∅-3sg
I hope she came.
(attainable desire in the present about a past situation )
b. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica is out of town. You hope
Rodica will come back by then to be able to attend the party.
kaaš ta farda
umade baš-ad.
kaaš by tomorrow come-pp aux.∅-3sg
I hope she comes by tomorrow.
(attainable desire in the present about a future situation )
When the complement of kaaš is X-marked, as in (380) and (381a), the sentence
conveys that the speaker believes that their wish did not or will not come true. Xmarked complements of desire predicates show the same temporal orientation as
X-marked conditionals, of particular interest are the past orientation of past imperfective complements and future orientation of pluperfect complements. As the
felicity of (380) in both contexts confirms, an imperfective X-marked complement
can describe past, present and future situations that the speaker wishes for.
(380) Imperfective X-marked complements
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a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she cannot come.You’re
now sad about this.
kaaš mi-am-ad
kaaš impf-come-pst-3sg
I wish she would come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
b. Context: Ava need to answer one more question to win the competition. A new
question is asked but it’s about geography which Ava is not good at.
kaaš javab ra mi-dan-est
kaaš answer ra impf-know-pst.3sg
I wish she knew the answer.
(unattainable desire in the present about a present situation )
c. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come.You’re now sad
about this.
kaaš mi-am-ad
kaaš impf-come-pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
Pluperfect X-marked complements can describe both past and future situations.
As we saw with future oriented pluperfect X-marked conditional, pluperfect Xmarked complements of desire expressions can only get a future oriented interpretation when the situation described by the complement has already been realized, as in (381b). In a context like (381c) where the situation described by the
complement has not already been realized, the pluperfect X-marked complement
is infelicitous.
(381)

Pluperfect X-marked complements
a. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come. You’re now sad
about this.
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kaaš umade bud.
kaaš come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
b. Context: Sam called Sara yesterday. Tomorrow is Sara’s birthday. If Sam had
called Sara tomorrow, it would have been better.
kaaš Sam farda
zang zade bud.
kaaš Sam tomorrow call hit-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish Sam would have called tomorrow.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
c. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she cannot come.You’re
now sad about this.
# kaaš umade bud.
kaaš come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
In addition to desire particle kaaš, Farsi also has a complex predicate (which
roughly means want) for talking about desires. This predicate replicates the same
pattern as kaaš. It can take either (zero tense) O-marked or X-marked complements.
When this predicate takes an O-marked complement, as in (382), it expresses desires of the speaker that are still attainable. As I mentioned earlier, aspect in the
complement clause restricts the temporal orientation of the content of the desire.
Imperfective O-marked complements can describe present and future situations
(382)

Imperfective zero tense O-marked complement
a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. You hope Rodica will come.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
be-ay-ad
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg impf-come.∅-3sg
I’d like her to come.
(attainable desire in the present about a future situation )
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b. Context: Ava need to answer one more question to win the competition. You
hope Ava knows the answer.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
Ava javab ra be-dan-ad
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg Ava answer ra impf-know-∅-3sg
I’d like Ava to know the answer.
(attainable desire in the present about a present situation )
Perfect O-marked complements expresses desires of the speaker about a past or
a future situation.
(383)

Perfect zero tense O-marked complement
a. Context: You’re entering a party. You hope Rodica is already there.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
umade baš-ad.
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg come-pp aux.∅-3sg
I’d like her to have come.
(attainable desire in the present about a past situation )
b. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica is out of town. You hope
Rodica will come back by then to be able to attend the party.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
ta farda
umade baš-ad.
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg by tomorrow come-pp aux.∅-3sg
I’d like to have come by tomorrow.
(attainable desire in the present about a future situation )

With X-marked complements, the desire predicate want expresses unattainable
desires. Imperfective X-marked complements can describe unattainable desires of
the speaker about past, present and future situations, as shown in (384).
(384) Imperfective X-marked complement
a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she cannot come.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
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I wish she would come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
b. Context: Ava needs to answer one more question to win the competition. A
new question is asked but it’s about geography which Ava is not good at.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
javab ra mi-dan-est
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg answer ra impf-know-pst.3sg
I wish she knew the answer.
(unattainable desire in the present about a present situation )
c. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
Pluperfect X-marked complements can describe unattainable desires of the speaker
about past and future situations, as shown in (385a). As noted earlier, the pluperfect X-marked complement can only get a future oriented interpretation when the
situation described by the complement has already been realized, as in (385b), and
it is infelicitous in contexts where the situation described by the complement has
not already been realized, as in (385c).
(385)

a. Pluperfect X-marked complement
Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
umade bud.
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
b. Context: Sam called Sara yesterday. Tomorrow is Sara’s birthday. If Sam had
called Sara tomorrow, it would have been better.
del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
Sam farda
zang zade bud.
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg Sam tomorrow call hit-pp aux.pst-3sg
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I wish Sam would have called tomorrow.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
c. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she cannot come.You’re
now sad about this.
# del-am mi-xah-∅-ad
umade bud.
heart-my impf-want-pres-3sg come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
The same predicate can also carry X-marking morphology, I will refer to this
form as ‘X-marked want’. As the generalization by von Fintel & Iatridou (2020)
predicts, the X-marking morphology is the same morphology appearing in the
consequent of X-marked conditionals (i.e. past imperfective).

The Conditional/Desire generalization in Farsi
(386) Morphology in X-marked Conditional
a. if impf-p-pst, impf-q-pst
b. if p-pp aux-pst, impf-q-pst
(387) Morphology in X-marked desires
a. I impf-want-pst that impf-p-pst
b. I impf-want-pst that p-pp aux-pst

X-marked want in Farsi is ambiguous between a transparent wish expression and
a past imperfective form of this verb, and it can take either zero tense O-marked
complements or X-marked ones. The combinations of this predicate and different complements give rise to a wide range of interpretations. Let us first look at
cases where this predicate takes a zero tense O-marked complement. Although
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judgments about these sentences vary, for most speakers (including myself) the
only reading available is the expression of an attainable desire in the past. That is,
X-marked want with an O-marked complement is interpreted as the past form of
the desire predicate. The infelicity of (388b) and (389b) in the provided contexts
illustrates this point.
(388) past form of want/imperfective zero tense O-marked complement
a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. You first wanted Rodica to come,
but you later had a fight.
del-am mi-xast
be-ay-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come.∅-3sg
I was hoping she would come.
(attainable desire in the past about a future situation )
b. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she could not come.
You’re now sad about this.
#del-am
mi-xast
be-ay-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come.∅-3sg
intended: I wish she came.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
(389) past form of want/ perfect zero tense O-marked complement
a. Context: While you were entering a party yesterday, you were hoping Rodica
was already there.
del-am mi-xast
umade
baš-ad.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg come-pp aux.∅-3sg
I was hoping she had come.
(attainable desire in the past about a past situation )
b. Context: You are in a party. Rodica hasn’t arrived yet. You wish Rodica was
already there.
#del-am mi-xast
umade
baš-ad.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg come-pp aux.∅-3sg
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intended I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the past about a past situation )
Based on the data presented so far, I make the following generalization about
complements of desire expressions in Farsi:

(390) Generalization: Complement of Desire expressions
X-marking (past imperfective or pluperfect morphology) on the complements of desire predicates is necessary for expressing unattainable
desires.

Finally, let us look at cases where the X-marked desire want takes an X-marked
complement. As the data presented so far show, X-marked complements always
convey that the content of desire is not attainable. However, the X-marked predicate
itself is ambiguous. It can either be interpreted as an expression of unattainable
desires in the present ‘transparent wish’, as in (391), or as the past form of the desire
predicate, as in (393). Different readings can arise from the temporal relations between the desire predicate and its complement. When the complement carries imperfective aspect, the content of the desire can be in the past, present or future of the
time of desire. When the X-marked predicate is interpreted as a transparent wish,
the time of desire is present. Imperfective complements describe past, present, or
future situations (391).
(391) transparent wish/ imperfective X-marked complement
a. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she could not come.
You’re now sad about this.
del-am mi-xast
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
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I wish she would come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a future situation )
b. Context: Ava needs to answer one more question to win the competition. A
new question is asked but it’s about geography which Ava is not good at.
del-am mi-xast
javab ra mi-dan-est
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg answer ra impf-know-pst.3sg
I wish she knew the answer.
(unattainable desire in the present about a present situation )
c. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come. You had fun
yesterday. But now you’re sad that she didn’t come.
del-am mi-xast
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
When X-marked want is interpreted as a transparent wish and takes a perfect
complement, the content of the unattainable desire can be a situation in the past of
the time of the desire, as in (392) and (392b). It can also have a future orientation
when the situation described has been already realized, as in (392c). Again, the
pluperfect X-marked complement is infelicitous when the situation described has
not been already realized, as in (392d).
(392) transparent wish/ perfect X-marked complement
a. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come. You’re now sad
about this.
del-am mi-xast
umade bud.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present about a past situation )
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b. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come. You were sad about
this yesterday. You just had a fight with her, and now you’re happy that she
didn’t come.
del-am mi-xast
umade bud.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wished she had come.
(unattainable desire in the past about a past situation )
c. Context: Sam called Sara yesterday. Tomorrow is Sara’s birthday. If Sam had
called Sara tomorrow, it would have been better. Sara to her friend (yesterday
or today):
del-am mi-xast
Sam farda
zang zade bud.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg Sam tomorrow call hit-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wish(ed) Sam would have called tomorrow.
(unattainable desire in the present/past about a future situation )
d. Context: You’re hosting a party tomorrow. Rodica told you she could not come.
You’re now sad about this.
# del-am mi-xast
umade bud.
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg come-pp aux.pst-3sg
I wished she had come.
(unattainable desire in the present/past about a future situation )
When the X-marked predicate is interpreted as the past form of want, and it
takes an X-marked complement, the sentence describes unattainable desires of the
speaker in the past, as in (391). Aspect in the complement restricts the temporal
relation the content of desire can have with respect to the time of desire.
(393) past form of desire want/ imperfective X-marked complement
a. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica told you she couldn’t come.
You were sad about this before the party, but when the party turned out to be a
disaster, and you thought that it was actually good that she didn’t come.
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del-am mi-xast
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
I wished she would come.
(unattainable desire in the past about a future situation )
b. Context: You were watching Ava competing in a trivia game yesterday. Ava
needed to answer one more question to win, the last question was about geography which Ava is not good at.
del-am mi-xast
javab ra mi-dan-est
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg answer ra impf-know-pst.3sg
I wished she knew the answer.
(unattainable desire in the past about a then present situation )
c. Context: You hosted a party yesterday. Rodica didn’t come. You were sad about
this yesterday. You just had a fight with her, and now you’re happy that she
didn’t come.
del-am mi-xast
mi-am-ad
heart-my impf-want.pst.3sg impf-come-pst-3sg
I wished she had come.
(unattainable desire in the past about a past situation )
In sum, the same morphology that appears in X-marked conditionals is necessary in the complement of desire expressions to talk about unattainable desires.
The data from X-marking with desire expression are important to understand the
role of the past in X-marking. The past oriented interpretation of imperfective Xmarked complements provides further evidence that the X-marker past can at the
same contribute a temporal and counterfactual interpretation.
With von Fintel & Iatridou (2020), I conclude that a successful theory about
the semantic contribution of X-marking should provide a unified analysis for its
role in X-marked conditionals, unattainable desire expressions, and weak necessity
modals.
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4.4.2

Explaining wishes and Weak Necessity

In the last part of this chapter, I sketch how the account we have developed so
far could be extended to X-marking in weak necessity modals and wishes. I do
not have a fully articulated theory of weak necessity modals and wishes within
the Anchor Semantics framework that can capture all of their complexities, so my
remarks remain speculative.
Under the proposal in this dissertation, the difference between X-marked and
O-marked comes down to the strength of their truth-conditions. As a past anchor
situation does not invoke the condition that the context set has to include the world
of the anchor situation (which together with the Prospective Contextual Modal
Restrictions results in the condition that the antecedent has to be compatible with
the factive context set), the resulting truth conditions of X-marked conditionals
are weaker than those of O-marked conditionals. Remember the denotation of
strong necessity modals in the Anchor Semantics (Kratzer 2020), which requires
the context set to include the world of the anchor situation (actual world).
(394) Jstrong K =λs. λp : p ∩ C 6= ∅. λq. (ws ∈ C & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ p →

∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 ))))

Given that modal restrictions for strong modals are delivered by the prospective
common ground, the requirement on the context set to include the world of anchor
amounts to saying that both the prejacent and the modal restrictions of strong
necessity modals should be compatible with the factive common ground.
We can assume that weak necessity modals, like X-marked conditionals, specify
that their anchor situation has to be a past situation, as a result of which the restriction that the world of anchor has to be included in the context set is not invoked.
Thus, the prejacent and the modal restrictions of weak necessity modals do not
have to be compatible with the factive common ground.
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(395) Jweak K = λs. λp. λq. ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ p → ∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤
w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))

where s is a past situation
To see how our analysis can capture the occurrence of X-marking in unattainable desires, we need to develop a denotation for desire predicates in the Anchor
Semantics. A proper semantics for desire predicates that takes into account all of
its complexity is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Here, I just want to sketch a
solution that is focused on the difference between O-marked and X-marked desires.
Following von Fintel & Iatridou (2020), I take the meaning of a desire predicate
to roughly convey the following:
(396) An agent x desires q in world w iff all of the worlds in the relevant domain
D that are “best” as far as x in w is concerned are q-worlds,
where the domain of desire ascriptions D is taken to be the set of epistemically accessible worlds for the agent of the desire (Heim 1992; Von Fintel
1999).
The task is to translate this meaning in the Anchor Semantics. To encode the
dependence of the modal on the agent’s epistemic set, I will use Kratzer’s account of
perspectival nature of epistemic modality. ‘Factual Domain Projection creates domains
where each world has an exact match of the modal anchor. Thus, Factual Domain Projection
determines for each world in the modal domain a distinguished part. We can take that part
to be the center of its world. An Anchor Semantics account of epistemic modality delivers
modal domains with centered worlds’(Kratzer 2020:22). Modals can have a wide range
of anchors, among which are ‘epistemicky situations’- ‘individuals having perceptual
experiences, retrieving memories, using whatever equipment to represent the facts they come
across and store the information they have gained’(Kratzer 2020:21).
Inspired by the formalization of epistemicky anchor situations by Kratzer (2020),
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I will take the anchor for desire predicates to be a temporal slice of the agent of the
desire s to which the agent bears the self-identity relation R. The domain projected
will be all worlds with the exact match of the anchor situation, and in which the
counterpart of the agent x bears the same identity relation to matches of the anchor
situation s in their respective world.
(397) JwantO K(s)(p)(q)(x) = Ridentity ( x, s) & ws ∈ Cx & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ pBestx →

∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))

The projected domain has to satisfy the Diversity Condition. That is, it has to
include worlds where q is true and worlds where q is false. The modal restriction p
allows for certain possibilities to be ignored, which in this case are worlds that are
not “best” as far as x is concerned.14 O-marked desires come with a constraint on
the context set representing presuppositions held by x has to include the world of
anchor s. This constraint together with our assumption that modal restrictions are
delivered by the prospective common ground forces both the content of the desire
and the modal restriction to be compatible with the presuppositions held by x in
the common ground. That is, the best worlds cannot be picked from worlds outside
the agent’s epistemically possible worlds. This accounts for Heim’s observation
that (398) is intuitively true despite the fact that in worlds that are compatible with
everything the speaker desires she actually doesn’t teach at all.
(398) I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester.

(Heim 1992:195)

The only difference between O-marked and X-marked desires is that the domain
of X-marked desires projects from a past anchor situation, and thus the world of
anchor does not have to be included in the context set as projected from presuppositions held by x in the common ground.
14 Here,

I have chosen to represent the modal restriction syntactically, just to keep the structure
modals and conditionals unified. My analysis, however, does not depend on this choice.
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(399) JwantX K(past(s))(p)(q)(x) = Ridentity ( x, s) & ∀w(w ∈ f act (s) ∩ pBestx →

∃s0 ∃s00 (s0 ≤ w & s00 ≤ w & Match(s0 , s) & R(s00 , s0 ) & q(s00 )))

where s is a past situation
Let us see how this works with some examples.
(400)

a. Present oriented O-marked complement
#Kaaš qad boland baš-am
Kaaš height tall
be.∅-1sg
I wish I am tall.

intended: unattainable desire

b. Future oriented O-marked complement
Kaaš qad boland be-šav-am
Kaaš height tall
impf-become-∅-1sg
I hope I become tall.

attainable desire

c. Present oriented X-marked complement
Kaaš qad boland bud-am
Kaaš height tall
be.pst-1sg
I wish I was tall.

unattainable desire

A plausible anchor for the desire particle with an O-marked complement can
be a present temporal slice of the agent of the desire, i.e. the speaker to which the
agent bears a self-identity relation. That is, the agent can point to a temporal slice of
hers and say ”that’s me”. The projected domain from this anchor would be worlds
with the exact matches of the present slice of the speaker. The counterpart of the
speaker in each of these worlds bears the same self-identity relation to the match of
the anchor situation (the present temporal slice of the speaker) in their respective
world. The projected domain satisfies the Diversity Condition, as it includes worlds
where the speaker is tall, and worlds where she is not. The domain restriction
rules out worlds that are not best according to the agent of the desire. O-marked
desires come with the constraint that the world of the anchor be in the context
set representing the presuppositions held by the speaker in the common ground.
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Thus, both the content of the desire and the modal restriction should be compatible
with the agent’s epistemic set. This cannot be true in the case of (400c). In the
common ground, the speaker probably presupposes that she is not tall, and this is
not something that can be changed. In a scenario where the speaker is still growing,
an O-marked complement is felicitous, as in (400b).
With an X-marked desire, as in (400c), the anchor situation is a past temporal
slice of the agent of the desire. Everything we have said about O-marked desires
holds. The only difference is that the world of anchor doesn’t have to be included in
the context set representing the presuppositions held by the speaker in the common
ground. Therefore, the modal claim can be true even the speaker presupposes that
she is short, and can no longer grow taller.

4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have presented the main proposal of this dissertation. Based
on new observations from Farsi, I have argued that past tense in X-marking has
a uniform temporal semantics. Following Arregui (2009), I have argued that the
role of the past is to put a temporal constraint on the anchor situation of modals,
and thus has a vital role in determining the quantification domain of X-marked
conditionals. Therefore, the uniform temporal approach keeps the core of the past
as modal approach alive as well. Developing a parallel semantics for O-marked
conditionals, we have a system that formally derives the domain widening associated with X-marking (Stalnaker 1975; von Fintel 1998; von Fintel & Iatridou 2020).
I have accounted for differences between Farsi and English with respect to the
strength of antecedent falsity inference associated with X-marked conditionals and
the temporal orientation of their antecedent by demonstrating that properties of
tense in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in the two languages vary. Languages can be grouped into two main categories based on tense in the antecedent
252

of X-marked conditionals: zero tense languages and present tense languages. I
have argued that the choice between these two options is linked to SoT properties
of languages, putting aside languages that have a paradigm for past subjunctive.
(401)

a. past [if p-∅i , q]

b. past [if p-pres, q]

Past subjunctive, SoT

Shiftable present (non-SoT)
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion

5.1

Summary

Exploring the semantic and pragmatic contribution of tense, aspect and mood morphology occurring in the antecedent of Farsi conditionals, this dissertation has focused on two properties in which X-marked conditionals in Farsi and English (two
languages with the same X-marking strategy) vary: (i) the temporal orientation
of antecedents, and (ii) the strength of antecedent falsity. Such cross-linguistic
variations raise new challenges for mapping the form of X-marked conditionals to
their meaning.
I have argued that the past orientation of X-marked conditionals containing only
one layer of past shows that one layer of the past tense morphology can convey a
temporal past meaning while simultaneously making its contribution to X-marking.
Cross-linguistic data suggest that the availability of such readings in a given language is linked to whether its present tense is shiftable. I have concluded that this
empirical observation necessitates a uniform temporal past approach to the role of
tense in X-marking.
I have then presented an analysis of conditionals in Anchor Semantics (Arregui
2009; Kratzer 2009), according to which there are two tenses in conditional constructions that contribute to the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals: the tense
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of the modal (the temporal specification of the situation variable which modals take
as first argument), and the tense of the antecedent (the temporal specification of the
situation denoted by the antecedent). Although in many languages the information
carried by the two tenses are indistinguishably packed into the temporal morphology in conditional antecedents, Farsi teaches us that they independently contribute
to the semantics and pragmatics of conditionals. The main contribution of this
dissertation is to show how cross-linguistic variations in X-marked conditionals can
be explained by different properties of tense associated with the temporal location
of antecedents, while positing that the semantic contribution of past tense in Xmarked conditionals is the same across languages.
I have provided evidence showing that the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals contains deictic tense which I have independently argued comes with a
settledness presupposition. Due to this settledness presupposition, Farsi conditionals with deictice tenses in their antecedent are only felicitous in contexts where
the truth or falsity of their antecedent is settled in the projected context set (in the
sense of Farkas & Bruce (2010)). Antecedents of English X-marked conditionals do
not carry any presupposition, and thus are felicitous in agnostic contexts.

5.2

Outstanding Issues

The new patterns this study has uncovered have raised a number of open questions.
There are at least two outstanding issues that I wish to acknowledge here.

5.2.1

The role of perfective aspect

In Chapter Three, I provided data showing that aspect maintains its typical semantics in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals. First, I showed that aspectual
restrictions in Farsi that hold outside of conditional environments also hold in the
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antecedent of X-marked conditionals. Second, the presence of imperfective aspect
in the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals is necessary to make counterfactual generic claims.
Providing novel data from Farsi and English, I have also argued that the contrast in felicity conditions of future oriented pluperfect and (imperfective) past Xmarked conditionals cannot be explained in terms of the number of the past tense
morphemes, contra Ippolito (2013). Given the fact that predictions of Ippolito’s
two past layers account are not borne out out in Farsi, and that I have independently
argued that aspect in the antecedent of Farsi X-marked conditionals is real, an account in terms of the aspectual differences of these conditional (Arregui 2005, 2007)
seems more promising. Farsi data support Arregui’s view that the contrast arises
due to the semantic properties of the perfective aspect embedded under perfect.
I have shown that Farsi conditionals whose antecedent contains perfective aspect
(pluperfect X-marked and perfective zero tense conditionals) cannot be used to
talk about non-existent objects. There are also semantic and pragmatic differences
between perfective and imperfective zero tense conditionals in Farsi that are crucial
to understand the role of perfective aspect in conditionals. This is a fascinating
question which I leave as a topic for future research.

5.2.2

Morphosyntax of X-marked conditionals

This dissertation has focused on deriving the semantic and pragmatic differences
between X-marked conditionals in Farsi and English. An issue I have not discussed
in this dissertation is the mechanism by which the past tense associated with specifying the temporal location of the anchor situation morphologically appears in
the antecedent of conditionals. Arregui (2009) explains the appearance of past
tense morphology in the antecedent of English X-marked conditionals in terms of
feature transmission under agreement between the zero tense in the antecedent and
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a higher c-commanding past tense. We have seen, however, the same mechanism
cannot be in play in Farsi X-marked conditionals whose antecedent carries deictic
tense. Given that even in languages lacking a tense deletion rule or past subjunctive
paradigm past tense can still appear in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals,
other mechanisms must be explored to account for the appearance of past tense
morphology in the antecedent of X-marked conditionals in such languages. This is
a topic for future research to elucidate.
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